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ABSTRACT 
 
A REVISED MODEL FOR INFORMED CONSENT IN PREDICTIVE GENETIC 
TESTING 
 
 
 
By 
Jessica Minor 
December 2013 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Gerard Magill 
This dissertation develops a revised model of informed consent for PGT. The 
need for this model arises from distinguishing characteristics of PGT, which make it 
distinctive from other forms of health-related testing. These characteristics are: the 
difficulty in understanding genetic risks and probabilities; the problem of treatment 
options for diagnosed genetic traits; and the concern with family-related genetic 
information. The first chapter explains PGT to identify these characteristics that shape the 
revised model of consent. The second chapter explores the history of consent to identify 
the widely recognized components of consent (understanding, disclosure, and 
voluntariness) that represent the current model. The third chapter explains the revised 
model by aligning the three distinguishing characteristics of PGT with the three widely 
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recognized components in the current model. At the end, the revised model is applied to 
direct-to-consumer and pleiotropic genetic testing.  
To explain the significance of the revised model of consent, the following main 
categories are discussed. First, PGT involves a risk analysis of the related probabilities 
that can be complicated for patients to comprehend. This point develops the importance 
of understanding in the current model. Risk assessment involves calculating probabilities 
to determine the likelihood of developing a disease. To accomplish this, the relation 
between autonomy and comprehension is crucial. The current model uses an approach to 
autonomy that is standardized and generic, focusing on consent by providing a signature 
to accept or reject a test. The revised model enhances patient involvement by adopting a 
more extensive approach, described as a process rather than as an event. Typically the 
current model does not offer a large amount of time to comprehending risk assessments.  
The additional time and complexity involved in comprehending the connection 
between risk and probability has significant implications for patient education by the 
doctor, thereby developing the meaning of the doctor-patient relationship. For example, 
the emergence of the so-called Nocebo Effect needs to be considered here.  
Second, there are complex treatment options, including no treatment for some 
diseases, that require genetic counseling to select an appropriate option. This point 
develops the importance of disclosure in the current model. Typically the current model 
emphasizes appropriate disclosure of information. The revised model takes this further 
and recognizes that this disclosure needs to be accompanied with genetic counseling both 
before and after testing to enhance decision making about a suitable option. Appropriate 
genetic counseling must include patient assessment and feedback mechanisms. 
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Third, PGT involves family-related information with accompanying implications 
that can compromise voluntariness. This third point develops the importance of avoiding 
coercion of both the patient and the patient‘s family when information is presented. The 
third distinctive characteristic of PGT is the relevance of genetic information for the 
patient‘s family. In the current model, family-related coercion is often difficult to 
identify. The revised model ensures voluntary consent by establishing procedures to 
avoid two forms of coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be tested (eg, if 
there is a family genetic trait already known, there can be pressure upon a child to be 
tested to ascertain if s/he is a carrier etc); and pressure upon the family regarding the 
testing outcome (eg, if a trait emerges that affects other siblings, a process needs to be 
undertaken to ascertain whether the sibling wants to know).  
The revised model of consent requires an additional component to the 
traditionally recognized three components (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness): 
the culture of patient safety. That is, the revised model of consent enhances the traditional 
components of consent within a medical culture that emphasizes patient safety. This 
safety culture requires nationally established systems of accountability for PGT that 
implement the revised components of consent in a transparent manner to foster trust in 
the emerging system of genetic-related services.  
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Chapter One: Introduction  
Genetic testing has been used for many years, but recently genetic testing has 
been used not as a diagnostic tool but as predictive measures. Francis Collins, Director of 
the National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health, says 
―virtually every human illness has a hereditary component.‖1 Because of this and the 
technology that has been developed, now everyone is a patient. Neil Sharpe and Ronald 
Carter in their book, Genetic Testing: Care, Consent, and Liability, say that the result of 
this genetic technology is ―more information (accurate or not) from more sources (biased 
or not) available to more patients (receptive or not) every day.‖2 Because of this 
sometimes the actual value and utility of genetic information can be questioned.
3
 The 
article ―Evaluating the Utility of Personal Genomic Information‖ by Morris Foster, John 
Mulvihill, and Richard Sharp states that the evaluation of such testing ―shifts from 
examining the value of asking a specific question about a particular gene for which 
variants are known to examining the value of a vast amount of information that includes 
multiple known variants and variants that are unknown, ambiguous, or have no 
significance.‖4  
Predictive genetic testing (PGT) can have implications on many different aspects 
of a person‘s life whether it‘s medical, social, emotional, or psychological. Many times 
people do not comprehend completely the results and impact the testing will have on 
themselves and their family. One woman illustrates this point further after she received 
the results of a test for the breast cancer mutation, the BRCA gene. She said the 
following: 
I am a carrier of a BRCA2 gene mutation. My genetic status is now as 
much a part of my personal identity as are my age (47 years old), my religion 
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(Jewish), and my educational training (a master‘s in community health). I have 
one sister who won the coin toss and did not inherit the mutation. My husband 
and I have two adult children, a son and a daughter, both of whom intend to learn 
their genetic status some day. Without a doubt, this genetic journey has been not 
only one of the greatest challenges of my life but also one of the loneliest.
5
 
 
While some of the information can be helpful, sometimes the information that is returned 
has no direct value or medical benefit for the patient.
6
 The technology and information 
can be premature, running ahead of treatment options and ethical implications. Neil 
Sharpe and Ronald Carter say that there is an ―unfortunate technological lag between our 
theoretical knowledge of a given genetic disease and our systemic ability to provide 
effective therapy.‖7  
Because the individual has not yet manifested symptoms of a specific disease or 
illness, informed consent should have different regulations and goals for PGT. In 
reference to informed consent, Lewis Vaughn in his book, Bioethics: Principles, Issues, 
and Cases, says ―At the simplest level, the term refers to the action of an autonomous, 
informed person agreeing to submit to medical treatment or experimentation.‖8 Informed 
consent can be viewed as a ―cornerstone for the development of the discipline of 
bioethics,‖ and it is one of the most essential and debated aspects of medicine today.9 
 The next section will give a description of the thesis statement. While the ideals 
and goals for informed consent can be complicated to discuss, implement, and establish 
ethical procedures, this dissertation seeks to address some of those issues by developing a 
revised model of informed consent for PGT.
10
 The need for this model arises from 
distinguishing characteristics of PGT, which make it distinctive from other forms of 
health-related testing. These characteristics are: the difficulty in understanding genetic 
risks and probabilities; the problem of treatment options for diagnosed genetic traits; and 
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the concern with family-related genetic information. The second chapter explains PGT to 
identify these characteristics that shape the revised model of consent. The third chapter 
explores the history of consent to identify the widely recognized components of consent 
(understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) that represent the current model. The 
fourth chapter explains the revised model by aligning the three distinguishing 
characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized components in the current model. 
The fifth chapter applies the revised model to direct-to-consumer and pleiotropic genetic 
testing. The sixth chapter gives a conclusion about the revised model of informed consent 
for PGT. 
To explain the significance of the revised model of consent, the following main 
categories are discussed. First, PGT involves a risk analysis of the related probabilities 
that can be complicated for patients to comprehend. This point develops the importance 
of understanding in the current model. Risk assessment involves calculating probabilities 
to determine the likelihood of developing a disease. To accomplish this, the relation 
between autonomy and comprehension is crucial. The current model uses an approach to 
autonomy that is standardized and generic, focusing on consent by providing a signature 
to accept or reject a test. The revised model enhances patient involvement by adopting a 
more extensive approach, described as a process rather than as an event. Typically the 
current model does not offer a large amount of time to comprehending risk assessments. 
The additional time and complexity involved in comprehending the connection between 
risk and probability has significant implications for patient education by the doctor, 
thereby developing the meaning of the doctor-patient relationship. For example, the 
emergence of the so-called Nocebo Effect needs to be considered here.  
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Second, there are complex treatment options, including no treatment for some 
diseases, that require genetic counseling to select an appropriate option. This point 
develops the importance of disclosure in the current model. Typically the current model 
emphasizes appropriate disclosure of information. The revised model takes this further 
and recognizes that this disclosure needs to be accompanied with genetic counseling both 
before and after testing to enhance decision making about a suitable option. Appropriate 
genetic counseling must include patient assessment and feedback mechanisms. 
Third, PGT involves family-related information with accompanying implications 
that can compromise voluntariness. This third point develops the importance of avoiding 
coercion of both the patient and the patient‘s family when information is presented. The 
third distinctive characteristic of PGT is the relevance of genetic information for the 
patient‘s family. In the current model, family-related coercion is often difficult to 
identify. The revised model ensures voluntary consent by establishing procedures to 
avoid two forms of coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be tested (eg, if 
there is a family genetic trait already known, there can be pressure upon a child to be 
tested to ascertain if s/he is a carrier etc); and pressure upon the family regarding the 
testing outcome (eg, if a trait emerges that affects other siblings, a process needs to be 
undertaken to ascertain whether the sibling wants to know).  
The revised model of consent requires an additional component to the 
traditionally recognized three components (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness): 
the culture of patient safety. That is, the revised model of consent enhances the traditional 
components of consent within a medical culture that emphasizes patient safety. This 
safety culture requires nationally established systems of accountability for PGT that 
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implement the revised components of consent in a transparent manner to foster trust in 
the emerging system of genetic-related services.   
This next section will situate the thesis of the dissertation within the current state 
of the question in the literature. The state of the question exists to explain the 
distinctiveness of this dissertation within the context of the current literature on informed 
consent and predictive genetic testing (PGT). The debate on PGT usually covers the 
science, ethics, and the public‘s understanding of PGT. Ruth Hubbard and R.C. 
Lewontin‘s article, ―Genetic Testing for Disease Predisposition, Pitfalls of Genetic 
Testing,‖ talks about many issues of PGT including genetic determinism, possible 
misunderstandings, and social influences and factors like discrimination. Neil Sharpe and 
Ronald Carter in their book Genetic Testing: Care, Consent, and Liability discuss genetic 
testing in relation to communication, duty of care, family influences, informed consent, 
and confidentiality and discrimination.  
The history of informed consent focuses on a discussion of the background and 
emerging components of informed consent. Both Albert Jonsen‘s book The Birth of 
Bioethics and Tom Beauchamp and James Childress‘ book Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics discuss the history and background of informed consent and address the cases that 
shaped the discussion for medicine and research.  
The debate on the current model of informed consent focuses on three common 
components, understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness. Authors Neil Manson and 
Onora O‘Neill in their book, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, address the issue 
of inadequate understanding of risk predictions, because of misconceptions or not enough 
patient education.
11
 Stephen Wear‘s book Informed Consent and Thomas Goetz‘s book 
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The Decision Tree analyze disclosure and communication. The current model emphasizes 
disclosure for decision making. Elizabeth Chapman‘s article ―Ethical Dilemmas in 
Testing for Late Onset Conditions: Reactions to Testing and Perceived Impact on Other 
Family Members‖ demonstrates genetic testing can have an influence on an entire family. 
Neil Sharpe and Ronald Carter in their book Genetic Testing: Care, Consent, and 
Liability discuss family-related implications of genetic testing.  
The application of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing is analyzed in Daniel 
Farkas and Carol Holland‘s article ―Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Two Sides of 
the Coin.‖ Peter Kraft and David Hunter‘s article ―Genetic Risk Prediction – Are We 
There Yet?‖ looks at the science and background of DTC genetic testing. Cynthia 
Marietta and Amy McGuire‘s article ―Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Is It the 
Practice of Medicine?‖ looks at DTC testing in relation to medical practice and the 
emphasis on medical treatment and the doctor-patient relationship.  
The following articles focus on the current problems of informed consent for 
pleiotropic genetic testing. Ellen Wright Clayton‘s article ―Incidental Findings in 
Genetics Research Using Archived DNA‖ and Elizabeth Chapman‘s article ―Ethical 
Dilemmas in Testing for Late Onset Conditions: Reactions to Testing and Perceived 
Impact on Other Family Members‖ focus on the ethics, background information, and 
disclosure of pleiotropic genetic testing. Zachary Cooper, Robert Nelson, and Lainie 
Ross‘s article ―Informed Consent for Genetic Research Involving Pleiotropic Genes: An 
Empirical Study of ApoE Research‖ focuses on the challenges of pleiotropic testing, 
mainly communication, understanding, and patient safety. 
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While all of these books promote foundational aspects of informed consent, there 
are few books that address specific issues of informed consent that arise from PGT. Some 
books like Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, Genetic Testing: Care, Consent, 
and Liability, and The Decision Tree linked informed consent and genetic testing briefly, 
but did not address PGT. Even though Neil Sharpe and Ronald Carter‘s book Genetic 
Testing: Care, Consent, and Liability develops a genetics model of consent, that model 
does not take into consideration all of the other important factors that can arise from 
PGT. The current model focuses on more of a transactional, event model of consent, and 
does not adequately address the characteristics of PGT which make it distinctive from 
other forms of medical testing. None of the literature has merged the current components 
of consent (understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) and the distinguishing 
characteristics of PGT together in order to form a revised model. Given the setting of the 
literature, the dissertation‘s thesis is distinctive, because it establishes a revised model by 
aligning the three distinguishing characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized 
components in the current model. 
The last section will provide a summary of the chapters. Each of the next sections 
will give a description and synopsis of what the chapters will discuss and analyze within 
the debate on PGT and informed consent.   
A. Chapter 2: Predictive Genetic Testing 
The second chapter explains PGT to identify the distinguishing characteristics of 
PGT that shape the revised model of consent. This chapter will look at the science behind 
PGT, genetic risks and probabilities, treatment options, and family-related genetic 
information. 
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1. Science Behind PGT 
The first part of this chapter looks at the science of PGT. PGT analyzes DNA and 
genetics to identify whether a person will develop or already has an at-risk gene that 
causes them to have a higher or lower than an average risk of developing a specific 
disease. This chapter will look at PGT and the science behind it including issues of new 
genetic technologies and understanding genetic information associated with specific 
diseases. In identifying the distinguishing characteristics of genetics, the chapter will 
highlight the power and limitations of genetic information. 
2. Understanding Genetic Risks and Probabilities  
The second part of the chapter looks at genetic risks and probabilities. Since risk 
predictions are very complex with difficult ideas to convey, genetic tests can result in 
misunderstandings and ambiguous results.
12
 Authors Neil Manson and Onora O‘Neill 
ask, ―How can people give adequate consent to acts that use genetic information if (as is 
acknowledged) they have false beliefs about genetic information or understand it 
poorly?‖13 The authors clearly illustrate the problem of adequate understanding and the 
ethics of consent. In order to have solid informed consent, it is important to increase 
public education on potential choices. One of the questions to address is whether or not 
patients and the public understand genetic risks and probabilities. By combing the science 
and ethics of PGT, this chapter will seek to address possible misunderstands of genetic 
information and PGT risk assessments.  
3. Treatment Options  
The next section will discuss and analyze possible treatment options for genetic 
tests. PGT often has complicated treatment options for diagnosed genetic traits, because 
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sometimes there are no treatments available for certain diseases. As a result, the 
disclosure of possible options is crucial in order to make appropriate decisions for PGT. 
This section will look at the standards of establishing adequate disclosure of treatment 
options for diagnosed genetic traits.
14
 There are three general standards: a reasonable 
physician standard, reasonable patient standard, and a subjective standard. Overall there 
is not a specific formula for knowing how much information a patient needs to be 
informed, but this section addresses disclosure of treatment options for PGT.
15
 
4. Family-Related Genetic Information  
The last section will look at the concern of family-related genetic information. 
Because genetic information can relate to the entire family, often there are problems that 
can arise as a consequence. Possessing genetic information can result in discrimination, 
privacy concerns, a burden of knowledge, and coercion.
16
 Confidentiality and 
discrimination can be a concern with genetics, but since the passing of the Genetic 
Information Non-discriminatory Act (GINA), genetic discrimination has not been as 
problematic. However discrimination can still be an unintended consequence for the 
patient and the patient‘s family and can play a role in informed consent and PGT.  
Often in the case of genetic testing, people cite the problem of the right to know 
versus the right not to know one‘s genetic makeup. Because of the complexity of genetic 
information, there are also family concerns that are raised by the right to know or not to 
know. The foundation of this argument can stem from the debate on genetic 
exceptionalism versus normal medical information. Genetic exceptionalism is the idea 
that genetic information is special, distinctive, and different than other types of medical 
information. Reasons for and against genetic exceptionalism will be presented and 
10 
 
discussed further in this section. This area demonstrates the importance genetic 
information has on consent for the patient and the patient‘s family. As a result 
appropriate measures are needed to ensure the responsibility of genetic information 
especially in areas that can have potential side effects on others.
17
  
B. Chapter 3: History and Components of Informed Consent  
The third chapter explores the history of consent to identify the widely recognized 
components of consent (understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) that represent the 
current model. Informed consent is needed when an ―activity is already subject to ethical, 
legal, and other requirements,‖ because consent is not needed for something you are 
allowed to do already.
18
 This chapter will look at the cases that have shaped informed 
consent in both the medical and research fields and the components of the current model 
of informed consent. 
1. Background of Informed Consent 
The first part of chapter three will look at the background cases of informed 
consent. The beginning of informed consent started with principles that originated around 
1914 with the case of Schloendorff v. society of New York hospital which emphasized 
the idea of autonomy. This case resulted in the idea that people have a right to determine 
what treatment they want. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees 
discussed physician disclosure of information in 1957. Several cases in the 1960s 
developed the ideas and addressed the basic features of informed consent, which include 
the nature and risks of the procedure, alternatives, expected benefits, and conditions of 
consent.
19
 These initial ideas started the consent procedures of today. There were also 
several research cases that resulted in stronger regulations for informed consent such as 
11 
 
the Tuskegee syphilis study, Willowbrook, and Guatemala. These cases all included a 
level of manipulation and/or coercion of vulnerable individuals, inadequate disclosure, 
and a lack of clinical equipoise. In the Tuskegee study, people were treated solely as 
research subjects for information purposes, and the best interests of the individuals were 
not emphasized. The pediatricians in the Willowbrook case conducted research on 
mentally retarded children instead of treating the sick children. With research studies the 
focus changes to information and scientific research instead of clinical treatment; 
research studies also have a different goal and differing standards of consent. The 
Helsinki Declaration differentiates clinical research and nonclinical research, and this 
chapter will analyze the change of focus from research consent to clinical patient consent. 
This paper will adopt both a research subject and patient treatment model of consent for 
PGT. Since PGT can return useful information on diseases and has the opportunity to 
help other researchers, the model of research subject is applicable. While both approaches 
will be used in certain situations, the main focus of PGT for this paper will be on the 
patient treatment model. The rest of this section will further develop the approach for the 
patient treatment and research subject model.
20
 
2. Emergence of Components of Informed Consent 
The last section will look at the emergence of informed consent components 
including the areas of comprehension, disclosure, and voluntariness. This section will 
analyze and discuss the history and major ideas included within each of the components 
of informed consent.  
a. Comprehension  
12 
 
The first major component of informed consent is comprehension. The 
relationship between comprehension and autonomy has continued to emerge through the 
history of informed consent. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress address the 
connection between autonomy and comprehension in Principles of Biomedical Ethics.
21
 
Autonomy is often cited as a major principle of informed consent, because it has had a 
role in the development of many informed consent procedures. Autonomy was seen in the 
Schloendorff case, and this idea was developed into the self-determination of competent 
patients. Informed consent has the potential to help respect individual autonomy, because 
obtaining consent exhibits at least a minimal form of autonomy. In order to have 
comprehension and understanding of information, the patient needs to be presented with 
information about risk information and the physician should encourage patient education. 
Comprehension and autonomy is encouraged by increased patient participation in the 
process. Consent should have an adequate understanding of the information. This section 
will further analyze the development of comprehension within the history of informed 
consent.
22
 
b. Disclosure  
The second main component is disclosure. Disclosure often addresses possible 
treatment and testing options of the current medical diagnosis and medical outlook. Salgo 
v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees in 1957 and several cases in the 
1960s discuss the emergence of physician disclosure of alternatives, risks, and benefits.
23
 
While disclosing all the applicable information is helpful and necessary, disclosure by 
itself does not always encourage appropriate decision-making.
24
 More information does 
not always lead to a better informed consent. Manson and O‘Neill state, ―Signatures, let 
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alone ticks in boxes, may have legal weight, but they lack ethical weight, and often do 
not provide evidentiary weight that genuinely informed consent has been given.‖25 
Informed consent is an ethical ideal where doctors are required to ―tell patients about 
possible medical interventions and to respect their choices regarding them. It is also a 
legal requirement, compelling health care providers to disclose information about 
interventions to patients and obtain their permission before proceeding.‖26 The link 
between disclosure and decision-making is addressed in the Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics.
27
 The specific history of disclosure and genetic counseling will be discussed 
further in relation to informed consent.  
c. Voluntariness  
The last component is voluntariness. Voluntariness of consent is often a major 
principle for genetic testing. The Tuskegee syphilis study, Willowbrook, and Guatemala 
experiments and research all have principles of voluntariness and coercion within them. 
These studies all involve a type of manipulation, coercion, and/or discrimination of 
vulnerable populations. The Willowbrook study raised the issue of voluntariness of 
parents consenting for their children to enter research studies.
 
Often medical testing has 
the ability to coerce and discriminate in order to get people involved in research studies 
or testing trials. When voluntariness of individuals is not emphasized, often the best 
interests of patients are ignored.
28
 The connection between voluntariness is analyzed 
further in the book by Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics.
29
 Also since genetic information can have an impact on the patient and the 
patient‘s family, informed consent needs to take into account the patient and patient‘s 
family concerns, values, and beliefs about genetic testing. Some of the important aspects 
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of informed consent can be family factors and the voluntariness of patients.
30
 People 
should have the ability to consent voluntarily about treatment.
31
 The rest of this section 
will look at cases and illustrations of the voluntariness of informed consent for medical 
and genetic testing.  
C. Chapter 4: Revised Model of Informed Consent 
The fourth chapter explains the revised model by aligning the three distinguishing 
characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized components in the current model. 
This chapter aligns understanding risk probabilities with comprehension, treatment 
options with disclosure, and family-related information with voluntariness. Then the 
revised model adds another component to informed consent, which is patient safety.  
The practice of the current model of informed consent in matters related to 
genetics tends to be more of an event, disclosure model.
32
 The revised model is an 
―ongoing process where patient insight is developed and re-assessed.‖33 To explain the 
significance of the revised model of consent, the following main categories of 
comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and patient safety are discussed. 
1. Comprehension  
First, PGT involves a risk analysis of the related probabilities that can be 
complicated for patients to comprehend. This point develops the importance of 
understanding in the current model. Risk assessment involves calculating probabilities to 
determine the likelihood of developing a disease. To accomplish this, the relation 
between autonomy and comprehension is crucial. Autonomy is emphasized in the current 
model by letting the patient decide whether or not to get tested. The current model uses 
an approach to autonomy that is standardized and generic, focusing on consent by 
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providing a signature to accept or reject a test. The revised model enhances the link 
between risk and understanding. This model enhances patient involvement by adopting a 
more extensive approach, described as a process rather than as an event. This model takes 
into consideration the fact that PGT has risks and values at stake that can only be 
evaluated by the specific patient.
34
 Typically the current model does not offer a large 
amount of time to comprehending risk assessments. The additional time and complexity 
involved in comprehending the connection between risk and probability has significant 
implications for patient education by the doctor, thereby developing the meaning of the 
doctor-patient relationship. For example, the emergence of the so-called Nocebo Effect 
will be considered here. This Effect says that providing patients too much information 
can result in harm when the patients are not able to handle the amount of information 
properly.
35
 
2. Disclosure 
Second, there are complex treatment options, including no treatment for some 
diseases, that require genetic counseling to select an appropriate option. This point 
develops the importance of disclosure in the current model. Typically the current model 
emphasizes appropriate disclosure of information. While patients can be educated about 
the procedure, selecting an appropriate treatment option can be more difficult. Genetic 
counseling can supplement disclosure and help to enhance selection of an appropriate 
option, but it is not required in the current model.
36
 In this model, genetic counseling and 
disclosure for decision-making purposes can be more difficult, since there are limited 
mechanisms in place to assess the patient. The current model also has challenging 
reimbursement policies which make it difficult for genetic counseling to take place. The 
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revised model takes this further and recognizes that this disclosure needs to be 
accompanied with genetic counseling both before and after testing to enhance decision 
making about a suitable option. Appropriate genetic counseling must include patient 
assessment and feedback mechanisms. A couple of feedback mechanisms and patient 
assessments will be discussed and analyzed, including feedback loops, a decision tree, 
linear steps, and nomagrams. Through the use of a decision tree, patients can better 
internalize the risks, benefits, and future impact of their decision in order to facilitate 
appropriate decision making. Also the revised model has more of an emphasis on 
prevention, which can help to facilitate appropriate institutional and reimbursement 
policies for counseling and education.
37
 
3. Voluntariness  
Third, PGT involves family-related information with accompanying implications 
that can compromise voluntariness. Since the results can impact the entire family, there is 
an opportunity for external pressures. This third point develops the importance of 
avoiding coercion of both the patient and the patient‘s family when information is 
presented. The third distinctive characteristic of PGT is the relevance of genetic 
information for the patient‘s family. In the current model, family-related coercion is often 
difficult to identify. Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility by Alfred Tauber 
briefly discusses coercion in the doctor-patient relationship.
38
 The revised model shifts 
the focus from coercion of the patient alone to family-related coercion regarding PGT. 
Often coercion and a lack of voluntary consent can come in many forms, ―some subtle, 
some not so subtle.‖39 Even the subtle forms of negative influences like ostracism and 
peer pressure can arise among anyone applying ―compelling pressure‖ such as the 
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patient‘s family.40 The revised model ensures voluntary consent by establishing 
procedures to avoid two forms of coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be 
tested (eg, if there is a family genetic trait already known, there can be pressure upon a 
child to be tested to ascertain if s/he is a carrier etc); and pressure upon the family 
regarding the testing outcome (eg, if a trait emerges that affects other siblings, a process 
needs to be undertaken to ascertain whether the sibling wants to know).  
4. Patient Safety 
Lastly, the revised model of consent requires an additional component to the 
traditionally recognized three components (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness): 
the culture of patient safety. That is, the revised model of consent enhances the traditional 
components of consent within a medical culture that emphasizes patient safety. This 
safety culture requires nationally established systems of accountability for PGT that 
implement the revised components of consent in a transparent manner to foster trust in 
the emerging system of genetic-related services. In order for this model to implement 
appropriate systems of accountability and transparency, a shift from treatment and 
diagnosis to prevention and early detection needs to occur. This shift will in turn 
emphasize a culture of patient safety in the area of PGT. Programs to ensure 
accountability will look at measures within laboratories and testing clinics to confront 
regulatory challenges that can increase false accountability.
41
 The revised model will 
promote consistent, appropriate institutional policies that ensure enhanced accountability 
measures. The revised model adheres to transparency measures that focus specifically on 
PGT. Trust is developed in the revised model by measures ensuring accountability of 
PGT and transparency in implementation.
42
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D. Chapter 5: Application  
The end of the dissertation applies the revised model of informed consent to both 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) and pleiotropic genetic testing. Each area will give a 
background of the genetic test, and then it will apply the revised model of consent to the 
test. 
1. DTC Genetic Testing 
 The first section looks at DTC genetic testing and applies the revised model to 
this field. The beginning of the chapter will look at the background of testing, and then 
the end of the chapter will apply the revised model to DTC genetic testing.  
a. Background of DTC Genetic Testing  
 DTC genetic testing is a little different than the typical genetic testing, because a 
physician is not required to be involved, and it has both a research subject and patient 
treatment model of consent. Peter Kraft, Ph.D. and David Hunter‘s article, ―Genetic Risk 
Prediction – Are We There Yet?‖ looks at the implications of this testing on patients and 
analyzes whether or not the science behind the testing is adequate. This article argues that 
DTC genetic testing could be a little premature, because the results can easily be 
misunderstood and the research is still in the beginning stages. Cynthia Marietta and Amy 
McGuire‘s article ―Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Is It the Practice of Medicine?‖ 
discusses the question of physician or counselor involvement. The authors suggest that if 
the DTC genetic testing companies are involved in practicing medicine, then physicians 
should be involved. Some of the risks with this type of testing include misinterpretation 
of results and a lack of necessary follow-up.
43
 But advocates say it can help consumers 
feel empowered by knowing their genetic makeup and helping with future treatment 
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plans. Advocates say that once a person knows that he or she is at an increased risk for a 
particular disease, then the person will take precautionary measures such as having more 
screening tests or changing lifestyle habits.
44
  
b. Application of the Revised Model 
 The second part of this section will apply the revised model to DTC genetic 
testing. This section will apply the areas of comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and 
patient safety to DTC genetic testing. Then it will conclude with a case study of DTC 
genetic testing. 
1). Comprehension  
 The fist area of application is comprehension. DTC genetic testing recognizes the 
importance of autonomy and self- determination. Since DTC genetic testing is different 
than some of the other types of testing in that it focuses on a patient and research subject 
model of consent, the application of autonomy can be a little different in this approach. 
This model emphasizes more patient involvement through a process of increased 
education in order to fully understand the risk assessments for DTC genetic testing. The 
doctor-patient relationship is a little different with DTC genetic testing, because often 
there is no direct contact with a physician. Companies encourage discussing the results 
with a physician, but risk assessment discussions are limited with DTC genetic testing. 
The revised model encourages more patient and physician education concerning DTC 
genetic testing risks assessments. 
2). Disclosure  
 The next area for DTC genetic testing is disclosure. The revised model includes 
both medical and non-medical information within the disclosure processes. One 
20 
 
additional area of disclosure with DTC genetic testing should be disclosing the level of 
research the results are based on. In order to establish better predictions, DTC genetic 
testing companies need to have a broad range of samples.
45
 In order to protect against 
unsubstantiated claims, the revised model encourages adopting a research confidence 
rating system to illustrate the difference between preliminary and confirmed research.
46
 
Genetic counseling is needed in the consideration of whether to initiate testing and after 
the testing in order to evaluate the results.
47
 Post-test counseling ensures the patient meets 
to assess the results with either the DTC testing company or the patient‘s personal 
physician. Also genetic counseling should include patient assessment and feedback 
mechanisms. 
3). Voluntariness  
 The third area of application is voluntariness. The voluntary nature of consent is 
crucial in order to ensure a meaningful consent for DTC genetic testing.
48
 Sometimes 
external influences can actually support and benefit a person‘s decision-making by giving 
additional information, but other times external influences exhibit deception, weakened 
choices, and faulty reasoning.
49
 The revised model of informed consent for DTC genetic 
testing seeks to avoid these types of detrimental influences. Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress in the book Principles of Biomedical Ethics says that professionals in the 
healthcare and medical research areas should ―probe for and ensure understanding and 
voluntariness‖ of consent.50 The revised model seeks to avoid coercion of both the patient 
and the family. This model ensures voluntary consent by adhering to procedures that 
decrease pressure by the family for the patient to be tested. The revised model also 
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ensures voluntary consent by adhering to procedures that decrease pressure upon the 
family regarding the testing outcome. 
4). Patient Safety 
Finally, the area of patient safety is applied to DTC genetic testing. Risks from 
false assurances and unreliable results can be minimized by adhering to the patient safety 
component within the revised model for PGT. One article in the Journal of Molecular 
Diagnostics said ―It is the consumer‘s responsibility to exercise caution to avoid 
becoming a victim of marketing ploys that prey on humanity‘s innate curiosity and 
fears.‖51 While ultimately DTC genetic testing is up to the consumer, there should also be 
mechanisms in place to ensure accountability, transparency, and trust in order to promote 
patient safety. DTC genetic testing labs will be required to participate in some type of 
genetics quality assurance program. This can help to ensure accountability, accuracy, and 
validity of materials and results.
52
 The revised model of consent also recognizes and 
emphasizes the significance of transparency in implementation. One company, 23andMe, 
started a star system for ―research confidence rating— with one star for preliminary 
research and four stars for established research.‖53 When consumers see the 
accountability and transparency measures that 23 and Me is starting to take right now, 
there can be a certain level of trust with that company. This section will end with a case 
study on DTC genetic testing and informed consent. 
2. Pleiotropic Genetic Testing 
 The second section of this chapter is pleiotropic genetic testing. This section will 
look at the background of pleiotropic genetic testing, and then apply the revised model of 
informed consent to pleiotropic genetic testing.  
22 
 
a. Background of Pleiotropic Genetic Testing 
 Pleiotropy is where multiple diseases can be expressed from one gene; one 
example is a test for Apolipoprotein E (ApoE), which can give a risk assessment for both 
coronary artery disease (CAD) and Alzheimer‘s disease. Doctors generally run the test to 
find out about the risk of coronary artery disease (CAD), but the results can also show the 
risk of developing Alzheimer‘s disease. Normally the patient has only given consent to 
find out about CAD, but now the doctor has to determine whether or not the patient 
should know the rest of the results. Zachary Cooper, Robert Nelson, and Lainie Ross‘s 
article ―Informed Consent for Genetic Research Involving Pleiotropic Genes: An 
Empirical Study of ApoE Research,‖ concludes that most of the time, informed consent 
for pleiotropic testing is not adequate, because many times the physicians and/or 
investigators have not disclosed what pleiotropy means and the possible consequences of 
the testing. Since there is no significant treatment for Alzheimer‘s disease, knowing a 
person is at risk might make pleiotropic genetic testing more of a problem.
54
 
b. Application of the Revised Model 
 The second part of pleiotropic genetic testing is the application of the revised 
model of informed consent. This part will apply the areas of comprehension, disclosure, 
voluntariness, and patient safety. The end of the chapter will conclude with a case study 
on the revised model of informed consent for pleiotropic genetic testing.  
1). Comprehension  
The first aspect of the revised model is comprehension of risk and probabilities. 
Informed consent for pleiotropic genetic testing cites autonomy as one of the 
foundational principles of testing. The ideas behind autonomy and pleiotropic testing are 
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that patients have the right to decide for themselves whether or not to be tested for the 
pleiotropic gene.
55
 The revised model of consent encourages patient involvement through 
a more extensive process of consent. This model promotes additional conversations and 
education of the patient in order to cultivate comprehension and understanding of the 
patient when thinking about risk assessments. The revised model of consent looks at 
education and communication in order to ensure additional understanding and 
comprehension. 
2). Disclosure  
The second area of application is disclosure. Because PGT has many complex 
treatment options, the revised model requires disclosure and genetic counseling in order 
to select an appropriate option. If the nature of pleiotropic genes were not clearly 
communicated antecedently, disclosure of this type of information can be difficult to 
communicate; patients might not be expecting to hear about additional risks of 
Alzheimer‘s disease.56 Disclosure should focus on what testing means and discuss the 
nature of Alzheimer‘s disease and pleiotropic genes. The pre-test counseling should focus 
on what the information will mean to the patient, since the test returns results for two 
diseases.
57
 The counselor can also ask about disclosure of results; does the patient want to 
know his Alzheimer‘s risk.58 By focusing on genetic counseling and patient feedback 
mechanisms, the revised model should ensure appropriate decision making.   
3). Voluntariness  
The third area of the revised model is voluntariness of family-related information. 
In pleiotropic genetic testing, coercion can arise from family members with strong 
opinions on either wanting or not wanting to know additional at-risk information for 
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possible Alzheimer‘s disease. Also voluntariness can be impacted by the way a doctor or 
relative explains the information or views of pleiotropic genetic testing.‖59 The revised 
model ensures voluntary consent by establishing procedures to avoid two forms of 
coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be tested (eg, if heart disease runs in 
the family, there can be pressure upon a younger individual to be tested in to see if s/he is 
at-risk etc); and pressure upon the family regarding the testing outcome (eg, if the patient 
finds out s/he is at an increased risk for Alzheimer‘s disease, there can be pressure on 
other individuals in the family to get tested for the disease as well).  
4). Patient Safety 
The last part of this chapter is the application of patient safety in the revised 
model of informed consent for pleiotropic genetic testing. The revised model applies 
systems changes in order to increase patient safety and decrease risk for informed consent 
of pleiotropic genetic testing. The revised model seeks to establish accountability 
measures for pleiotropic genetic testing procedures and results.
60
 This model promotes 
accountability by encouraging additional communication between the doctors and 
laboratories performing the tests. Often specific accountability and transparency 
measures are hard to identify in informed consent, but the revised model seeks to enhance 
and clarify those measure for pleiotropic genetic testing.
61
 Transparency can be 
maintained by the doctors and counselors when educating and communicating with the 
patient about pleiotropic testing. When discussing risks and options with patients, doctors 
and counselors should be especially attentive to bringing out the differences of 
pleiotropic genetic testing in order to promote transparency of information and 
procedures. After establishing additional measures, trust is easier to build and maintain in 
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the revised model of informed consent. The end of the section will have a case study on 
informed consent and pleiotropic genetic testing.  
E. Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The last chapter of the dissertation is the conclusion. This paper demonstrates the 
need for a revised approach to consent for PGT. The revised process model should be a 
continual ―process where patient insight is developed and re-assessed‖ instead of the 
bureaucratic interferences.
62
 The revised model of informed consent for PGT tries to 
emphasize and clarify the expectations, goals, and challenges of implementation to 
encourage better medical treatment for individuals. An article in the American 
Psychological Association Ethics Rounds suggests there is a relationship between ethics 
and clinical care. Dr. Stephen Behnke of the American Psychological Association says 
―good ethics can promote good clinical care.‖63 While the informed consent process can 
help improve patient decisions and communication, the consent process will not lead to 
perfect decisions. It can only improve ethical decision-making about proposed treatments 
and testing.
64
 The last chapter will sum up the dissertation and will provide practical 
ways for implementation of the revised model. 
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Chapter Two: Predictive Genetic Testing 
The second chapter gives an introduction to and analysis of predictive genetic 
testing (PGT). This chapter explains PGT to identify the distinguishing characteristics of 
PGT that shape the revised model of consent in future chapters.  
In order to fully understand the distinguishing characteristics, the beginning of the 
chapter will focus on the science of PGT. Having an understanding of the science behind 
this testing will help to elicit and further develop the three distinctive characteristics for 
this and future chapters. This chapter will introduce each of the three characteristics that 
arise from the science of PGT. As a result, this chapter establishes the foundation of the 
analysis for all the subsequent chapters.  
The first part of Chapter 2 focuses on the background and science of PGT in order 
to get a better idea of the technical aspects behind genetic testing. The second part deals 
with the first distinguishing characteristic of PGT, understanding genetic risks and 
probabilities. Because genetic risks and probabilities are typically unique to PGT, this 
section will look at possible misunderstandings that can arise from not fully 
understanding genetic information. The third part looks at treatment options for 
diagnosed genetic traits. PGT can be different from other medical tests in that this testing 
can return results for diseases that have no treatment or preventative measures. This 
section will analyze that fact and identify some possible treatments that might help with 
PGT. The fourth area analyzes family-related genetic information. While some medical 
tests can involve family information, PGT has significant implications for family 
members of the individuals being tested. This section will discuss different styles of 
communication and disclosure of test results, and it will also look at the different 
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concerns of family-related information for genetics. Then this fourth area will analyze the 
ideas of genetic exceptionalism versus normal medical information in regards to family-
related genetic information. The fifth section will conclude with a summary of the 
implications and the distinguishing characteristics of PGT. By identifying the 
distinguishing characteristics of genetics, the chapter will highlight the power and 
limitations of genetic information and testing. The conclusion will bring together all the 
aspects of PGT that can influence the revised model of informed consent.  
A. The Science Behind PGT 
This section will look at PGT and the science behind it including issues of new 
genetic technologies and genetic information associated with specific diseases. Predictive 
genetic testing (PGT) looks at those at risk, the asymptomatic people.
1
 One of the 
differences between PGT and a typical medical diagnostic test is the fact that PGT looks 
at the future while a diagnostic test gives information concerning the present.
2
    
An article by Philip Mitchell, Bettina Meiser, Alex Wilde, et al. defines genetic 
testing as a test ―used to identify a particular genotype (or set of genotypes) for a 
particular disease in a particular population for a particular purpose.‖3 Philip Mitchell, 
Bettina Meiser, Alex Wilde, et al. go on to say that population is important because of the 
positive predictive value (PPV). The predictive value of a test is influenced by how often 
that disease occurs in a specific population. Generally there are three concepts used to 
evaluate a test: analytical validity, clinical validity, and clinical utility. The article by 
Philip Mitchell, Bettina Meiser, Alex Wilde, et al. says that analytical validity is related 
to the reliability and accuracy of a specific test. In genetic testing this is the ability of the 
test to identify the specific genotype. Analytical validity answers the question of does the 
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genetic test actually identify what it is supposed to identify such as a Huntington‘s 
mutation or the BRCA mutation. Clinical validity is ―determined by: (1) the strength of 
evidence for the link between genotype and disease; and (2) test performance 
characteristics such as sensitivity, specificity, positive and negative predictive values, and 
likelihood ratios.‖4 Clinical validity looks at the accuracy and consistency of test 
performance. Clinical utility looks at the actual value of the test. This area answers the 
question of whether or not the test provides information that could be useful to the 
patient. There are 8 areas that should be analyzed in clinical utility. The testing purpose 
should look at areas of legitimacy, efficacy, effectiveness, and appropriateness. The 
possibility of testing should analyze areas of acceptability, efficiency of economic 
evaluation, optimality of economic evaluation, and equity of resources.
5
  
This science behind PGT will look at four different areas including the science, 
utility, benefits, and risks of testing. The science will look at the technical aspects of 
testing, the utility will provide the basic value and purpose of testing, and then the 
benefits and risks of testing will be analyzed.    
1. Science  
The purpose of PGT is to assess an individual‘s risk of developing a specific 
disease. PGT analyzes DNA and genetics to identify whether a person will develop or 
already has an at-risk gene that causes them to have a higher or lower than an average 
risk of developing a specific disease. In order to make predictions about a person‘s risk 
for developing a specific disease, scientists analyze areas in a person‘s genes and 
chromosomes for genetic variants and mutations.
6
 PGT looks at ―polymorphisms that 
increase the probability of disease development.‖7 Mutations can be identified by looking 
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at segments of genes and chromosomes in order to identify genes that are different from 
the normal size and shape of a specific gene.
8
 Currently, studies have identified the 
genetic variants that might be linked to a higher risk of at least 40 diseases.
9
 Also studies 
have identified over 1,000 genetic variants associated with a risk of disease.
10
 The genetic 
variants make up what is called a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP).
 
Generally 
companies predict genetic risks by ―calculating how often that condition occurs among 
people of the customer‘s general age, sex and ethnicity, then factor in the presence or 
absence of the relevant SNP.‖11 It is important to note that the results depend on what 
genetic variants the laboratory decides to use when analyzing the predicted risk of 
disease.
12
 One company could be analyzing 9 variants, while the other company is 
analyzing 13 variants. The number of variants analyzed can make a difference in the 
results as well. Once a genetic variant is associated with a risk of a particular disease, 
tests can be run to look at the SNPs in a specific sample in order to determine risk. If the 
individual does have the mutation, then it means that that individual has a higher chance 
of developing that specific disease or cancer than a person without that mutation.
13
  
Diseases can be caused by a number of genetic and environmental factors. An 
important aspect to predicting disease is the fact that there can be several variants in a 
gene and those variants can be linked to several different diseases.
14
 SNPs can be 
associated with many different areas. One SNP could be more common in a person with 
breast cancer, Parkinson‘s disease, or another type of cancer.15 The BRCA 1/2 gene 
mutations were identified in 1994 and 1995.
16
 These mutations increase the likelihood of 
developing breast and/or ovarian cancer. Generally many different genes are involved in 
the development of a disease. For example, Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the 
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Vanderbilt Law Review say that researchers have found over eight hundred gene 
mutations that are linked to cystic fibrosis. Since there are so many different variations 
and mutations for this disease, the predictability of developing cystic fibrosis can vary 
greatly from variation to variation. One genetic mutation can impact the severity of the 
disease while another mutation might not impact the disease at all. Anita Silvers and 
Michael Ashley Stein in the Vanderbilt Law Review state that ―identical mutations in 
such genes will affect individuals from different populations to different degrees because 
of variations in environmental factors.‖17 Each mutation does not carry the same weight. 
Huntington‘s disease is more of a unique disease for PGT in that the test has a 
higher degree of certainty for predicting. In 1993, the genetic variation for Huntington‘s 
disease was identified, and as a result PGT was offered for at-risk individuals. 
Huntington‘s disease is an incurable neurodegenerative disease with no medical 
treatments available to slow the progression.
18
 There are approximately 30,000 
individuals with Huntington‘s disease, but it is suggested that there are another 200,000 
that have not been tested yet and are at risk in the United States. This disease is generally 
categorized as a late-onset condition, because typically the disease manifests itself around 
40 years old. The test for Huntington‘s disease has 100% penetrance, which means if the 
gene is present, then the individual will develop Huntington‘s disease at some point in his 
or her life. On the other side, if the gene is not present, then the individual is not at risk 
for Huntington‘s disease. With this disease, either the Huntington‘s gene is present or it is 
absent. Because of the certainty and the predictive value of testing for Huntington‘s 
disease, the results for PGT are more clear cut. The science behind PGT for Huntington‘s 
disease is not as complicated as other diseases. However, there are other issues to 
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consider with this testing such as the non-existent treatment options and the difficult 
family implications of this predictive testing, and both of these issues will be discussed in 
later sections.
19
 
The confidence in predictive genetic testing can be both over- and underestimated 
at times. Most genetic tests will not predict with certainty the likelihood of developing a 
specific disease, because most diseases have a number of genetic and environmental 
aspects to them. Huntington‘s disease, however, has a genetic test that will predict with a 
high degree of certainty that a person will develop the disease in the future. But even with 
a disease like Huntington‘s, there is no way to predict how the disease will affect an 
individual person. Many of the tests are subject to uncertainty, false positives or 
negatives, and possible misinterpretation. Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review say ―neither now nor in the future will someone‘s genetic 
makeup forecast that person‘s future health condition with certainty.‖20 There are many 
factors that can influence the development and severity of the disease or illness. Some of 
the factors that influence the predictive value of the test include the differences of gene 
expression, accuracy of the specific test, and reliability of the research. But on the other 
side, Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the Vanderbilt Law Review say ―it is 
equally misleading to say that basing health predictions on genetic testing is ‗little more 
than medical speculation.‘‖21 So while PGT cannot attest to the severity and/or certainty 
of a specific disease, this testing does have a certain value and legitimacy for medical 
care.
22
 
Also included within the science of PGT are the inheritance patterns for disease. 
If one parent is homozygous for a specific disease, then he or she has two copies of the 
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mutation. If a parent is heterozygous for a disease, then he or she has one copy of the 
mutation and one copy of the normal gene. Because there are different patterns of 
inheritance, not all disease inheritance is the same. For example, Huntington‘s disease is 
an autosomal dominant disease. The inheritance pattern for Huntington‘s disease is easy, 
because it is only concerned with one gene. Because it is dominant, the disease will be 
passed down to the children if any of the children inherit one mutated gene. The Punnett 
square below further illustrates this concept. The capital ―H‖ is the mutation causing 
Huntington‘s disease, while the lower case ―h‖ represents the normal gene.  
 H h 
h Hh hh 
h Hh  hh 
 
Table 1: Punnett square for Huntington‘s disease 
The box represents one parent with Huntington‘s disease (Hh in red) and one parent 
without Huntington‘s disease (hh in purple). When children are born, each child will have 
a 50% chance of inheriting Huntington‘s disease (Hh) and a 50% chance of not having 
Huntington‘s disease (hh). This is a basic representation of genetic inheritance patterns. 
While this seems fairly easy, the inheritance pattern for Huntington‘s disease is probably 
one of the easiest. Most other diseases that can be predicted with PGT are multifactorial 
diseases. There are several factors that influence the inheritance of the BRCA mutation. 
Even if a person has the mutation, it is not necessarily a positive diagnosis since there are 
other influencing factors such as the environment and the individual‘s lifestyle.23 
2. Utility  
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Sometimes PGT is recommended based on the utility of the testing, and other 
times it is not recommended because of a lack of insufficient evidence of testing benefit. 
Some instances of increased utility include the following: ―high morbidity and mortality 
of disease, effective but imperfect treatment, high predictive power of the genetic test 
(high penetrance), high cost or onerous nature of screening and surveillance methods, and 
preventive measures that are expensive or associated with adverse effects.‖24 On the other 
hand, decreased utility for predictive genetic testing include: ―low morbidity and 
mortality of disease, highly effective and acceptable treatment, poor predictive power of 
the genetic test (low penetrance), availability of inexpensive, acceptable, and effective 
screening and surveillance methods, and preventive measures that are inexpensive, 
efficacious, and high acceptable— for example, vaccination.‖25 James Evans, Cecile 
Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke in ―The Complexities of Predictive Genetic Testing,‖ from 
the British Medical Journal say that the usefulness of the test can decrease if the disease 
is curable. For example, James Evans, Cecile Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke suggest that 
when breast and colon cancer are able to be cured or treated by effective and safe 
measures, then the benefit of testing is reduced. However, if the disease is curable and is 
identified earlier, then the disease might be able to be cured earlier rather than later. 
Evans, Skrzynia, and Burke also suggest that if there are successful and economical 
screening tools in place for certain diseases, then the utility of PGT will decrease. One 
example given is of hypertension. Since there are acceptable screening methods that are 
not expensive, there is not a need to participate in PGT for hypertension. James Evans, 
Cecile Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke suggest that if the cost of screening is much higher, 
then PGT will be more economical and attractive to individuals. Evans, Skrzynia, and 
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Burke also suggest that in order for PGT to have higher utility, the preventive measures 
would generally have some problems and/or be fairly costly. For example, the utility of 
PGT typically can increase when a person is at risk for breast cancer and is considering a 
prophylactic mastectomy. James Evans, Cecile Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke say ―when 
prevention is simple, however, the value of testing decreases,‖ and the example of a 
vaccination is given.
26
 Since vaccinations are so easy to prevent diseases, there is no need 
for PGT of diseases like measles, mumps, and rubella. The utility of PGT can play an 
important role in the utilization of testing and the risks and benefits of testing. 
3. Benefits 
Reasons to undergo testing include motivational and emotional. Motivational 
reasons include ―early detection, prevention, and control.‖27 The goal of PGT is to 
identify which people have the mutation so that additional monitoring can take place for 
those at risk. Identification and monitoring of at-risk individuals will hopefully ―lead to 
reduced morbidity and mortality through targeted screening, surveillance, and 
prevention.‖28 If there is additional monitoring, then the hope is that there can be early 
diagnosis of the disease. PGT can help to monitor those at increased risk and decrease the 
amount of screening for those that are not at risk or are low risk. Possible prevention and 
treatment plans are another benefit of testing. Sometimes there can be surgeries or 
chemotherapy that can help to decrease a person‘s risk for a specific disease.29 Also PGT 
could help with future plans and ―may lead individuals to alter their diet or avoid 
exposure to certain chemicals in an attempt to avoid future disease.‖30 The hope is that 
people will avoid ―risk-inducing behaviors.‖31 Shoshana Shiloh and Shiri Ilan, the 
authors of ―To Test or Not To Test? Moderators of the Relationship Between Risk 
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Perceptions and Interest in Predictive Genetic Testing,‖ described a study about risk 
perceptions and testing utilization. The study concluded that the high interest in the test 
was associated with ―both motivations and especially with emotional-reassurance 
motivation, but not with risk perceptions, health/illness orientations, and cancer 
anxiety.‖32 The study demonstrated that risk perceptions did not necessarily lead to 
increased test utilization or interest in PGT. Shoshana Shiloh and Shiri Ilan say that 
understanding the perceived risk is crucial but that is not enough to alter behaviors 
including fitness modifications. In order to change behaviors and goals, there needs to be 
psychological changes as well. The article by Shoshana Shiloh and Shiri Ilan concludes 
that in order to have informed consent and decision making, there needs to be objective 
and reasonable information about the possible risks and benefits. Also there can be 
psychological and emotional benefits of testing. Emotional motivations include 
eliminating uncertainty, gaining support or hope, and preparing emotionally.
33
 Finding 
out that a person is not at risk or is at a very low risk of developing a certain disease can 
often decrease his or her anxiety levels. This can also lead to a greater ―self-perception.‖ 
Knowing a person‘s risk status can help to alter or reinforce their view of themselves. 
Sometimes PGT can result in a greater ―sense of control,‖ because the person at risk can 
follow certain procedures and/or treatments that could potentially decrease their risk.
34
 In 
some people‘s minds, PGT can help to gain control by knowing their risk status and/or 
organizing events in their life and future.
35
 Motivational and emotional reasons for testing 
can be benefits of PGT.  
There can also be future benefits. Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review suggest that some genetic variants and mutations could have 
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different functions and outcomes than originally thought. ―In the future, scientists could 
discover that having a particular breast cancer gene mutation correlates with immunity 
from AIDS (as sickle-cell trait correlates with heightened immunity to malaria).‖36 Even 
with emotional, motivational, and future benefits, sometimes there can also be anxiety, 
worry, and discrimination that can impact themselves and their family.
37
  
4. Risks  
Shoshana Shiloh and Shiri Ilan in their article, ―To Test or Not To Test? 
Moderators of the Relationship Between Risk Perceptions and Interest in Predictive 
Genetic Testing,‖ say that while PGT can promote encouragement and hope, it can also 
―cause considerable distress to others from premature knowledge of likely illness.‖38 
Discrimination and psychological harms are often cited as the main harms, but there can 
be others associated with PGT. Sometimes there can be false assurances which can cause 
problems for future treatment. False assurances come from getting a lower risk than what 
is actually true. On the other hand, there can be problems from getting a higher risk than 
what is actually true. If a woman is told she has a high risk for developing breast cancer, 
then she will make decisions based on that information such as having a prophylactic 
double mastectomy. Problems arise when people adopt ―irreversible, risk-inducing or 
expensive risk prevention strategies based upon incorrectly high estimations of risk.‖39 
Also sometimes people can have feelings of powerlessness. People often have no control 
over whether or not they develop a certain disease, and this can cause additional 
problems emotionally and even physically by not following recommended protocols. The 
possibility of discrimination and stigmatization can also be a risk of this information.
40
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Discrimination can occur in many areas including employment, insurance, and 
social situations. Genetic discrimination ―arises when individuals with no symptoms or 
signs receive less favorable or adverse treatment because of their genotype.‖41 If the 
concern about discrimination is high, then sometimes people might not participate in 
PGT, because he or she is concerned about his family‘s insurance premiums. If the tests 
are not conducted, then the individual could be missing out on possible treatment options. 
In a study with 163 cancer geneticists, about 68% of the geneticists said that if a person 
underwent testing for BRCA1 or 2 or hereditary non-polyposis colorectal cancer 
(HNPCC) they would not bill insurance so that there would be no discrimination. Also 
with this study, 26% of the geneticists said that they were in favor of using an alias for 
testing so as not to cause potential discrimination.
42
 Another study conducted by phone 
found that people were also discriminated against because a family member had a 
hereditary genetic disease. Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the Vanderbilt Law 
Review say that having a negative test result could result in other prospects. Anita Silvers 
and Michael Ashley Stein continue to say that ―Proof that they are not at risk will 
reassure them of their ability to succeed in endeavors aversive for people who develop 
the disease.‖43 Sometimes people who are at-risk will not participate in certain events or 
careers in life, because the individuals assume there is nothing he or she can do. Other 
times, people do not allow individuals to participate, because people consider those 
individuals to be at risk.
44
 Discrimination can occur in many different areas and activities. 
At the beginning, individual and family discrimination played a significant part in PGT, 
but in 2003, the Genetic Information Non Discrimination Act (GINA) was established. 
This act tries to eliminate employment and insurance discrimination.
45
 However, Susan 
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Wolf and Jeffrey Kahn in ―Genetic Testing and the Future of Disability Insurance: Ethics, 
Law & Policy,‖ say that the ―fear of discrimination is important, as individuals may 
decide to forego genetic testing (even when it might prove medically useful) in order to 
protect themselves against insurance discrimination.‖46  
Another possible concern about knowing a person is at risk is psychological 
harms.
47
 Marita Broadstock, Susan Michie, and Theresa Marteau in ―Psychological 
Consequences of PGT: A Systematic Review‖ from the European Journal of Human 
Genetics, suggest that there were no significant changes in the emotional suffering for the 
carriers and non-carriers in a period of three years after PGT. The authors suggest a 
couple of reasons for this finding. In this study, there could be general psychological 
defense methods that had already been started. Broadstock, Michie, and Marteau say that 
research suggests that the people participating in testing are often stronger emotionally 
and are more capable of handling information. By already deciding to take a PGT and 
coming forward for testing, people tend to have thought about the testing in advance. 
Another study found that people getting tested for Huntington‘s disease (HD) generally 
―had higher ego strength, were more socially extroverted, and had more positive coping 
strategies than the general population.‖48 Often the people considering getting tested for 
HD have increased experiential knowledge about this disease. Another study with HD 
looked at those who decided not to undergo testing and then compared them to those who 
came forward for testing. The study suggested that those who did not undergo HD testing 
were more pessimistic about the future. The most common attitudes presented in those 
who participated in the study were denial of the results or test, elimination of uncertainty, 
or both. Also sometimes people from at-risk families already had strong coping methods. 
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Broadstock, Michie, and Marteau concluded that as genetic testing is increasingly 
brought into routine medical care, ―some of the protective factors associated with the 
research environment are likely to be reduced,‖ and likely there will be more 
psychological harms.
49
  
However on the other hand, in ―Predictive Genetic Testing in Children and 
Adults: A Study of Emotional Impact‖ from the Journal of Medical Genetics, S. Michie, 
M. Bobrow, and T. M. Marteau suggest that there is a significant level of anxiety after 
getting a positive test result. S. Michie, M. Bobrow, and T. M. Marteau say that this 
conclusion is especially important in adults with not as many psychological resources.
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One article by Regina E. Ensenauer, Virginia V. Michels, and Shanda S. Reinke, 
―Genetic Testing: Practical, Ethical, and Counseling Considerations,‖ illustrates the 
importance of genetic information and possible psychosocial implications when it says 
―Once genetic testing results are learned, it is something that will stay with that patient 
throughout her/his lifetime.‖51 As a result, additional counseling and assessments could 
be helpful to decrease any potential anxiety.
52
  
B. Understanding Genetic Risks and Probabilities  
Since risk predictions are very complex with difficult ideas to convey, genetic 
tests can result in misunderstandings and ambiguous results.
53
 PGT and risk assessments 
are often ―complicated and confusing.‖54 Authors Neil Manson and Onora O‘Neill ask, 
―How can people give adequate consent to acts that use genetic information if (as is 
acknowledged) they have false beliefs about genetic information or understand it 
poorly?‖55 The authors clearly illustrate the problem of adequate understanding and the 
ethics of consent. In order to have solid informed consent, it is important to increase 
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public education on potential choices. One of the questions to address is whether or not 
patients and the public understand genetic risks and probabilities.  
This section on understanding will look at three ideas. The first discussion is on 
interpreting test results, and this area will look at both positive and negative results of 
testing. The second area will look at misunderstandings of genetic information and PGT 
risk assessments, and this section will seek to identify and address those misunderstands. 
The third area of discussion is education, and this analyzes both patient and public 
education of genetic risks and probabilities.  
1. Interpreting Test Results 
Having a positive result on the prostate cancer test does not mean that a person 
has prostate cancer right now nor is it certain that he will ever get prostate cancer in the 
future. A positive test is not a clinical diagnosis at the time. A positive test means that a 
person has an increased risk for developing a certain disease or illness.
56
 A positive test 
means that there was some kind of variance in a chromosome or gene, and depending on 
how that gene functions determines what type of increased risk a consumer will have.
57
 
Also it is important to remember that mutations in genes or chromosomes can manifest 
themselves differently to different people. In genetics, having a certain gene or genotype 
does not always translate into specific symptoms or traits for each person.
58
 Another 
important factor to remember is that most diseases are multifactorial, in that the disease 
takes into account several areas including family history and environmental responses.
59
  
Negative results carry the same weight. Just because a person received a negative 
result, does not mean the person will be absent of that disease.
60
 It simply means that the 
test did not find a genetic variance in the gene or chromosome.
61
 Negative test results do 
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not mean that the person will never develop the disease, but that there is still a normal 
―population risk‖ for that disease.62 For those undergoing BRCA testing, if the results are 
negative, then that means the individual has the same level of risk for breast and/or 
ovarian cancer as the general public. Those individuals have an average risk. However, 
while the person is at an average risk, there are no testing procedures that will ―remove 
this background risk.‖63 The only thing that can help a person with an average risk like 
the general public are the screening recommendations which include clinical breast 
exams and mammograms at the scheduled time. While most negative results mean the 
person did not have the mutation, a negative result could also be evidence of a false 
assurance. False assurances generally mean that either the genetic variance has not been 
identified yet or the test failed to detect the genetic variance.
64
 With BRCA 1/2, ―contrary 
to possible patient and physician expectations, no current single technology can identify 
all mutations.‖65 
An article by Jon Emery, Kristine Barlow-Stewart, and Sylvia A. Metcalfe 
entitled, ―There‘s Cancer in the Family,‖ says that genetics most likely influences all 
cancers to an extent, but ―certain cancers, such as breast, colorectal and ovarian are more 
likely to demonstrate familial clustering.‖66 The BRCA1 gene, affecting 1 out of 1,000 
people, has increased risks for developing breast and ovarian cancer. Those with this 
gene have a 40-80% chance of developing breast cancer and a 10-60% chance of 
developing ovarian cancer. This gene, BRCA1, is also associated with a higher risk of 
developing prostate cancer. However, it is important to note though that even with the 
increased risk from the BRCA 1/2 mutations, only 5-10% of all breast cancer is linked to 
these genetic mutations.
67
 Also another example, those with a mutation in the mismatch 
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repair (MMR) gene have a chance of developing hereditary non-polyposis colorectal 
cancer (HNPCC). Typically there is a 1 in 1,000 chance of having this mutation in the 
general public. But if a person has this hereditary mutation, then there is a 70-90% 
chance that he or she will develop colorectal cancer by the age of 75. Also if a person has 
this mutation, then there is a chance he or she could develop other cancers as well such as 
endometrial, ovarian, stomach, urinary tract, small intestine, pancreatic, and/or biliary 
tree cancer. These other cancers have a lower risk of developing, but there is still a risk.
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2. Misunderstandings 
Sometimes there is confusion about what the results of PGT, risk assessments, 
and genetic tests in general mean. At times the media can contribute to some of the 
misleading information about genetics and genetic testing.
69
 One example of the media 
contributing to misunderstanding is illustrated in a story in the New York Times. With 
PGT there will always be a level of uncertainty. Uncertainty is included in whether or not 
an individual will get the disease, when the disease will occur, and/or the severity of the 
disease; however, the idea of uncertainty is generally not presented. The New York Times 
discussed a ―genetic report card,‖ and said that this ―would predict a baby‘s health history 
at birth.‖70  
There can also be faulty views of genetics by the general public or even medical 
professionals. Possible misunderstandings about genetics include confusion about facts 
like genes are in human cells, there are 46 chromosomes, and the genes are in 
chromosomes. There are also misunderstandings with the idea of risk probabilities like 
problems in measuring risk and/or overestimating risk. Robert Klitzman in 
―Misunderstandings Concerning Genetics Among Patients Confronting Genetic Disease‖ 
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analyzes some common misconceptions of genetics and genetic testing. He identifies 
three categories of misconceptions: genetic tests, genetic mechanisms, and statistics. 
Misconceptions about genetic tests include ideas that genetics can predict behavior and 
genetic tests have more predictive power than they really do. One misconception of 
genetic testing is that genetics can predict behavior. One person says ―You hear a lot 
about predispositions for drug addiction and alcoholism, and ―the gay gene‖—folk 
information. My wife works with scientists. They know what‘s going on, but are the 
minority.‖71 This idea can be linked to genetic exceptionalism which can be seen in 
media stories and the news. Also, people often think that genetic tests can predict with 
certainty the odds of developing a particular disease.
72
 The complexity of this idea is 
illustrated in the following statement: 
People think the test will tell you whether you will get the disease or not, 
rather than it being a piece of information that says, ―You‘re probably at higher 
risk for getting this disease, but it doesn‘t mean you‘re going to get it.‖ 
Intellectually, I understand that. But emotionally, even that is hard to wrap my 
head around.
73
 
 
While many times the predictive value is overestimated, Susan Michie, John Weinman, 
Julie Miller, et al. suggests the opposite. Michie, Weinman, Miller, et al. in ―Predictive 
Genetic Testing: High Risk Expectations in the Face of Low Risk Information,‖ analyze 
uncertainty and categorize this area as test representation. While the article by Michie, 
Weinman, Miller, et al. was written towards the beginning of PGT, there is still some 
relevance to ―seeing is believing‖ as stated by those in the study comparing bowel 
screening to genetic test. Screening for a disease can tell if there is an actual tumor, but 
PGT on the other hand looks to genetics to predict when or if the disease will develop in 
the future. Sometimes physical evidence proves more valuable to people. Michie, 
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Weinman, Miller, et al. suggest that the confidence level for this type of testing can be 
lower than other types, which can lead to a higher perception of risk. Those with more 
uncertainty about the confidence of results thought they had a higher level of risk than 
what was actually true, which suggests that there is a greater perception of risk when 
there is lower confidence in testing results.
74
 Both Klitzman and Michie, Weinman, 
Miller, et al. illustrate that PGT results can be overestimated and underestimated. 
Misconceptions also exist for genetic mechanisms. There are five popular areas 
including: homozygous and heterozygous, inheriting physical characteristics and diseases 
together, families passing on more genes to certain children, metaphysics of genetics,  
and implications for beliefs about scientific and non-scientific mechanisms. The first, 
homozygotic and heterozygotic, relates to the dominant and recessive inheritance patterns 
previously discussed. One woman illustrates the confusion that exists when she said ―I 
don‘t know: Is there such a thing as genes being just slightly there—you have this gene in 
a minute way, not a more dominant way? I don‘t know how that works.‖75 If inheritance 
of disease is not adequately addressed, there can be confusion and anxiety. The second 
issue is common views about inheritance of genetic mutations and physical traits. This is 
demonstrated by the following quote: ―I always thought that because I looked more like 
my mother, I was at risk of getting the disease.‖76 People can think that because they look 
more like the person with a disease, they have similar risks for that disease. Following 
this logic, people who did not look or act like the affected person, thought the gene 
skipped them. Similarly, the third misconception is the idea that a person can have more 
―biological material‖ from a parent than another individual. It is assumed that since a 
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child looks more like one parent that child has more of the parent‘s genes, and as a result 
will develop similar diseases. When growing up children hear things like:  
―You‘re just like me when I was a kid.‖ So you assume: if I look more like 
him or her, then I‘m probably going to get what he or she has. In high school, 
hereditary means: two parents come together and pass on what they have. 
Whatever they have, you have. So, if you look like your dad, then most likely, if 
he has green eyes, I have green eyes. My dad‘s got big teeth, I got big teeth…. 
Now, you hear my dad has that disease and it‘s hereditary, so ―I got the disease.‖ 
You explain it in your head by saying, ―I probably have more of his cells than her 
cells.‖77 
 
The fourth misunderstanding, metaphysics and the power of positive thinking, 
emphasizes the power of the mind. In this area, the mind can control the body. People 
might think that if the mind is powerful enough, the disease will not manifest. If a person 
hopes really hard, then maybe certain people might not get sick. A woman said the 
following about Huntington‘s disease (HD):   
I had this real strong feeling that my dad had come to clean it up, to finish 
off this nasty, ugly business, and that my sister and I were going to be fine. He 
took this thing on, and was gonna wrestle it down for us. I also thought that if 
anybody has it, it would probably be her. Three days after my dad‘s funeral, she 
was going to get her results. She sat in front of me in the car. I put my hands on 
her, and thought, ―Take it away. Make me have it, so you don‘t have to.‖ My dad 
was the best support I ever had. I just really thought that he wouldn‘t have given 
me such a thing.
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She thought her dad had a decision about whether or not to give HD to the family. The 
fifth misconception is fitting the scientific and nonscientific views together. When a 
person has a misconception, it can be difficult to understand something that seems 
contradictory. One woman tried to rationalize this by saying ―I suppose I look more like 
my father‘s family on the inside, and my mother‘s side on the outside.‖79 When beliefs 
seem to conflict with tests, the individual can either realize their perception was wrong or 
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come up with a new beliefs that fit both the test results and their prior misconceptions. 
Sometimes misconceptions have a stronger impact than people realize. 
The next common area of misunderstandings is statistics. The study found four 
main categories including: ―percentages vs. proportions, absolute vs. relative risks, each 
―toss of the coin‖ being independent, and the existence of two options meaning that the 
odd must be 50/50.‖80 The first is about percentages and proportions. Many people do not 
necessarily understand the implications of percentages, and so it is important to make the 
numbers ―real.‖ There is a one in 4 chance that you could develop this disease. The 
second area is absolute and relative risks. This issue can be complicated for both patients 
to comprehend and health care workers to communicate. One person with degrees in 
Mathematics and Business gave the following example. A health care worker ―said that if 
I took Tamoxifen, I was going to double my chances of uterine cancer.‖81 After talking 
with the medical staff, the patient realized that doubling his chances meant that his 
chances would be two in 10,000 instead of 1 in 10,000. The patient continued to say that 
―People sometimes throw numbers out, and if you don‘t understand or question it, it 
could be pretty scary.‖82 Absolute risks are the typical general population risks associated 
with getting a disease like the one in 10,000 above. Relative risk is a ratio of the person‘s 
risk, which takes into account other factors like taking tamoxifen above. Also, risk is not 
static; risks can fluctuate according to new research or models. Sometimes doctors 
assume patients understand, but often they do not.
83
 The third area in statistics is the idea 
of statistics in relation to a coin toss. Since there is a 50% chance of getting the gene, 
some people think that if there are two siblings, one will get the disease, and one will not. 
However, this is not true, because each flip of the coin is independent of each other. 
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Therefore each sibling has a 50% chance of developing the disease. One man said that he 
was scared when his brother did not have the gene, because he thought ―for sure we 
couldn‘t both get away unscathed. I know they‘re independent events, so the fact that he 
tested negative does not influence my testing at all. But emotionally, it didn‘t feel that 
way at all.‖84 People need to be reminded that there is the same level of risk with each 
flip of the coin. The fourth area is the idea that the presence of two options has to indicate 
that there is a 50/50% chance. Since a person can have or not have the gene, people think 
there is a 50% chance of getting a disease. While there is a 50% chance of Huntington‘s 
if it runs in the family, the general risk for breast cancer is 12%. The risk for the BRCA 
1/2 mutations is 0.24% in Caucasians and 1.2% in the Ashkenazi population. The rate of 
BRCA 1/2 in those already diagnosed with breast cancer is about 8.3% in the Ashkenazi 
Jewish, 2.2% in the non-Hispanic Caucasian, and 1.3% in the African-American 
population. Having the BRCA mutation is significantly lower than a 50% chance.
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Also Klitzman suggests that education, emotions, concepts of responsibility, 
penalties, and social aspects will play a role. First, the level of education can have a 
positive or negative effect. Some common misconceptions can be eliminated if a person 
has had some education in science and/or statistics. Second, sometimes even after 
presenting a patient with a negative or lower than average risk, he or she might still 
perceive that risk to be more intimidating due to emotional issues.
86
 The third factor is 
beliefs about punishment. Sometimes people think the inheritance of a disease was a 
result of something he or she did, fate, or karma. The fourth factor is the role of social 
contexts. People can feel embarrassed, because their views are thought to be 
unreasonable. One person felt embarrassed by being a part of a group that believed ―some 
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people came into the world to extinguish a genetic disease from the family.‖87 Social 
beliefs can play a large part in forming people‘s perception. All of the previous 
misunderstandings can have some serious implications. First, misunderstandings can 
impact the decision to get tested and treated. One person said: ―I thought: if I didn‘t have 
a mammogram, I wouldn‘t have breast cancer… So I‘ve never had a mammogram.‖88 If 
people are confused about testing, then their choices could result in inappropriate 
treatment decisions. Second, misunderstandings can have a big impact on a person‘s 
ability to cope. If a person has gone their whole life thinking he or she will not get a 
disease because of some misconception, the ability to cope with seemingly contradictory 
test results can be difficult. One woman assumed her sister had the Huntington‘s gene, 
but her sister ended up not having the gene. As a result this woman had many concerns 
now especially since she had a child already. A person‘s ability to cope with bad news 
can depend on their perceptions. Third, misunderstandings can also have an impact on 
reproductive decisions. The woman in the previous example falsely assumed she would 
not get HD so she did not even consider her reproductive options. Misconceptions can 
have an impact on a family for reproductive options as well.
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3. Education 
A study in ―Public Perceptions of Ethical Issues Regarding Adult Predictive 
Genetic Testing‖ in Health Care Analysis by Douglas Martin and Heather Greenwood 
concluded that there needs to be more public education about PGT. Douglas Martin and 
Heather Greenwood say that there was anxiety due to the minimal public education about 
the BRCA genetic mutation. One person in this study said ―it‘s an important issue that 
people need to know about, especially because it affects people of my heritage but 
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beyond that. It‘s information that women can get to prevent them from passing away 
from disease.‖90 Some people said there should be some government-sponsored 
education programs for PGT. Other people said it is ―important that public education not 
overemphasize the genetic component of disease to the detriment of the investigation into 
other contributing factors to illness, such as ‗‗socio-economic or environmental 
conditions‘‘, as well as causing the public to neglect the possibility of non-genetic 
preventative measures, or to be overly worried about a disease for which they are not at 
high risk.‖91 Also included in the discussion on public education was the physician‘s 
education and knowledge of PGT. Douglas Martin and Heather Greenwood said that 
some people feared that inadequate information of PGT especially BRCA testing would 
cause physicians to have fear of talking with their patients about the subject. As a result, 
this fear would lead physicians to have limited discussions concerning patient education. 
Maxwell Mehlman in ―Predictive Genetic Testing in Urology: Ethical and Social Issues,‖ 
said that physicians might lack appropriate education in order to interpret these test 
results.
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In order for physicians to encourage patient understanding, physicians should 
have adequate knowledge about the disease, understanding of the patient‘s test results, 
and a practical understanding of absolute and relative risks.
93
 In a patient discussion 
about the risk of BRCA mutations, one physician tried to describe it in terms the patient 
might understand more easily. The doctor said the following:   
In explaining testing to patients, I find it useful to describe a gene as a 
building and to point out that just as a building has many rooms, so a gene has 
many chemicals. If even one of the thousands of chemicals in a gene is missing or 
changed, the product the gene makes will be a little ―off,‖ leading to increased 
cell growth and increased cancer risk. In the course of genetic testing, the 
laboratory will be ―walking‖ through the BRCA1 and the BRCA2 buildings, 
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looking for a damaged room (a mutation). If they find such damage in a gene, it 
will mean the individual has an increased risk of both breast and ovarian cancer.
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This physician encouraged a practical discussion about risks in terms of construction. 
Many times physicians have a significant impact on how patients will interpret risk and 
probabilities of PGT. The Self Regulatory Theory says that people recognize risk 
―influenced by factors such as identity, consequences, cause, control, and timeline.‖95 
Sometimes personal experiences can hurt physicians or patients in understanding risk 
probabilities, but other times using a patient‘s values and experiences can encourage 
greater understanding.  
C. Treatment Options for Diagnosed Genetic Traits  
PGT often has complicated treatment options for diagnosed genetic traits, because 
sometimes there are no treatments available for certain diseases. As a result, the 
disclosure of possible options is crucial in order to make appropriate decisions for PGT. 
The beginning of this section will look at disclosure and analyze standards and consent 
guidelines of disclosure. The second area, treatment options, will focus on possible 
treatment options for some diseases. Then the third area will conclude with specific 
recommended treatment plans and options for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
(HBOC). 
1. Disclosure 
Generally information that is material to a person‘s decision should be discussed, 
especially potential treatment options.
96
 Part of this section will look at the standards of 
establishing adequate disclosure of treatment options for diagnosed genetic traits.
97
 There 
are three general standards: a reasonable physician standard, reasonable patient standard, 
and a subjective standard. By adhering to the reasonable physician standard which is 
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typically the most popular, physicians should disclosure all information that a reasonable 
physician would disclose in that situation to his or her patients. The only problem with 
this standard is that some patients might want more information. The reasonable patient 
standard requires disclosure of information that patients typically would want to know 
about a disease or treatment. The last standard is the subjective or specific patient 
standard.
98
 This standard really depends on what information an individual patient would 
want.
99
 This standard is typically not used very often. The next chapter will discuss in 
depth some additional details of the standards of disclosure.  
Doctors often ask how much information is needed for patients to be informed, 
and Howard Brody responds with two things in the book Taking Sides: Clashing Views 
on Bioethical Issues. First the doctor has to disclose the ―basis on which the proposed 
treatment or the alternative possible treatments have been chosen,‖ and second the patient 
should be able to ask questions about the physician‘s proposed treatment and reasoning to 
the patient‘s approval and satisfaction.100 Also it has been argued that some procedures 
require stronger, specific consent than others, because the treatment or procedure is more 
risky and serious. The difference in consent of a low risk versus high risk procedure is 
important to discuss in relation to the distinguishing characteristics of PGT. Overall there 
is not a specific formula for knowing how much information a patient needs to be 
informed, but this section addresses disclosure of treatment options for PGT.
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2. Treatment Options 
One potential benefit to PGT is the availability of treatment options for many 
diseases. If the test comes back with a positive result, then ideally the person can take 
preventive or prophylactic measures and/or prepare for the future. Sometimes there are 
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treatments that could prevent the disease or lessen the severity of the disease.
102
 Another 
general treatment option is continued surveillance.
103
 Douglas Martin and Heather 
Greenwood in ―Public Perceptions of Ethical Issues Regarding Adult Predictive Genetic 
Testing‖ also emphasize the importance of identifying treatment options. One of the 
audience members said it is ―absolutely essential that they [women at high risk] know so 
that they can make sorts of choices in their lives that will permit them to live their lives in 
a more, I guess, more knowledgeable, and certainly a more planned fashion.‖104 Many 
times the appropriate treatment option does not stick out at the beginning, and additional 
discussions need to take place before all the treatment options are realized and fully 
appreciated.
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 Also it is important to ―ascertain how the client anticipates test results will 
affect his/her medical management and health behaviors.‖106 Treatment options might be 
available, but sometimes patients might not want to participate in those treatments or 
prevention method.  
3. Hereditary Breast and Ovarian Cancer 
The following section is an example of potential treatment options for hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC). Sometimes treatment options are difficult to discuss 
for PGT, because often there are few curable diseases. This is often the case for HBOC, 
which has no specific treatment guidelines for those at risk. Research is still being done 
to determine general guidelines for medical staff. General treatment guidelines include 
more screening, chemotherapy and chemoprevention, surgery to prevent and/or slow the 
progression of cancer, and possibly changing diet or other aspects of life.  
When combining an MRI, ultrasound, mammography, and clinical breast exams, 
about 95% of breast cancers were found. The National Society of Genetic Counselors 
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(NSGC) recommends surveillance for women at high or moderate risk for breast cancer 
starting with a semiannual clinical breast examination at 25, self-exams monthly at 18, 
and yearly mammograms starting at 25. Women at low risk should do monthly self 
exams at 18, annual clinical breast exams between 25 to 35, and annual mammograms at 
40. Chemotherapy includes therapy like tamoxifen, which has been shown to decrease 
risk by 50% for at-risk women. One study by M. C. King, S. Wieand, K. Hale, et al. 
concluded that the disease risk went down 62% for BRCA2 carriers when treated with 
tamoxifen, but there was not much affect on BRCA1 carriers. However, many other 
studies demonstrate a 50% decrease for both mutations. Tamoxifen is recommended up 
to 5 years for those at high risk and optional for women at moderate risk. After a 
prophylactic mastectomy, the risk typically decreases 90%. However there is still a small 
risk, since many people opt for a subcutaneous mastectomy, leaving more of the tissue 
intact, and not a total or simple mastectomy. Ovarian cancer on the other hand has fewer 
treatment options than breast cancer. Additional surveillance is harder and often does not 
result in early diagnosis. The screening also has many false positives, and sometimes 
those can lead to potentially harmful procedures like surgery. Surveillance for those at 
high risk of ovarian cancer should start with an annual or semiannual transvaginal 
ultrasound, pelvic exam, and testing at 25 or ten years younger than when the first person 
was diagnosed in the family. Those with a family history of ovarian cancer (a moderate 
risk) should have annual or semiannual ultrasounds, pelvic exams, and testing between 30 
and 35 or ten years younger than the earliest diagnosis. Without BCRA and ovarian 
cancer in the family, surveillance and screening is not necessary. One chemoprevention 
for ovarian cancer might be oral contraceptives. At-risk women taking oral contraceptives 
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for six plus years decreased their ovarian cancer risk by about 60%. This treatment has 
been shown to have an impact on high risk women up to 15 years following the 
discontinuation of treatment. The NSGC says that women with a family history of 
ovarian cancer could use oral contraceptives for 5 years, but this form of prevention is 
still under debate. Prophylactic bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy (BSO) can reduce 
ovarian cancer by about 80-96% for those at high risk with the BRCA mutations. The 
BSO can be done either with or without a hysterectomy, but after a BSO women cannot 
have children. The NSGC says ―the earlier a pre-menopausal woman has BSO, the more 
risk reduction there is for development of a future breast cancer.‖107 While it can reduce 
HBOC, there is about a 4% risk of developing peritoneal cancer from the remaining 
tissue in the abdominal cavity. A paradox of this procedure is that often hormone 
replacement therapy (HRT) is needed after surgery, because women undergo an instant 
surgical menopause. While a BSO decreases the risk of breast cancer by 50%, the HRT is 
often said to increase the incidence of breast cancer. Recently, studies concluded that 
short-term HRT after a BSO does not impact the risk of breast cancer as much as once 
thought. A BSO could help substantially with those at high risk for ovarian cancer. A 
BSO is not always encouraged for a medium risk, and it is not recommended for low risk. 
Males with BRCA mutations should also undergo continued surveillance including 
clinical breast exams and an as needed mammography. Men at high risk are encouraged 
to have annual clinical breast exams and monthly self-exams. Prostate cancer screening 
includes digital rectal exams and prostate specific antigen (PSA) tests. No 
chemoprevention or prophylactic surgery options for men at high risk for HBOC exist. 
Sometimes research studies for people with variants of unknown significance (VUS) and 
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a family history of cancer try to identify other susceptibility genes that might be involved 
with HBOC.
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One study found that women who thought their ―susceptibility to breast cancer as 
very likely to extremely likely engaged in fewer detective health behaviors than did those 
with lower risk perceptions.‖109 Overall, there is not a consensus on perceived risks and 
health promotion behaviors, and this can be problematic at times. While there are 
surgeries and treatments for HBOC, these treatments are not guaranteed to eliminate 
and/or prevent the cancer nor is it guaranteed to significantly improve a person‘s quality 
of life. With surgery, there are a lot of issues to discuss with the physician. Discussions 
about these potential treatment options are necessary for all involved.  
D. Family-Related Genetic Information  
Genetic testing information can be different than other types of medical 
information, because testing results also have an impact on the entire family. Results 
have the potential to ―yield information about another person.‖110 Sometimes testing 
involves testing of family members in order to identify the genetic mutation in the family. 
This type of testing procedure can cause contention to emerge in the field. Often in the 
case of genetic testing, people cite the problem of the right to know versus the right not to 
know one‘s genetic makeup. Should family members have a right to know or a right not 
to know? This is the question that often arises in the debate. Another question that arises 
is how does genetic testing typically deal with one person wanting to know while another 
family member does not want to know.  Anita Silvers and Michael Ashley Stein in the 
Vanderbilt Law Review say ―The individual-consent mechanism ill fits a technology that 
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is based on the relational nature of genetic information.‖111 This issue will be addressed 
further in future chapters. 
Many times genetic mutations can be hereditary.
112
 If a specific mutation and 
variant is found, then sometimes that test can also be used to diagnose a symptomatic 
relative.
113
 The symptomatic individual can be tested to see if he or she has the same 
genetic mutation. If so then other members of the family might want to have PGT in 
order to see if he or she is at an increased risk for developing that disease. This section 
will look at the concern of family-related genetic information. Because genetic 
information can relate to the entire family, often there are problems that can arise as a 
consequence.
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 Possessing genetic information can result in discrimination, privacy 
concerns, a burden of knowledge, and coercion.
115
 Confidentiality and discrimination can 
be a concern with genetics, but since the passing of the Genetic Information Non-
discriminatory Act (GINA) in 2003, genetic discrimination has not been as prevalent. 
However discrimination can still be an unintended consequence for the patient and the 
patient‘s family and can play a role in informed consent and PGT. The Vanderbilt Law 
Review says ―fear of discrimination thus has the potential to block benefits that otherwise 
might be gained from genomic knowledge.‖116 Even though this article by Anita Silvers 
and Michael Ashley Stein is talking about disability and employment discrimination, this 
statement is also true of other types of discrimination including familial discrimination or 
stigmatization. Part of the problem with genetic information is that ―Once discovered, it 
has the potential to affect many biological family members through time, rendering them 
vulnerable to the same genetic prediction.‖117  
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This section will look at communication, disclosure and non-disclosure of 
information to relatives, genetic exceptionalism, and coercion. The first area will 
specifically look at some communication patterns within families in order to analyze the 
impact of genetic information on families. The second area looks at the issue of 
disclosing test results to families versus not disclosing information. The third area 
focuses on the debate of whether genetic information is exceptional information or just 
normal medical information. The fourth and last area is a discussion on coercion of 
families and patients from possible influences of genetic information.  
1. Communication Patterns 
 There have been some studies looking into communication patterns of families. 
One study by S. H. Chaffee and J. M. McLeod in the 1970s divided family 
communication into two approaches. Communication was grouped by socio-oriented or 
concept-oriented styles. The socio-oriented people wanted to keep peace and unity in the 
family, and so information that could cause division or problems within the family would 
not be discussed typically. The concept-oriented families were more concerned with open 
communication. This type of pattern lends itself to more communication within families 
especially in the context of genetic testing. In 1991, L. D. Ritchie made some changes to 
these communication patterns. The revised patterns were conformity or conversation 
oriented. The conformity oriented pattern typically emphasized the children‘s 
responsibility to conform to the parents‘ expectations and viewpoints. There are 
appropriate topics and then there are inappropriate topics for family discussions, and the 
goal of this view is to stay away from conflict with the parents. The conformity view 
does not encourage showing emotions. The conversation oriented view is equivalent to 
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the concept-oriented view, and the goal of this view is open communication among 
family members. There are also some additional communication patterns. Studies by M. 
R. Bury have looked at communication styles for chronic diseases and have identified 
two patterns of communication: accommodation and active denial. Accommodation 
typically involves open communication about the disease; while active denial generally 
limits the discussion that occurs in regards to the disease and the implications. A study 
done by R. Kenen, A. Ardern-Jones, and R. Eeles in 2004 looked at disclosure patterns 
for genetic testing results, specifically hereditary breast and ovarian cancer (HBOC). This 
study found five approaches to communication. The first, open/supportive, allowed 
patients and those tested to disclose and talk about any aspect of the disease and testing 
process with family. Second, directly blocked openly establishes limitations for the 
suitable and unsuitable aspects of discussion among the family and those tested. The third 
style, blocked indirectly, also establishes boundaries for discussion, but most often uses 
non-verbal communication to set the boundaries. Fourth, self-censored discloses 
information on a case-by-case basis depending on the individual‘s comfort level. This 
study divides the self-censored style into two categories: reactive and proactive self-
censored. The reactive self-censored style discusses information while gauging an 
individual‘s reactions, and then limiting disclosure if a person is uncomfortable with the 
topic of discussion. A person using the proactive self-censored approach would not 
discuss certain information to family members if the person tested thought it might cause 
additional concern and division among the family. The fifth, third party, uses another 
person to disclose information to a family member on his or her behalf.
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Communication about genetic testing results among family members is often not 
a simple straightforward procedure. One study by Clara Gaff, Veronica Collins, Tiffany 
Symes, and Jane Halliday concluded that there are different trends between men and 
women, carriers and non-carriers, and the type of information being disclosed. Many 
times people disclose information to their families because they believe their family has a 
right to know the genetic information.
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 A study by B. J. Wilson, K. Forrest, E. R. van 
Teijlingen, et al. said that communication of genetic testing results was influenced by 
complex family dynamics. This study demonstrated that the process could be influenced 
by ―the nature of the disease, whether or not preventive measures were available, the 
overall pattern of family communication, and the individual coping styles of family 
members.‖120 The study also said that feelings of ―guilt, denial, rationalization, and/or the 
desire to protect others‖ could have a significant impact on communication and 
disclosure to family members.
121
 While a typical diagnostic blood test generally has 
medical information for that specific patient, a positive or negative predictive genet test 
can impact the entire family.
122
 Hereditary cancers can only be identified when more than 
one person in the family is tested.
123
 
2. Disclosure & Non-Disclosure of Test Results to Relatives 
Generally people are encouraged to tell family members if the test came back 
with an increased risk and there are relatives that could be at-risk. The family might 
appreciate the information or might not want to know anything about that information. 
Either relatives will find out or the family will be ignorant of a person‘s test results. 
However, both of those situations can have consequences for the family. James Evans, 
Cecile Skrzynia, and Wylie Burke in ―The Complexities of Predictive Genetic Testing,‖ 
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from the British Medical Journal say ―the utility of a predictive genetic test will therefore 
depend on whose point of view is considered.‖124 The article by Clara Gaff, Veronica 
Collins, Tiffany Symes, et al., said that disclosure can be difficult sometimes, and the 
authors suggested having additional support from the genetics staff. Clara Gaff, Veronica 
Collins, Tiffany Symes, et al., also concludes that most of the people with the HNPCC 
mutation generally had good reactions after disclosing genetic information with at-risk 
relatives. This study concluded that men typically had more difficulties in disclosing 
genetic information to family than women.
125
 Disclosure of test results is encouraged so 
that family members might be able to participate in genetic testing as well to see if they 
are at an increased risk or not. The at-risk family members could also participate in 
surveillance and/or preventative measures if available. Also sometimes at-risk family 
members might want to take this information into account for family planning and 
reproductive purposes.
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On the other side, some family members might not want to know in order to avoid 
worry, mental and emotional damage, and/or discrimination.
127
 One study on genetic 
information said that many times there are more ―psychological and social risks rather 
than physical risks.‖128 Often people are hesitant to tell this information, because of the 
implications. Sometimes disclosing this information to relatives can put a strain on the 
family relationships. Generally pressure can come from both sides. The person tested can 
encourage or pressure the family to get tested or the family with a known risk could 
encourage additional members of the family to get tested. Either way this type of 
information brings an additional layer of anxiety and concern for all those involved.
129
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Non-disclosure is not recommended, because then the family is not aware of their 
potential increased risks for disease. In a study about non-disclosure, 206 geneticists out 
of 800 responded to a survey. In this study, 60% said that they had encountered people 
who would not disclose test results to his or her family. Some of the diseases that were 
not disclosed to families include Huntington‘s disease, familial translocations, and 
familial cancer syndromes. In this study, the reasons included concern about 
discrimination, fear about future relationships after disclosure, and already fractured 
family relationships. In this study, some of the geneticists thought about disclosing 
information to the families, but most did not disclose anything. There were four 
geneticists though that did present increased risk results to families in seven cases. The 
American Society of Human Genetics gave a statement on disclosing family-related 
genetic information in 1998. The patient‘s confidentiality needs to be respected. The 
ASHG document says that ―In the context of medical information, privacy rights translate 
into protection of personal data, affirmation of confidentiality, and freedom of choice.‖130 
For most cases, disclosure cannot come from the physician. However, the statement went 
on to say that only in exceptional cases can a patient‘s confidentiality be overridden. 
These conditions are the same for breaching confidentiality in many other instances as 
well. Harris, Winship, and Spriggs explain that the stipulations include ―that attempts to 
encourage disclosure have failed, that harm is serious and foreseeable, that at-risk 
individuals can be identified, and that the disease is preventable or treatable, or early 
monitoring is medically accepted to reduce risk or avert harm.‖131 The goal of disclosure 
is to inform relatives so that he or she can make informed decisions concerning their 
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health. The risks of disclosing this information without permission should be less than the 
risks that could result from telling the family.
132
  
These recommendations are generally accepted by many groups including the 
President‘s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, and the World Health 
Organization (WHO). The American Medical Association (AMA) goes further than 
recommending disclosure when the group says that patients should be informed before 
testing occurs that disclosing test results to relatives is typically expected. As a result, 
physicians should help with this process of disclosing information to at-risk relatives. 
Disclosure to third parties without permission is protected under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996. Before confidentiality and privacy 
can be breached, HIPAA requires that the incident is a ―serious and imminent threat to 
the health or safety of a person or the public and the physician has the capacity to avert 
substantial harm.‖133 Even though there is a potential harm to the at-risk relatives, it is not 
established right now that a possible genetic disease qualifies under this criteria.  
3. Genetic Exceptionalism  
Because of the complexity of genetic information, there are family concerns that 
are raised by the right to know or not to know. The foundation of this argument can stem 
from the debate on genetic exceptionalism versus normal medical information. Genetic 
exceptionalism is the idea that genetic information is ―special,‖ distinctive, and different 
than other types of medical information. Those who argue in favor of genetic 
exceptionalism due so from the facts that it has to do with the entire family, it has 
predictive value, there is the potential for discrimination and psychological harm, and 
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currently the full potential of extracting information from samples is unknown.
134
 While 
the predictive nature of PGT is not necessarily enough to differentiate it from nongenetic 
testing, some predictive genetic tests have the ability to predict with a high degree of 
certainty such as tests for Huntington‘s disease. While nongenetic tests can predict risks, 
nongenetic tests cannot predict with a high degree of certainty, and so PGT has in some 
situations has a greater level of predicting diseases than nongenetic tests. Another 
important aspect of PGT is perception. Genetic information is often seen as more 
personal and important than other medical information. Michael J. Green and Jeffrey R. 
Botkin in ―‗Genetic Exceptionalism‖ in Medicine: Clarifying the Differences between 
Genetic and Nongenetic Tests,‖ say ―Right or wrong, genetic information is believed to 
reveal who we ―really‖ are, so information from genetic testing is often seen as more 
consequential than that from other sources.‖135 This idea of revealing who you ―really‖ 
are can lead to an extreme form of genetic exceptionalism, which is genetic determinism. 
This often arises when a person or society focuses solely on the role of genetics to the 
exclusion of other factors. The basis of genetic determinism lies in the idea that a 
person‘s genes determine who he is, and some believe that each new genetic development 
brings us closer to this idea of unlocking the key to life. In response Leon Kass says, 
―Precisely because we have been taught by these very scientists that genes hold the secret 
of life, and that our genotype is our essence if not quite our destiny, we are made nervous 
by those whose expert knowledge and technique touch our very being.‖136 
Another concern of PGT is the fact that the information can influence a person‘s 
entire family. Michael J. Green and Jeffrey R. Botkin in ―‗Genetic Exceptionalism‖ in 
Medicine: Clarifying the Differences between Genetic and Nongenetic Tests,‖ say 
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genetic tests ―identify predispositions that are exclusively transmitted vertically (from 
parent to child), while nongenetic tests identify predispositions transmitted in a variety of 
ways (exposure to common environmental risk factors or person-to-person contact).‖137 
The difference between PGT and nongenetic predictive testing is transmission and 
diagnosis. If a mother has a positive test result for HD, then her children automatically 
have a 50% chance of developing HD as well. When she decides to get tested, those 
results have a significant impact for her children, and could even result in a diagnosis for 
one of them. Also, in the case of identical twins, a diagnosis of HD could be made for the 
twin that was not even tested. The authors explain that with genetic information, people 
can be diagnosed with a condition even without specifically participating in the test. 
While nongenetic testing has implications for the family, PGT can have a considerably 
higher level of risk to families. There are also people against the idea of genetic 
exceptionalism. Green and Botkin say that there are three common aspects of genetic and 
nongenetic predictive tests. First, the tests both try to predict future illnesses whether it is 
testing for BRCA or testing cholesterol for a potential stroke. Second, the general 
procedures for both are comparable; there is a family history discussion and an exam. 
Sometimes for PGT, there is additional blood work. Third, whether the records are kept 
electronically or in print, both involve the same procedures. Green and Botkin suggest 
that genetic and nongenetic information have the same risks and benefits when it comes 
to medical records. Authors like Neil Manson and Onora O‘Neill say that most things 
said about genetic information can also be said of other non-genetic information and both 
can be acquired through observation without the person‘s knowledge. Also, genetic 
information requires a lot of interpretation, and specific information about an individual 
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that might not be evident at the beginning.
138
 Green and Botkin suggest that even though 
PGT has the ability to predict disease, nongenetic tests can also predict future illnesses, 
giving examples of testing for HIV, TB, and cholesterol. After getting results of HIV, this 
nongenetic test can have a significant impact on a person‘s medical future and his or her 
family. Many tests have the ability to predict future medical problems, and as a result, the 
predictive nature of the test is not distinctive enough to separate it from nongenetic 
information. Questions about disclosure and confidentiality of family members would 
arise from both PGT and nongenetic predictive testing. In regards to discrimination, there 
are many types of nongenetic medical information that can cause social and legal 
discrimination; however, discrimination in both instances should be discouraged. 
Psychological risks are not exclusive to PGT, and often times there can be significant 
psychological harms when having a positive HIV test. Instead of differentiating tests by 
genetic or nongenetic, Green and Botkin suggest analyzing tests by looking at four areas. 
Those areas include: ―1) the degree to which information learned from the test can be 
stigmatizing, 2) the effect of the test results on others, 3) the availability of effective 
interventions to alter the natural course predicted by the information, and 4) the 
complexity involved in interpreting test results.‖139 The authors argue that genetics has a 
limited effect on gaining additional analysis or protections for a test, because genetics is 
only one of the aspects involved. The authors suggest that the clinical consequences are 
more important than the genetic foundations of the test.
140
 
The idea behind genetic determinism can be damaging since it elevates genetics 
and generally excludes other factors. One extreme example of genetic determinism 
focuses on the eugenics movement of sterilization laws and Nazi concentration camps, 
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which was started by people who focused solely on scientific knowledge and genetic 
attributes.
141
 Having a singular focus on a person‘s genes can cause some problems for 
both the patient and the patient‘s family. In their article, Michael Green and Jeffrey 
Botkin conclude by saying, ―practitioners and patients must consider the consequences of 
any predictive testing before an asymptomatic person learns what he or she might not 
want to know.‖142 While this paper does not argue for genetic exceptionalism, it should 
be noted that genetic information does possess a unique value to individuals and their 
family. This area demonstrates the importance genetic information has on consent for the 
patient and the patient‘s family. As a result, appropriate measures are needed to ensure 
the responsibility of genetic information especially in areas that can have potential side 
effects on others.
143
  
4. Coercion  
Douglas Martin and Heather Greenwood in ―Public Perceptions of Ethical Issues 
Regarding Adult Predictive Genetic Testing,‖ also look at external pressures of PGT. The 
public who were involved in the study were concerned that ―external pressures may 
affect the capacity for free choice, such as pressure from family members, either to be 
tested or not to be tested, because of the impact of the resulting knowledge.‖144 The 
public was also concerned about the possible implications of this testing such as 
reproductive decisions. One person said ―there may be an ethical obligation on the part of 
women primarily, men too I guess, who test positive, not to have children.‖145 Coercion 
can be a strong influence in family members and patient‘s decisions about PGT. 
E. Conclusion  
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 This chapter focused on PGT in general, and it analyzed four main areas including 
the science of PGT, understanding genetic risks, disclosing possible treatment options, 
and identifying the influence genetic information has on families. First, the science of 
PGT is important to understand, because it is the foundation of all the other aspects of 
testing. PGT is the analysis of risk predictions for diseases. The science of PGT should 
help people understand and be aware of the uncertainties that go into this type of testing. 
Because the science of PGT is still relatively new, scientists are still trying to understand 
how certain genes interact and know which genes are involved in diseases.
146
 Also 
knowing the science of PGT can help people to have a basic knowledge of the potential 
risks and benefits of testing.
147
 The reasons that are generally given for participating in 
PGT include detecting and preventing disease, reducing the severity of disease through 
treatment, planning for the future, and eliminating uncertainty or anxiety about possible 
diseases.
 
Sometimes these reasons can be broken into categories like motivational or 
emotional. Some of the potential risks of testing include anxiety, feelings of 
powerlessness, discrimination, and/or discrimination.
148
 
The second section discussed was genetic risks and probabilities. Understanding 
genetic risks can be extremely complicated, but this section tries to address the basic test 
interpretations and possible misunderstandings that can accompany testing. Sometimes 
tests can have confusing, vague results which can be difficult to interpret.
149
 Positive test 
results mean that the test identified a variation that put the individual at an increased risk 
of disease.
150
 Negative results mean that there was no variation found, but there could 
still be false assurances.
151
 A negative test means that a person has the same level of risk 
for disease as the general population.
152
 When interpreting results, it is important to 
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understand that diseases are multifactorial, taking into account many different variables 
that determine the amount of risk such as environmental and physical factors.
153
 Also 
different genes affect people differently, and there is no way to know how people will be 
affected in the future.
154
 Since understanding test results can be complicated, it is 
important to try to eliminate as many misunderstandings as possible. The three main 
categories of misunderstandings include genetic tests, genetic mechanisms, and statistics. 
Perceptions can make a significant impact on people, and if those perceptions prove to be 
faulty, then the people who held those beliefs are often confused and have even higher 
anxiety levels. Education can also help with understanding genetic risks and eliminating 
some of the misconceptions that are common.
155
 Having increased public education can 
help patients with future communications with their doctors. In addition, physicians can 
have more education about how to communicate these concepts to patients in order to 
encourage meaningful discussions.
156
  
The third section looks at potential treatment options. Sometimes people think this 
testing will help with future treatments, but sometimes there are no treatment options for 
certain diseases. Some thought that if a gene was found that ―treatment existed, or would 
soon be developed— that prevention and treatment were possible, as is generally the case 
with other clinical tests that have been developed and used.‖157 PGT is different than 
other medical tests, because sometimes testing does not lead to a cure or treatment. This 
area looks at possible disclosure standards for identifying options of PGT.
158
 Disclosure 
is an important aspect, especially when identifying the possible treatment options for a 
particular disease.
159
 Possible treatment options include preventive or prophylactic 
measures, measures to lessen or prevent the disease, and/or just surveillance with no 
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treatment.
160
 Specific treatment options were discussed for HBOC, which demonstrate 
the importance of identifying and disclosing possible options for PGT.
161
 
Since this testing relates to the entire family, the fourth part of this chapter 
discusses the importance of family-related genetic information in relation to PGT. This 
section emphasizes the impact a family can have on a person being tested and the impact 
a person being tested can have on the whole family.
162
 Sometimes it can be difficult for 
people to tell his or her family about testing results, because those results have 
implications for the family as well.
163
 Several family members have to be tested before a 
hereditary condition can be identified, but sometimes disclosure can be difficult.
164
 This 
section offers some help when recommending additional support from genetics staff help 
patients disclose information to families.
165
 Ideally patients should disclose test results to 
those that could be affected by the results in order to prepare for the future. If patients do 
not disclose that information, the families are not aware of the risk and cannot participate 
in PGT.
166
 The issue of genetic exceptionalism also arises when discussing family-related 
information, because genetic exceptionalism recognizes that genetic information affects 
more than just the individual patient. Genetic exceptionalism focuses on the special 
nature of genetics, while recognizing the implications for the entire family.
167
 While 
some argue for genetic exceptionalism, some argue against this idea saying that both 
genetic and non-genetic information can help to predict certain illnesses.
168
 Since PGT 
has many implications for families, sometimes these external pressures can culminate in 
coercion of the patient or the family.
169
 This last section discusses the importance of 
eliminating coercion and/or controlling external pressures.  
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This chapter gives an overview of the factors that are important in PGT. The 
science of PGT is important in order to understand the rest of PGT. Genetic risks and 
probabilities are central to a person‘s decision about whether or not to participate in PGT. 
It is also crucial for people to know the possible treatment options or the lack of treatment 
options for a disease before deciding to go any further in their testing. Since PGT can 
impact both the patient and the patient‘s family, knowing the possible family implications 
can help to strengthen a person‘s informed consent for PGT. All of these aspects are 
central to the discussion of informed consent and PGT and help in understanding the 
concepts of the future chapters.  
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Chapter Three: The History and Components of Informed Consent 
The third chapter explores the history of consent to identify the widely recognized 
components of consent (understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) that represent the 
current model. This first part will analyze the clinical and research history of informed 
consent and discuss specific cases. Then, the second part will look at the emergence of 
the components of informed consent which are comprehension, disclosure, and 
voluntariness. This section will discuss the components of consent that have influenced 
the current model.  
The ethics of science and medicine is often discussed within the realm of 
bioethics. Bioethics discussions first started with the scientific and medical communities, 
and then theologians and philosophers entered the discussions. The study of bioethics 
promotes the identification and prevention of ethical concerns. One of the most important 
and foundational areas of bioethics is informed consent.
1
 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. 
suggests that an action involving another person is not ethically justifiable without that 
person‘s permission or consent. Thus, informed consent originated from the idea that 
individuals should have the right to make decisions themselves. In order for a medical 
treatment or research study to be morally acceptable, a person‘s consent is required 
before treatment or participation in research.
2
  
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress note that there are often two interpretations 
of informed consent. Subsequently, these two interpretations need to be distinguished so 
that it is clear adequate consent has been given. The first interpretation deals with an 
autonomous authorization. This interpretation is demonstrated when a person actively 
and voluntarily gives permission for a procedure and/or treatment without coercion. This 
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is most often seen as the ethical ideal for consent, because mere agreement with a 
recommendation for treatment is not enough to satisfy this first interpretation.
3
 The 
second interpretation deals with effective consent. This interpretation is generally 
identified as the legal and typical hospital approach before a treatment can occur. This 
interpretation of consent looks at social and legal guidelines and does not emphasize 
autonomy. Because the second interpretation does not focus on the individual actively 
authorizing an action, sometimes the second interpretation falls short of the ethical ideal. 
However, that does not diminish the importance of the second interpretation, because 
hospitals need to have consent guidelines that can be applied easily without 
overwhelming the patient or physician. The mature minor doctrine is a helpful illustration 
for identifying the differences in these interpretations. A minor can understand and 
authorize a treatment under the definition of an autonomous authorization, but the minor 
cannot give effective consent without being recognized legally as a mature minor with all 
the rights of an adult. Thus, a person can authorize an action, while not being able to give 
effective consent.
4
 While these interpretations are distinct, the prerequisites of effective 
consent are needed to make sure that the autonomous authorization can be upheld and 
implemented. In order for consent to be practical, both interpretations of consent are 
needed. If there is an autonomous authorization without fulfilling the requirements of 
effective consent, then consent has not taken place like the case of the mature minor 
doctrine. On the other hand, if there is an effective consent without an autonomous 
authorization, adequate consent has not taken place either. Combining the two 
interpretations can give a greater depth to consent. When looking at the history of 
consent, both of these concepts are utilized. A better understanding of consent history 
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ensues when an individual is able to recognize which interpretation is being used at the 
time. Thus, it is important to differentiate between these two interpretations before 
discussing the background of consent.  
A. The Background of Informed Consent 
 The first section of this chapter will give an overview of the history of informed 
consent in both the clinical and research fields. The background of consent analyzes the 
cases that helped to shape consent in history. The first part will look at the clinical history 
of consent and will focus on the patient treatment model. The second part will look at the 
history of consent in research and will focus on the research subject model of consent. 
The third section will summarize the history and look at the two models of consent.  
1. Clinical History 
The first section will divide the clinical history into three sections: the early 
history of consent, the cases during the1950s and 1960s, and then the cases in the late 
1900s. Each will analyze the important cases that arose during that time. 
a. Early History 
In Hippocratic times, patients were typically not informed about their health.
5
 In 
the Hippocratic tradition, there was no discussion of treatment options or the reasoning 
behind the physician‘s recommendations.6 Instead of including patients in discussions of 
their health to encourage patient participation, the patients were only to obey the doctor. 
The responsibility of the physician was to protect the patients.
7
 While the physician was 
to act in the patient‘s best interest, some type of permission was required before the 
physician started. As clarified by Albert Jonsen permission was either implied or explicit. 
This idea comes from the 15
th
 century English common law, which required permission 
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before touching. Even in the 15
th
 century, if permission was not obtained, touching was 
considered an offense.
8
  
In 1674, in some cultures, doctors and patients would agree on treatments; 
however, that was not the norm for the day. In the Mediterranean area, that emphasis on 
agreement evolved in 1756. During this time, detailed information was given to patients 
regarding their conditions and the proposed treatments. Since medical education was 
incomplete and physicians had limited experience at the time, Christopoulos, Falagas, 
Gourzis, and Trompoukis clarify that this level of understanding was unexpected. In one 
instance on April 1756, a father had signed a form saying that he understood his son‘s 
diagnosis and treatment, hired a doctor to carry out the treatment, and acknowledged that 
if anything went wrong he would not hold the doctor responsible. Even if the document 
was written to protect the doctor or the patient, this example demonstrates the 
considerable amount of understanding the father had towards his son‘s disease and 
treatment.
9
   
One of the first legal cases for consent, Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, occurred in 
1767. The court ruled that since requiring simple consent was typical during that time, the 
physician should be held responsible for failing to meet that standard.
10
 In this case, 
getting consent from the patient was a means to encourage better cooperation after the 
operation and not to demonstrate autonomy or authority.
11
 It was a means to an ends.  
Beauchamp explains that Thomas Percival‘s book, Medical Ethics, in 1803 
asserted that the patient‘s beneficence was more important than truth-telling. The book 
also suggested that this dishonesty was charitable.
12
 Deception for the good of the patient 
was accepted, because the physician knew what was best for the patient at the time.
13
 As 
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a result, many physicians did not see the point of informed consent, and many times 
decisions were made without consulting the patients.
14
 During this time in history, the 
physician‘s benevolent intentions were emphasized more than patient consent. Thus 
consent regulations were not seen to be a necessity.   
The principles of informed consent originated around 1905 with Mohr v. 
Williams.
15
 Anna Mohr gave consent for an operation on her right ear, but noticing she 
needed surgery on the left instead, the physician performed surgery without her consent 
for that side. The court said the physician should have gotten consent for that as well.
16
 
Another case in 1905, Pratt v. Dams, ruled that consent from the specific individual 
needed to take place before surgery. Dr. Pratt only told Mr. Davis about the need for his 
wife‘s surgery. Mrs. Davis did not consent to or know about the surgery to remove her 
uterus and ovaries. Thinking Mrs. Davis did not warrant additional information, Dr. Pratt 
did not tell her, because he did not want her to worry or be hostile.
17
  
The Schloendorff v. the Society of the New York Hospitals case in 1914 
established the nature of the consent discussion.
 
After complaining of stomach problems, 
a woman consented to an examination in New York in 1908. She did not consent to 
surgery, but the doctor operated anyway. As a result, the operation led to gangrene and 
the loss of fingers.
18
 With this case Justice Cardozo ruled that all competent adults should 
be able to make medical decisions for him- or herself.
19 S
ince doctors can be liable for 
surgeries done without consent
, 
the physician in this case was liable for damages he 
caused.
20
 In his work on informed consent, Beauchamp explains that the case illustrates 
patient self-determination and supports the 15
th
 century principle that protected against 
unwanted touching.
21
 However, Lewis Vaughn notes that while the case emphasized self-
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determination, the ruling did not combine being informed with being able to consent.
22
 
Another way of demonstrating this point is made by Alfred Tauber when he explains that 
a simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answer was acceptable for consent at that time. Later in the 1920s 
and 30s, consent started to demonstrate more of an emphasis on patient participation with 
the Haskins v. Howard case in 1929.
23
 However there were also exceptions to that; one 
being an emphasis on consent in order to protect doctors against malpractice suits.
24
 
During this time, some cases focused more on patient participation and authorization, 
while others emphasized more of an effective consent to protect against litigation.  
b. Mid 1900s 
In 1955, judges in the Hunt v. Bradshaw case ruled that failure to disclose 
information about potential paralysis after surgery was enough for liability.
25
 In 1957, 
Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees focused on the duty of 
physicians to disclose material information.
26
 Martin Salgo was paralyzed after having a 
translumbar aortography. Because the physician did not tell him of the risk for paralysis, 
the court ruled in favor of Mr. Salgo.
27
 During the ruling, the California Supreme Court 
said there was a duty for physicians to disclose relevant information in order to make an 
intelligent decision.
28
 This was the first case that used the phrase ―informed consent,‖ 
which was coined by Justice Bray.
29
 This case was also one of the first to link disclosure 
to patient consent.
30
  
Several cases in the 1960s develop the concepts of disclosure. As a result of the 
Natanson v. Kline case of 1960, Hana Osman suggests that the consequences of not 
informing patients changed from battery to negligence.
31
 Mrs. Natanson, claiming her 
doctor did not inform her of the risks of cobalt therapy, suffered serious burns.
32
 The case 
85 
 
determined that the risks, benefits, and alternatives of a proposed treatment needed to be 
disclosed.
33
 If one of those areas is left out of the discussion, then negligence can occur.
34
 
This case emphasizes the three general types of information that should be disclosed. 
Another case takes that information further. In the Mitchell case, the court suggested that 
physicians should inform patients about some of the more severe risks as well.
35
 Then in 
a Kansas case dealing with patient paralysis after a sodium urokan injection, disclosure of 
the risks, benefits, and alternatives was proven not to be enough. In this case, Justice 
Schroeder said that doctors needed to inform patients in easy to understand language 
about the disease, treatment options, possible risks, and the likelihood of a positive 
outcome.
36
 Thus, disclosure was beginning to be linked with understanding. As a result, 
doctors were required to give patients suitable information before getting consent.  
Albert Jonsen explains that the 1960s brought about the professional duty of the 
physician to disclose material information to patients. There were a couple of 
transplantation cases that demonstrated the importance of disclosure especially when 
evaluating the risks and benefits to a healthy donor. A transplant case in 1969 in 
Kentucky looked into transplantation involving identical twins at the Peter Bent Brigham 
Hospital. One twin needed a transplant, but the other was healthy and theoretically able to 
donate to the other twin. Since the twins were minors, this caused debate about the risks 
and benefits of transplantation in minors. Generally medical procedures for minors were 
acceptable if there was a medical benefit, but questions arose about what the benefit was 
to the healthy twin donating the organ. After looking at three cases, the judges said 
surgery was acceptable if certain conditions were met including consent of the parents 
and donor and proof that the healthy twin profited even psychiatrically from the 
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procedure. In one of the cases, the potential kidney donor, Jerry Strunk, was mentally 
retarded and living in the state mental hospital. Approving the transplant, the court ruled 
that Jerry would actually benefit by having his brother live. Thus the court adhered to the 
principle of benefit for both the donor and the recipient.
37
 While these cases bring up 
many issues, the important aspect for consent was the evaluation of the available 
information. In order for the healthy twin to consent to transplantation, the physician 
needed to provide adequate information of the risks and benefits for each party involved. 
c. Late 1900s to early 2000 
In 1972, the California Supreme Court in the Cobb v. Grant case ruled that all the 
information material to decision making should be disclosed to patients by physicians.
38
 
Also in 1972, the Canterbury v. Spence case in Washington D.C. added another 
dimension to disclosure. In 1958 Mr. Canterbury had a laminectomy due to shoulder pain 
and possibly a ruptured disc, and a day after surgery fell and became paralyzed. Dr. 
Spence then did a second surgery, but Mr. Canterbury was unable to recover fully and 
suffered from incontinence and partial paralysis. He sued claiming that the doctor never 
told him of the risk for paralysis. The court ruled the risk of paralysis was material to his 
decision, and thus was needed for consent.
39
 Post, Blustein, and Dubler clarify this point 
further when explaining that enough information was needed so that a rational person 
could make a decision about a treatment.
40
 However, because patients do not have a 
complete understanding of medicine and only have the doctor to help him or her reach an 
appropriate choice, the court ruled that physician disclosure was required.
41
 The court 
ruled in favor of Mr. Canterbury, which demonstrated the importance of patient decision 
making. As a result of this case, Judge Robinson said that disclosure guidelines should be 
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based off of the patient rather than the physician.
42
 Because this case encouraged the 
reasonable patient standard, many states implemented that view instead of the reasonable 
physician standard.
43
 However, the reasonable physician standard was still the most 
widely held view.  
The 1980 case, Truman v. Thomas, concerned a woman named Rena Truman who 
died at the age of 30. Dr. Thomas was Rena Truman‘s doctor from 1963 until 1969. 
During that time, Dr. Thomas never did a pap smear. In 1969 she was diagnosed with 
advanced cervical cancer after going to another doctor. Her children sued Dr. Thomas, 
and said that if he had done a pap smear, their mother could still be alive or at least could 
have had a better chance of survival. Dr. Thomas said that he had told her she should get 
a pap smear, but Rena always rejected the idea, either because it was too costly or she did 
not feel like having it done. The ruling said that just because a patient does not agree to a 
procedure does not mean that the requirement for disclosure should be any less. The 
ruling suggests that the decision to reject a procedure does not change the doctor-patient 
relationship, because both decisions require physician assistance and input.
44
 The court 
originally ruled that Dr. Thomas was not negligent for not specifically informing Rena 
about the possible risks of not having a pap smear. But later an appeal tested his duty of 
care in not fully explaining the consequences of rejecting a pap smear. Dolgin and 
Shepherd suggest that this case illustrates the need for explaining both the risks and 
benefits whether the patient consents or not to a medical procedure.
45
  
The case in California in 1990, Moore v. Regents of the University of California 
analyzed potential conflicts of interests. After diagnosing Mr. Moore with hairy-cell 
leukemia, the physician withheld information about his plans for Mr. Moore‘s unique 
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samples. Since there was not a lot of research done on this leukemia, the doctor used his 
tissue to get a patent on the cells. Deliberately withholding this information, the doctor 
received the patent before proceeding to remove Mr. Moore‘s spleen. The court ruled the 
physicians also had to disclose personal, non-medical information if that information 
could affect the patient‘s decision-making capabilities. Because the physician‘s judgment 
could have been impaired by financial conflicts of interests and the patient was not 
informed about this research or the patent, the court determined that Mr. Moore did not 
give informed consent.
46
 
The Arato v. Avedon case in California in 1993 evaluated the duty of a physician 
to give the life expectancy of a patient. This case involved a patient undergoing 
experimental chemotherapy and radiation for an advanced stage of cancer. While the 
physician told the patient and family the risks and benefits and his poor prognosis, 
statistics were not given for his chance of survival. The case stated that the patient would 
not have consented to chemotherapy if he knew the low success rates and life 
expectancy.
47
 However, the ruling determined adequate information was given to make 
an informed decision. Because statistics are not always dependable, the court said the 
statistics were not necessary.
48
 Another case looking at disclosure of additional 
information was the Johnson v. Kokemoor case in 1996. As clarified by Janet Dolgin, the 
case was based on a physician‘s failure to report his inexperience with the proposed 
surgery.
49
 The court determined that a physician‘s lack of experience can change the risks 
for surgery. As a result, the ruling explained that general risks could significantly 
increase if an inexperienced doctor performs the procedure.
50
 Another way of noting this 
point is made by B. Sonny Bal and Theodore Choma when explaining that presenting 
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patients with general statistics and ignoring other statistics that could yield material 
information is not recommended and could be misleading. In the end however, the patient 
dropped the claim. Both the Arato v. Avedon and the Johnson v. Kokemoor case 
demonstrate some additional information that might be material to a patient‘s decision.51   
All of these initial cases formulate the principles and ideas of the informed 
consent procedures of today. The next area will focus on the history of research cases for 
informed consent.  
2. Research History 
While the clinical aspects of informed consent were being established, the 
morality of human subject research was being formed and analyzed. Jonsen illuminates 
this point further. Because there are only future benefits and no individual therapeutic 
purpose to research, the ethics of human subject research was questioned.
52
 This section 
looks at the early history, the mid 1900s, and then the late 1900s to early 2000s.   
a. Early History 
Engelhardt explains that in 1538 in the Summa Armilla, Bartolomaeus Fumus said 
doctors err when substituting accepted procedures for experimental measures, because 
the physicians are experimenting with patients and exposing them to harm. A Jesuit 
moral theologian John Ford argued that if research was to take place, then consent was 
essential for experimental studies that did not heal but evaluated side effects. If consent 
was ignored, then the research was immoral, unethical, and illegal. Jonsen notes that 
another important aspect of research consent was suggested by Dr. Otto Guttentag. In 
order for research consent to be ethical, the differences between physician and physician 
experimenter had to be recognized. To reduce confusion about research and medical 
90 
 
treatment, people need to be aware of the different goals of the two positions.
53
 This is 
often one of the most important aspects of research consent. This section will discuss the 
major cases that shaped consent for human subject research.  
The Walter Reed yellow fever experiments in the 1880s helped to establish 
procedures for informed consent.
54
 Dr. Reed and Drs. James Carroll, Jesse Lazear, and 
Aristide Agramonte tested their hypothesis of yellow fever transmission from 
mosquitoes. Since Dr. Lazear and some staff died from self-experimentation, the 
researchers sought volunteers and created a form that described the purpose and risks of 
the experiment. The forms said that the people volunteered freely. Reimbursement would 
be given to survivors or relatives if the subject died. In the end, 25 got sick but none died. 
Proving beneficial, the results demonstrated the mode of transmission and proved 
mosquitoes were the source. The yellow fever experiments made it possible for healthy 
volunteers to freely consent. As a result, in 1886 Dr. Charles Francis Withington, 
receiving an award for his dissertation The Relation of Hospitals to Medical Education, 
said that in-patients were more than biological samples and nobody should participate 
against their will especially if the research had no clear medical purpose. Then later in 
1900, the Prussian Ministry of Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs said that 
research with no clear benefit to the individual should not be conducted unless he or she 
explicitly consents after the risks and benefits were explained. Later the guidelines were 
strengthened to include regulations for vulnerable populations and documentation 
procedures. Looking at vulnerable populations and documentation, in 1912, the research 
of Dr. Hideyo Noguchi with the Rockefeller Institute was questioned, because he infected 
400 people from mental hospitals, orphanages, or hospitals with syphilis without 
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obtaining their consent. As a result, Walter Cannon, a Harvard physiologist, argued that 
before being published in a research journal which this case was, the articles should 
ensure and document that both research subjects and their families are informed of the 
experimental procedure and given a chance to give consent. Even though there were 
regulations being developed for research consent, research studies in general were still 
novel and sometimes premature. In 1935, since researchers were using a live polio 
vaccine during testing, 9 children died, and as a result, research was discontinued for 20 
years.
55
   
During the 1940s, vaccines were developed for shigella, research was done with 
military using mustard gas without their consent, and pregnant women were given 
radioactive iron for an experimental program. In 1941 research was conducted at the 
Ohio Soldiers and Sailors Orphanage, New Jersey State Colony for the Feeble-Minded, 
and a mental hospital in Dixon, Illinois. Radiation experiments with several thousand 
individuals were also conducted during this time, and many times the exposed area had to 
be removed. Research during the war generally had very low consent standards, and as a 
result war time experiments were seen differently than patient experiments. Gregory 
Pence compared consent of research subjects to the selective service which did not 
require consent for being drafted. Pence conveys that some people went to war, while 
others were ordered to participate in research for things like vaccines. These views led up 
to the time of Nazi research, which involved some of the most appalling experimentation 
against humanity. During this time, there were numerous experiments conducted on 
unwilling individuals or prisoners like observational studies for differing altitudes, 
vaccination experiments, and sterilization techniques. At Buchenwald in 1943-1945, 
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prisoners, Jews, and other people involuntarily received trial typhus vaccines. Out of the 
1,000 injected, 158 individuals died from that experiment.
56
  
Dr. Ernst Grawitz studied staphylococci by putting samples in women‘s legs, and 
then tried to identify drugs that would eliminate it. Dr. Sigmund Rascher studied 
hypothermia at Ravensbruck by subjecting naked prisoners to freezing water in order to 
identify revival procedures for pilots who crashed. Some of the worst research was with 
the ―angel of death,‖ Dr. Josef Mengele. Needing revolutionary research to become a 
Professor, Mengele started experimenting at Auschwitz in 1943. Pence expresses that his 
experiments tried to circumvent genetics by changing the individual‘s environment to 
create the perfect blonde hair, blue eyed person without disease. To cut down on the 
variables, he used about 150-200 twins from concentration camps. He tried to produce 
blue eyes by shooting dye in the eyes, transplant organs among twins, create twins by 
making them reproduce, and even surgically conjoin twins which resulted in gangrene. 
He used his twins to study the differences by infecting one and using the other as a 
control, after he had killed both. His research, based on eugenics, was responsible for 
approximately 400,000 deaths. Although he was never caught, the Nuremberg Tribunal 
tried 20 physicians and 3 medical administrators, charged with subjecting people 
involuntarily to research. In the end, nine of the accused got life prison sentences and 
seven were sentenced to death.
57
  
As noted by Miller and Wertheimer, the Nuremberg Code was established in 1946 
to protect against the harms and atrocities committed in the name of science.
58
 The Code 
is typically recognized as the beginning of informed consent.
59
 Requiring voluntary and 
free consent, the Code says that the individual needs enough information and 
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understanding in order to make an informed decision.
60
 These guidelines tried to provide 
increased attention on the dignity of research subjects when making decisions, but Dolgin 
and Shepherd suggest that the patient‘s decisions and consent will not be protected 
appropriately unless researchers adopt these obligations.
61
 Jonsen articulates that the 
Code set forth the idea that research should benefit humanity while eliminating needless 
pain and promoting the responsibility to withdraw from dangerous research trials. Then 
later, the AMA House of Delegates approved regulations for the ethical use of human 
subject research on December 28, 1947 that were based on the Code. On July 14, 1949, 
Dr. Leo Alexander, a psychiatrist who had helped with the Tribunal, said that the Nazi 
experiments arose from both the pursuit of scientific knowledge and unsettling political 
and personal motivations. During this time, many people thought Americans were being 
polluted by utilitarianism which focused on the greater good and often ignored the 
individual‘s good. As a result of this, many did not grasp what happened in Germany. 
Several thought it was applicable only for savages and not the United States.
62
 However, 
the next several years brought equally appalling research cases which occurred in the 
United States. 
b. Mid 1900s 
After the war, in the 1950s and 60s investigators were highly motivated to 
eliminate disease and sickness.
63
 Charles McCarthy suggests that if there was no benefit 
to volunteers, then it was wrong to knowingly subject a person to an unauthorized assault 
on privacy without adequate consent.
64
 One case that demonstrates this further was the 
Porton Down research. Ulf Schmidt describes the Porton Down research of 1953 in 
which gas and toxic smoke inhalation was studied. In this study, Professor Pulvertaft said 
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that some soldiers might be getting persuaded to participate in research without adequate 
disclosure.
65
 The NIH made policies in 1953 emphasizing the difference between healthy 
volunteers and patients.
66
 One of the cases that demonstrate these ideas further is the 
Willowbrook study. In 1956 the Willowbrook case arose in New York at a hospital where 
most were mentally retarded. Drs. Saul Krugman, Joan Giles, and Jack Hammond, 
studying the effects and natural history of hepatitis, infected some of the new patients 
with hepatitis in hopes of developing a vaccine. Because the hospital let researchers 
experiment on many of the patients for the good of society, David and Sheila Rothman 
noted that the lines of treatment and research were blurred in this hospital.
67
 Since most 
children would get hepatitis anyway by living there, the hospital considered this study to 
be acceptable. As clarified by Beauchamp and Childress, this research was justified by 
citing the immunity after and the safety of the children since they were away from others. 
But, the resulting immunity would also occur in others who recovered from the disease. 
Not being the main goal, immunity was an inadvertent side effect; albeit it was a positive 
side effect. However, the end result did not justify this experiment, because as stated by 
Jonsen, a research trial has to be ethical at the beginning. One problem with this study 
was the fact that there were other alternatives to decrease hepatitis such as a gamma-
globulin vaccine, which had already been used to successfully lower the disease 
frequency at this institution. Opponents argue that the children should not be used to 
further scientific research, but that doctors have a responsibility to help the children. In 
regards to consent, one of the biggest problems with this study was the therapeutic 
misconception. The patients were confused as research subjects and vice versa. Another 
problem with consent was the way in which consent was obtained. At the beginning 
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parents were sent letters or had private discussions with the physician, but towards the 
end, parents were grouped together to discuss the protocol. Researchers argued that this 
method of consent allowed them to have better consent, but all the risks might not have 
been given like cirrhosis or other deadly liver problems. Thus, it was not clear whether 
the parents actually understood what the study was and what the risks and benefits 
were.
68
  
Then in the late 1950s, the area of placebos was brought up. There were a couple 
of studies that looked at procedures to treat angina. The experiment included consent of 
surgery for an internal mammary artery ligation, but it did not cover the fact that not 
everyone would have this procedure done. Some patients had a fake surgery, a placebo 
surgery, while others had the real procedure. Because researchers thought simple consent 
was acceptable at this time, this case was not questioned in the beginning. Thus in the 
beginning, obtaining simple consent was enough to conduct trials without disclosing what 
research was being done.
69
 However, in time, other principles were added to consent that 
encouraged additional disclosure.  
In the 1960s some ideas about research were starting to change, including the idea 
that the sole requirement for physician-investigators was to be responsible and truthful. 
On March 8, 1962, Merrell Pharmaceuticals had to withdraw its drug and tell people of 
the possible consequences of taking this medication. The Kefauver-Harris amendment, 
established by the FDA to regulate new medications, required proof of efficacy and 
voluntary consent of subjects in drug trials.
70
 As clarified by Beauchamp, this amendment 
required doctors to tell people it was an experimental drug. During this time, the 
government was more involved in regulations for human subject research and protection. 
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Another case that demonstrates there is more to evaluating an experiment than the 
researcher‘s beneficence and truthfulness was the Jewish Chronic Disease study. In July 
1963, the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn conducted a research experiment 
involving older hospital patients with unclear competence levels. Dr. Chester Southam 
with Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research and Dr. Emmanuel Mandel with the 
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital injected patients with cancer cells without their consent. 
Consenting to a skin test, the patients were not told about the cancer cells and research, 
because often mentioning cancer caused patients to be concerned and suspicious.
71
 Since 
risk was very low, the doctors did not mention cancer for the patient‘s best interest. Dr. 
Southam said that injecting cancer cells was not risky, but he was also hesitant to inject 
himself since there were a limited amount of cancer researchers. By stating it was a skin 
test and not research, confusion occurred which led people to assume it was treatment 
when it was not.
72
 Miller and Wertheimer argue that Dr. Southam did not comprehend the 
important distinction of research and medical care.
73
 Before consent is obtained, people 
need to know the differences between the research and typical medical care. In this case, 
both doctors‘ licenses were suspended, because they obtained consent through coercion 
and deception. The court said that passion and enthusiasm for research cannot disregard 
certain protections.
74
  
 In June 1964, the World Medical Association‘s guidelines for good research, 
―Principles for Those in Research and Experimentation,‖ were updated and became the 
Helsinki Declaration. Jose Miola explains that the Helsinki Declaration, which was 
stronger than the Nuremberg Code, addressed the human dignity of all individuals and 
argued against the idea of deadly human experimentation. The Declaration also defined 
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the difference of patient treatment research and nonclinical research, saying that trials 
without therapeutic benefit required additional safeguards.
75
 While nonclinical research 
typically does not benefit the patient, the goal of clinical treatment research should solely 
be for the patient‘s benefit.76 Another result of the Declaration was the ability of relatives 
or surrogates decision makers to give consent for those who are not able to make 
decisions for themselves.
77
 While the Helsinki Declaration was very helpful to research 
safeguards, the Declaration discussed issues of consent together with being a good, 
trustworthy physician-investigator. As a result, Jonsen suggests that the implied decline 
in the significance of consent was due to many people thinking the only important aspect 
of research was the character and dependability of the researcher.
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Around the same time as the debates about research safeguards, Charles 
McCarthy explains that the NIH established a committee led by Robert Livingston to 
look into human subject research. Also at this time, Dr. Henry Beecher wrote an article 
which gave many examples of blatantly unethical research cases. Because of the many 
corrupt research cases, the committee went against the prevailing idea of that day and 
said there was more to decision making than just the views of the physician and 
researcher. As a result, the committee suggested the need for a regulatory body and 
oversight committee for human subject research.
79
 Thus, Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs) were established in 1966. IRBs try to eliminate unnecessary risk by analyzing the 
risks and benefits of a trial and encouraging consent before participation.
80
 Consent 
during this time was especially important, because the line between research and 
medicine was continually being distorted.
81
 As a result of the many challenging cases, the 
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first written informed consent for research started at the NIH Clinical Center in Bethesda, 
MD in 1966, and other places implemented this towards the end of the 1970s.
82
  
c. Late 1900s to early 2000 
On July 26, 1972 the New York Times described one of the most appalling 
research cases in the United States, the Tuskegee Syphilis study. Lasting 40 years, the 
study involved approximately 600 black men from Tuskegee, Alabama who were 
unknowingly given syphilis in order to study the effects on the body.
83
 In the beginning 
the men were given free transportation, food, and medicine, but towards the middle in 
order to get them back to the hospital, the researchers sent letters saying that they had 
―bad blood‖ and needed medical care including spinal taps.84 At the end, only 74 of the 
400 men with diagnosed syphilis were alive. After Peter Buxtun complained about the 
study in 1966, the researchers reviewing the study decided to secretly continue, but in 
1972 Buxtun told the story to a medical reporter. After the story broke, the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study Ad Hoc Panel in 1972 had different conclusions, saying that the study 
should have never started and the study should be discontinued. This nightmare was 
made worse by the fact that the government regulated this project and never treated any 
of the individuals even after penicillin was readily available by 1948.
85
 Dr. Wenger, head 
of a venereal disease clinic, said that the only way to get the men for autopsy was to put 
them in a government hospital to instill more confidence.
86
 Because there were very 
limited policies for consent procedures or for oversight committees in this study, IRBs 
became more popular and influential after this.
87
 Jonsen notes that this case was the most 
significant for the public‘s view of ethics. A class-action suit against the government was 
settled in 1974 which gave compensation and free medical care for subjects and relatives 
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of the deceased. However, it is unclear whether the people trusted the government for 
medical care after this. This case promulgated the many questions and concerns of 
research ethics and highlighted the importance race had during that time.
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Miller and Wertheimer explain that in 1974 the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research was created to 
establish ethical research guidelines.
89
 Recognizing the need for consent of both healthy 
and sick volunteers, the Commission agreed on surrogate decision making for 
nontherapeutic research if there was lower than average risk. Looking at levels of risk, 
the Commission established some levels of protection. The Office for Protection from 
Research Risks (OPRR) was developed to analyze research guidelines and regulate 
compliance. In the 1970s, a discussion of research on prisoners started. Up until this 
point, a prisoner‘s sentence was reduced if he or she participated in research. However 
Jessica Mitford in her book, Kind and Usual Punishment: The Prison Business, said that 
prisons put unnecessary burdens and intimidation on individuals which created an 
intrinsic coercion. Originally thinking voluntary consent did not apply to prisoners, the 
Commission re-evaluated and concluded that research was permissible in some instances 
when risks and benefits were equitable, prisoners wanted to participate, and research 
would help the quality of medical care for prisoners. But since there was not enough 
emphasis on changing the prison system, prisoner research gradually decreased after 
March 1976 when the Justice Department eliminated the availability of most of those 
programs.
90
 In 1977, some prisoners were given the option of being released from 
Newgate Prison if they participated in a smallpox vaccine trial. Since the standard 
sentence there was death by hanging, many considered themselves lucky since no one 
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died during the trial.
91
 When the National Commission put together their 
recommendations for patient protection and research, the organized guidelines became 
known as ―The Belmont Report‖ in 1979.92 The Report emphasized the importance of 
autonomy and beneficence in order to protect the research subjects.
93
  
Then the Common Rule was adopted for research in 1991. This rule defined 
minimal risk as nothing more than an ordinary risk of everyday life. Minimal risk was 
used in evaluating whether or not an individual should participate in a research study.
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One case that raised questions about minimal risk was a case at the University of 
California at Los Angeles (UCLA) in 1994. As described by Pinals and Applebaum, this 
case observed psychotic patients after withdrawing their medication in order to study the 
disorder relapse. One of the problems with this study was the fact that research said if a 
person is taken off a medication, then sometimes that person will not be able to respond 
as well the next time. This study also brought attention to the use of placebos for people 
already on beneficial medications.
95
 Because there was a chance the individual could 
have residual effects from this study, it was not clear whether this was considered a 
minimal risk or not. In addition to minimal risk discussions, because this case studied 
psychotic patents with no medication, questions about competency and vulnerable 
populations arose as well.  
In 1995, the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (ACHRE) 
looked into human subject research in 1944 to 1974.
96 
In about half of the cases, the 
committee found the disclosure of risks and other material information was lacking and 
there was little concern for those with limited decision-making capabilities. The National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission‘s (NBAC) analyzed these cases in their report, 
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―Research Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May Affect Decisionmaking 
Capacity.‖ The report recommended having an independent professional analyze a 
person‘s capacity to consent to research if there was a greater than average risk.97 Also 
the ACHRE recommended apologizing for some studies, because some of the worst cases 
led to a significant lack of trust in the medical system.
98
 In 1997, President Clinton 
officially apologized for the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.
99
 At that time, $10 million from 
the government went to the subjects and/or relatives of the Study.
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In 1999, 18 year-old Jesse Gelsinger died from complications of an experimental 
study looking at ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency (OTC) at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Andrew Thompson and Norman Temple note that while the study would 
not benefit him, Jesse understood it had a chance of helping others. But 4 days after the 
procedure, he died from multiple organ failure.
101
 A wrongful death suit was brought 
against Dr. Wilson saying he was aware the virus had caused problems in the past for 
people with OTC. It was later identified that Dr. Wilson had financial conflicts of 
interests with the company responsible for the adenovirus. The claim argued that Dr. 
Wilson did not use clear language so that the family could understand plainly what was 
involved. Over the next several years, the NIH, having strict guidelines, suspended 
clinical research at several research universities.
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Then in the early 2000s, a couple of cases dealt with inadequate disclosure. The 
first case occurred in 2000 in Uganda. Enrolling about 15,000 people, this study looked at 
questions about HIV transmission. As clarified by Paul Farmer and Nicole Gastineau 
Campos, the report said that the participants were not told about treatment and spouses 
were not told about the other spouse‘s disease status.103  The second case occurred in 
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2001 in the United States. In 2001, researchers of the Krieger lead paint study solicited 
people to move into houses with lead paint.
104
 The Institute enrolled 108 lower economic 
families, but did not tell them of the risk of mental retardation from lead paint. Maryland 
Judge Dale Cathell held that the board had suggested researchers drew up forms 
circumventing regulations for risk disclosure. One critic compared the children to 
canaries used in mining.
105
 As a result, there were several lawsuits from parents of 
children suffering from complications such as learning disabilities. The court argued that 
parents and researchers could not deliberately expose children to harmful situations 
where no benefit was expected.
106
 This was a major case for research involving children 
since there was no possibility of benefit. Both cases illustrate a lack of disclosure to 
research subjects.  
In 2003, the Greenberg v. Miami Children‘s Hospital Research Institute case in 
Florida evaluated the research under Dr. Matalon. In 1987 Dr. Matalon joined Dr. 
Greenberg to identify the Canavan gene in order to create a genetic screening test. Dr. 
Greenberg and the Chicago Chapter of the National Tay-Sachs and Allied Diseases 
Association (NTSAD), Inc. asked the Canavan families to give some tissue samples and 
money to help their research progress. As a result of the information, Dr. Greenberg and 
the NTSAD created a registry with medical and social information about the families. 
After changing workplaces in 1990, Dr. Matalon continued his research and the families 
continued giving him their support. In 1993, Dr. Matalon found the gene, applied for a 
patent on September 1994, and became the sole inventor on the patent in October 1997. 
A year later, the families said that Miami Children‘s Hospital and Research Institute were 
pressuring testing centers with legal actions and royalty fees as a result of the patent. 
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However, the families claimed that Dr. Matalon and Miami Children‘s breached the 
informed consent by not informing the families of the patent and the potential fees. Since 
the families thought the test would not be commercialized in order to lower the cost and 
find a cure, they said they might not have participated in the research if they knew 
otherwise. However, the court ruled against the families, because the families were seen 
more as contributors of money and samples.
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3. Conclusion 
Consent is generally required to minimize harm to both the patient and research 
subject. However, when studying these two areas, the history illustrates some of the 
complexities of differentiating between clinical and research consent. In 1962 Walter 
Modell argued that a patient automatically consents to research when going to a doctor 
for help even if he or she did not explicitly give consent. Through the many cases that 
shaped consent requirements, clinical and research authorization were further delineated. 
The Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case illustrates that differentiating between the 
clinical and research context is especially important for consent. If research enlists 
vulnerable populations where patients are confused with participants, then informed 
consent has not occurred adequately.
108
 Thus, Laura Weiss Roberts suggests that people 
need to recognize the differences between clinical and research contexts and objectives 
before consent is given. If research participants do not realize the experiment has no 
medical benefit for them personally, then therapeutic misconception exists and consent 
should be questioned.
109
  
Because new developments in genetics have the opportunity for both research 
subject and patient treatment models of consent, this paper will adopt both for PGT. 
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Since genetic testing can reveal many different treatment options, consent for PGT 
should have a strong patient treatment focus. On the other hand, since PGT can perform 
research on the resulting information, consent should have an emphasis on a research 
subject model as well. While both approaches will be used in certain situations, the main 
focus of PGT for this paper will be on the patient treatment model.  
B. Emergence of the Components of Informed Consent 
The second section discusses the emergence of the components of consent within 
the historical setting. By evaluating the historical, ethical, and legal aspects of consent, a 
greater view of consent is possible.
110
 This section will analyze the current components of 
consent that have arisen from history. In order for there to be adequate consent, Tom 
Beauchamp suggests evaluating three aspects. First, there has to be an understanding of 
the information. Second, after evaluating the disclosed information and 
recommendations, a decision can be made and permission obtained. Third, consent has to 
be voluntary without undue sources of coercion.
111
 After taking into account those 
aspects, an individual should be able to give a reasonably justified consent for a 
procedure or study. These three components will be looked at further in the proceeding 
sections.   
The first area will look at comprehension. Specific examples and cases will be 
discussed in relation to the history. Then the concepts of autonomy, competence, and 
understanding will be discussed further. The second area will focus on disclosure looking 
at the history, the standards, and the information that is typically included in disclosure. 
The third and last area that will be discussed is voluntariness. This area will give specific 
examples of cases that demonstrated voluntariness or a lack of voluntariness. Then the 
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concepts that arose from the historical examples of informed consent will be analyzed 
further in regards to voluntariness. Each category will discuss the questions that arise 
from the idea of what comprises informed consent. 
1. Comprehension  
The first section deals with comprehension in relation to informed consent. The 
history of comprehension with specific examples will be analyzed at the beginning. Then 
the ideas which arose from the history of consent and comprehension are broken down 
and discussed further. Those ideas include autonomy, competence, and understanding.  
a. History 
The relationship between comprehension and autonomy has been formulated 
throughout history. Stephen Wear expresses that at the beginning, doctors assumed 
patients consented to treatment, because the patients sought the doctor out for a problem. 
Often the mere presence of the patient was enough to signal permission to the doctor, 
even if the patient did not understand everything involved in the treatment.
112
 This 
practice supported the idea that physicians were in charge and that the autonomy of the 
patient did not matter. Paternalism was the overwhelming principle during that time. 
However, in the 17
th
 century, De Sorbiere, a French doctor and philosopher, thought 
about full disclosure, but then said it was not practical and could lead to a lack of 
physician trust. He argued that this idea might make patients question whether or not he 
was able to practice medicine properly. In addition, he said that normally patients would 
not be able to understand enough to make an intelligent decision.
113
 Even though he 
dismissed the idea, he did acknowledge that some people might be able to give consent 
for themselves. This idea would be developed later.   
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Albert Jonsen explains that the Walter Reed yellow fever experiments around 
1880 encouraged the ideas of autonomy and comprehension in research consent. 
Following that case, Dr. Charles Francis Withington in 1886 argued that people should be 
able to consent to research themselves. Toward the 20
th
 century, Mark Twain suggested 
that faith and confidence in the doctor was all that was required at the time. Around 1903 
Richard Cabot expressed that patients should be informed and physicians should disclose 
some information. However because paternalism was still prevalent at the time, Cabot 
was not arguing that patients should make decisions themselves. He was arguing for more 
information with simple consent. A little later Dr. Francis Moore supported the ideas of 
Cabot that physicians should discuss the dangers of treatment with the patients. But as he 
noted, since patients do not have adequate education or evaluation skills to make that 
decision, the patient should not be allowed to actually make the decision.
114
 The 
Schloendorff v. the Society of the New York Hospitals case in 1914 started the new 
emphasis on patient autonomy. Justice Benjamin Cardozo‘s famous quote demonstrated a 
new emphasis on patient self-determination.
115 
Because the Nazi experiments lacked 
autonomy and comprehension of risks, the Nuremberg Code was needed to establish the 
requirement of adequate understanding for research.
116
 The Willowbrook study in 1956 
was another case illustrating insufficient consent and comprehension of risks.
117
 While 
autonomy was starting to progress, the idea of comprehension of risks and benefits also 
started to arise. The 1957 case, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of 
Trustees, concluded that some information needed to be discussed with the patient in 
order to encourage understanding. However, if confusion exists about the differences 
between research and treatment, understanding is not present. The Jewish Chronic 
107 
 
Disease Hospital case in 1963 illustrates the confusion that existed among comprehension 
and research consent. One witness in Southam‘s defense said that consent was adequate, 
because there was no risk. The witness suggested that a minimal level of risk was enough 
to satisfy consent.
118
 Also since the participants thought the research was for their benefit, 
the patients evidently did not comprehend or understand the experiment. Then later the 
court in the Canterbury v. Spence case took comprehension further and said that 
autonomy depends on the amount of information that is needed for an enlightened 
decision.
119
 The Tuskegee Syphilis study demonstrated an alarming lack of autonomy and 
comprehension.
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One of the cases that illustrate many aspects of comprehension and consent was 
the suicide of Dr. Chad Calland with the UCSF School of Medicine after having 5 kidney 
transplants. An article, ―Iatrogenic Problems in End-Stage Renal Failure," published right 
after his death, said that his doctors, who were also his friends, did not understand his 
goals of treatment and values concerning quality of life and dialysis. He was concerned 
about the differences in viewpoints and suggested that patients suffered unsympathetic 
treatment. In response to those events, there was a conference. At the conference Albert 
Jonsen noted that sometimes there can be a difference in how physicians and patients 
view success or failure. While a doctor often looks at medical aspects to measure success, 
patients often look at values and quality of life. This case emphasizes the autonomy and 
understanding of patients when consenting to treatment. Later, Charles Fried‘s Medical 
Experimentation: Personal Integrity and Social Policy put individual autonomy above 
the good of society.
121
 The Belmont Report in 1979 based the justification of consent on 
autonomy.
122
 As a result of these examples, autonomy began to be the primary concern 
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for consent. Around 1981, the AMA supported consent as a key requirement to ensure the 
autonomy of patients, and this policy applied to even the reluctant physicians.
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However, in order to promote autonomy, the patient has to have adequate information to 
make a decision. As a result, the competency of the patient or subject was linked to 
comprehension for consent. The AMA document said that competent individuals did not 
have to arrive at the same conclusions; consent did not have to result in similar 
decisions.
124
 But then in 1994, the UCLA case came into question, because it was not 
clear the psychiatric patients were competent to make a decision about research 
participation. In 1995, NBAC gave guidelines for human subject research which included 
an area on competency. The report said that if risk is lower, sometimes surrogates can 
make decisions to let a person participate. While this report tried to establish guidelines 
to help protect vulnerable patients, some doctors thought the report categorized all 
patients with psychiatric problems as incompetent. However, Pinals and Applebaum 
point out that it is wrong to assume all mentally ill are unable to consent.
125
 The risks 
involved in the Jesse Gelsinger case and the Krieger lead paint study were not clearly 
explained enough, and as a result comprehension was lacking and consent was 
questionable.
126
  
Jay Katz concludes that many physicians thought patients were not educated 
enough to make appropriate choices. Thus, physicians assumed responsibility for their 
patients. Katz suggests that if the law of consent is to change, then judges have to have a 
practical vision for applying autonomy. Because the rules of autonomy were so new, 
sometimes doctors applied them more extensively than initially intended.
127
 As a result, 
the emphasis of autonomy today is typically the most prevalent when looking at consent.  
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b. Autonomy 
Autonomy is often cited as a major principle of informed consent.
128
 Autonomy 
can encourage patients to make their own decisions, promote personal goals, and become 
more active in their health. Thus, an autonomous choice reflects the patient‘s values and 
beliefs.
129
 Since physicians do not always know how specific treatments will affect a 
patient‘s values or relationships, individual patients are in a better position to make their 
own decisions.
130
 However, sometimes there are personal or external pressures like 
misunderstandings that can cause the individual‘s autonomy to be reduced.131 As a result, 
the individual needs to be aware of the limitations of autonomy on decision making. In 
summary, Berg, Applebaum, Lidz, and Parker explain that it is the philosophical 
underpinnings of Mill‘s liberty principles to be free and Kant‘s moral obligations for 
independence that allows people to act autonomously.
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While the basis of autonomy is now firmly held, the ideas of autonomy have 
shifted throughout the history of consent.
133
 In the beginning, there was a strong 
paternalistic view of patients and doctors.
134
 Paternalism is linked back to Hippocrates 
who said that healing can be promoted by hiding certain medical facts.
135
 During this 
time, physicians were told to instruct patients, to promote obedience, and to rebuke those 
not following orders.
136
 Encouraging obedience was to protect the patient against his or 
her own emotions and fears so as not to make impulsive decisions. Paternalists did not 
see the point in causing patients pain with the possible uncertainties of treatment. If 
physicians did not follow those guidelines, then some equated this as abandoning the 
patient. The popular view for that time was that M.D. stood for ―make decision,‖ and if 
the physician was not able to make a decision, then he did not belong in medicine.
137
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While paternalism was based on a strong view of beneficence towards the patient, 
paternalism was questioned in the twentieth century. After numerous cases brought the 
honesty and accountability of physicians and researchers under review, the emphasis of 
paternalism was beginning to dwindle.
138
 As a result, people started to endorse autonomy 
to promote their safety and beneficence. As clarified by Wear, the autonomy vs. 
paternalism debate is not between right or wrong, but between completely different goals 
for medicine.
139
 A different way of explaining this point is made by Edmund Pellegrino 
who notes that a strong emphasis on beneficence will lead to promoting good, but 
sometimes the level of beneficence that is needed or wanted can be difficult to balance in 
medicine.
140
 Even though physicians might know what the best option is, doing it without 
consent is a mistake.
141
  
One area that often arises in autonomy is the question of application. 
Neil Manson and 
Onora O‘Neill ask
 the question
 
does it matter that autonomous choices could be bad, right or 
wrong, or possibly detrimental? Some physicians and researchers argue that 
recommendations should only suggest those on an agreed upon list, because patients 
should not be able to ask for every type of treatment possible.
142
 However, there is not 
just one acceptable option for each decision.
143
 Katz expresses that while the law 
regulates people‘s actions to ensure a safe society for others, the law typically cannot 
regulate personal decisions. Since the majority of the risk is to the individual person 
agreeing to a procedure or trial, this area of consent is largely uncertain.
144
 People have 
unsafe behaviors and actions all the time while knowing the consequences, such as eating 
too much or smoking.
145
 While some decisions can seem irrational to some, other people 
might think the decisions are well thought out. Decisions do not always have to be 
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uniform and standardized.
146
 Another way of noting this was made by Katz explaining 
that since the opinions and beliefs of doctors and patients are typically not the same, a 
person‘s individual decision might not make sense to the doctor, but that does not mean 
the decision is wrong.
147
 Choices of a competent, accountable person can be valid even if 
others view their decisions as faulty or mistaken and if their values are not the same as 
everyone else‘s.148 In our culture, individual autonomy is promoted even if others can 
make a better choice.
149
 The application of individual autonomy on decision making is 
still being debated.
150
  
In conclusion, the tensions between autonomy and the physician‘s responsibility 
to care for patients have led to regulations that can increase a patient‘s rights to choose 
but decrease liberty.
151
 More is needed for consent than just a poor view of autonomy, 
which in the past has been promoted by selecting an option.
152
 As clarified by Terrence 
Ackerman, autonomy is generally linked with noninterference, but sometimes 
noninterference does not respect a person‘s autonomy. If sickness impacts autonomy and 
a physician is neutral, then that noninterference can limit a person‘s decisions.153 E. 
Haavi Morreim takes that idea further when explaining that by focusing solely on human 
freedom, the moral principle of responsibility can be overlooked. Thus noninterference 
should not be the ideal emphasis of autonomy.
154
 Instead Engelhardt argues that 
autonomy should be viewed as an agreement so that even people with dissimilar values 
can respect other people‘s independence and choices.155 While autonomy might be an 
illusion today, there can be approaches to encourage a deeper autonomy for the future.
156
   
c. Competence  
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In order to have comprehension and autonomy, Leclercq, Keulers Scheltinga, et 
al. suggest that a patient must first be competent to make decisions for him- or herself.
157
 
Sometimes the terms competence and capacity are used interchangeably, but capacity is a 
legal term while competence is the general term used for decision-making ability. 
Because capacity cannot be determined without a legal assessment, this paper focuses on 
competence for decision making.
158
 Grisso and Applebaum suggest that competence is 
seen as having knowledge of the circumstances and demonstrating reasoning abilities.
159
 
But in order to show there is adequate knowledge and reasoning, people need to be able 
to communicate their ideas.
160
 These three areas are the basis of the discussion on 
competence and will be analyzed further.   
Competence for decision making generally looks at three areas: understanding the 
facts, evaluating the information, and communicating a choice. First, Berg, Applebaum, 
Lidz, and Parker explain that in order for an individual to be competent, the person 
should have the potential to understand.
161
 People should understand the facts of 
disclosure and their circumstances. This area is often debated, because the level of 
understanding is not always straightforward. Sometimes the level of risk affects the level 
of understanding that is needed. If a treatment or research proposal is risky, then 
participants should generally have a higher level of understanding. One study by Benson 
et al. illustrates that with additional education and discussion, patients with some mental 
deficiencies could have an acceptable level of understanding in some areas. Also, because 
a person‘s beliefs about their condition can affect the level of understanding that is 
exhibited, the person should have a proper view of their disease. People who do not 
believe they are sick will have a harder time understanding and adequately consenting to 
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treatment or research participation. Then specifically in regards to research participation, 
understanding also should include appreciating the fact that this research is not 
therapeutic in nature.
162
 The individual should understand the disclosed information, the 
individual‘s condition, and the nature of the research study if applicable. Second, the 
person should be able to apply and evaluate the information. While the decision does not 
have to be the one accepted by everyone else, the person needs to be able to demonstrate 
reasoning capabilities. Sometimes people with and without mental deficiencies can have 
trouble with this. Demonstrating reasoning abilities is an important aspect of 
competence.
163
 Being able to evaluate the information that was presented will help in 
reaching a decision. Third, after understanding and evaluating the information, a person 
has to be able to make and communicate a decision. An important aspect of this is that 
the decision should be consistent over time. If a person is constantly changing the 
decision, sometimes that can signal psychological problems causing competence to be 
questioned.
164
 This last area should demonstrate a deliberate choice. Childress argues that 
approval is different than informed consent. A person may approve of the research, but 
that does not mean the individual has given his consent to participate in the research.
165
 
All three of these areas are generally analyzed when looking into the competence of an 
individual.  
Even after assessing competence there is some debate about certain groups that 
might not be able to make decisions adequately like children or the mentally ill.
166
 The 
debate around children looks at whether they are mature enough to analyze the 
information in relation to their goals.
167
 This aspect is even more complicated while 
looking at research participation. When looking into justifications for research involving 
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children, Paul Ramsey suggests that sometimes faulty motivations can be attributed to 
children. Often research participation is justified in adults, because the adults have an 
interest in promoting a certain medical cause; however, children are not the same, and 
most do not wish to promote a cause like a cancer walk. Ramsey concludes that parents 
should not be able to consent for their children to be entered into a non-therapeutic 
study.
168
 Thus the competence and justifications of consent to research participation 
involving children is a very complex matter. Another group that might not be able to 
make decisions adequately is those with mental diseases. By looking at the MacArthur 
Treatment Competence study, Pinals and Appelbaum conclude that those with 
psychological problems should not automatically be assumed incompetent. If a certain 
group is presumed to be incompetent and left out of studies, then sometimes the results 
are not applicable to all groups. As a result, the authors suggest degrees of competence 
for decision making.
169
 Often the more serious procedures or research studies require a 
higher level of assurance that the patient is competent.
170
 Even when there are groups 
with limited abilities, assessments have to be made before assuming incompetence. 
Sometimes after additional time and education, competence can be encouraged.
171
 
d. Understanding 
Informed consent can focus on information, understanding, or both.
172
 Schachter, 
Tharmalingam, and Kleinman point out that understanding is not the same as 
remembering information.
173
 In order to promote understanding, both information and 
education are needed.
174
 Because understanding is typically more involved than merely 
presenting a list of facts, many times information is emphasized over understanding. 
Even though understanding is the ideal, understanding is not always present in medical 
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and research cases.
175
 Some people argue that medical information is too complex to 
understand or that the patient‘s decision-making skills are not adequate. Often the 
question asked is can sick patients understand and apply the medical information while 
handling the doubts and ambiguities that are common in medicine.
176
 In response, Dan 
Brock notes that this cynicism is not necessary. He suggests that patients only need to 
understand what will happen if no treatment occurs and how the risks, benefits, and 
treatments will affect their quality of life. If doctors explain all of this, then patients 
should be able to make informed decisions.
177
  
However, there are some aspects that can limit understanding as well. First, one of 
the problems discussed in a study on research protocols in Europe and the USA was the 
large amount of information on the consent forms. Difficulties can result when 
researchers assume the subjects understand everything on the form. Fitzgerald, Marotte, 
Verdier, et al. argue that even in less-developed countries, understanding could result if 
enough attention was given to education and communication.
178
 Understanding can be 
negatively impacted if too many side effects are given in a short period of time.
179
 
Second, understanding can be limited if the language on the form is confusing.
180
 The 
information on consent forms is also being analyzed in terms of clarity.
181
 Third, having 
an inadequate amount of time can limit understanding as well. One case that illustrates 
this is a dismissed malpractice case in Canada. A woman argued she had not given 
consent for the doctor to inject her eye with medication. Surprised when he did the 
procedure right after telling her about it, she said that she thought she would have had 
time to think about the procedure.
182
 As clarified by the Belmont Report, the way 
information is given can be just as important as the actual information presented.
183
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Fourth, not having enough physician involvement can limit understanding. Arnold and 
Lidz argue that informed consent should be a process involving continual communication 
with the physician to encourage patient participation.
184
 However, instead of a strong 
doctor-patient relationship, Katz points out that history has illustrated a lack of physician 
attention and involvement.
185
  
Consent is not just making sure the risks and benefits have been recited, but it 
should promote an understanding of the implications and goals of medical treatment 
and/or clinical research. If understanding is not present, then participants might not have 
truly made an informed consent. By having a greater level of understanding, the 
comprehension and autonomy of the individual will be encouraged as well.
186
  
2. Disclosure   
 The second section looks at the emergence of the idea of disclosure in informed 
consent by analyzing the history, standards of disclosure, and necessary information to be 
disclosed. The history of disclosure will give specific examples and cases. The three main 
standards of disclosure will be analyzed in the second section. Then, the third section will 
look at the ideas of material information and therapeutic misconceptions.  
a. History 
Katz explains that in the early history of consent, disclosure was really only 
important when unappreciative people did not follow what the physician said. With 
Hippocrates, physicians were not supposed to tell the patient anything about their health 
believing it might cause their health to decline.
187
 Physicians believed that telling patients 
about their condition was insensitive and worse than withholding it. Thus, withholding 
information and extreme therapeutic privilege was justified, because the doctor knew 
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what was best for the patient. However, some American doctors argued against this belief 
saying that the truth was more beneficial. One doctor, Dr. Samuel Johnson, did not 
appreciate the withholding of information, because he thought doctors had done it to him 
many times before. While truth-telling and disclosure would become a significant aspect 
of consent, the prevailing ideas of physician authority and therapeutic privilege were not 
easily swayed at the beginning.
188
 
Issues of disclosure started being discussed as early as 1880 with the Walter Reed 
yellow fever experiments. Then in 1916, the discussion of patient decision making in 
research arose. Walter Cannon, Dr. Peabody, and the AMA debated back and forth on the 
importance of patient participation for research, but the prevailing view of physician 
authority won out at that time. In 1929, the Haskins v. Howard case sought to give 
patients more involvement in the decision-making process, but the case did not change 
the disclosure requirements.
189
 Then the 1940s and 50s brought human subject research 
during war times in which there was limited or no disclosure to participants.
190
 As a result 
of the research cases, the Nuremberg Code gave specific recommendations for disclosure 
including the risks, benefits, procedures, goals, and structure of the research study.
191
 
Disclosure became more important when patient rights began to arise in the late 1950s.
192
 
The Salgo v. Leland, Natanson v. Kline, and Mitchell v. Robinson cases focused mainly 
on disclosure of certain information. Tauber explains that during this time, courts were 
beginning to question whether patients had the right to accept as well as reject a 
procedure.
193
 While rejecting a treatment was previously accepted, patients were now 
starting to accept treatments.
194
 Because of this, patients needed more information in 
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order to be able to accept a treatment. Thus, Arnold and Lidz suggest that informed 
consent and disclosure was emphasized even more due to societal trends.
195
  
Since disclosure was now required, the main issue became what information was 
necessary to be disclosed. Miller and Wertheimer explain that the Jewish Chronic 
Disease Hospital case in 1963 did not disclose all necessary information to patients of the 
hospital.
196
 Then in 1964, some of the prevailing beliefs about disclosure started to 
change when the popular view of physician authority came into question. In1965 the NIH 
established IRBs which would help with disclosure for human subject research. However 
even though there was more accountability, the Tuskegee Syphilis study illustrated a 
momentous lack of disclosure and truth-telling.
197
 The Cobb v. Grant and Canterbury v. 
Spence cases in 1972 generally agreed that all information material to a decision 
including specific risks should be disclosed to the patient.
198
 The 1980 case, Truman v. 
Thomas, asked how much disclosure was necessary. In response, some said that if the 
physician was required to explain everything to the patient, then the physician would 
spend too much time in education about tests. As a result of these discussions, Dolgin and 
Shepherd point out that two general categories of consent arose: the idealists and the 
realists. The idealists hold that physicians should seek quality conversations with the 
patients in order to encourage autonomy and understanding rather than the mere 
exchange of information. On the other hand, the realists, mostly physicians, suggest that 
many patients probably do not want this type of in-depth conversation. Because of that, 
the realists hold that the basic amount of information was enough.
199
 These two 
categories help to explain the course of the discussion on disclosure. Then the 1990 case, 
Moore v. Regents of the University of California, deliberately withheld information from 
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the patient due to a conflict of interest.
200
 After that in 1996, the Johnson v. Kokemoor 
case discussed whether or not physician experience or inexperience should be disclosed 
to patients. However, the courts struggled with adding more to the disclosure rules at that 
time.
201
 Then the Jesse Gelsinger case in 1999 and the Krieger lead paint study in 2001, 
which focused on the lack of disclosure for the procedure in general and the risks of the 
research.
202
  
  The attitudes and requirements of disclosure continued to evolve throughout 
history. Part of this change arose from public discussions of unimaginable clinical and 
research cases. Jonsen explains that in the beginning, doctors were encouraged not to 
have open discussions with their patients, but that changed over time. Now, disclosure 
and communication are required for adequate informed consent, and doctors recognize 
the patient‘s right to make medical decisions.203 
b. Standards of Disclosure 
Disclosure involves giving necessary information to patients who have a right to 
know.
204
 Before a decision can be made, the risks and benefits of a particular procedure 
need to be addressed. As clarified by Beauchamp and Childress, disclosure is directly 
related to the decision-making process of the patient. The standards of disclosure are 
generally guided by the autonomy of the patient and the physician‘s duty to disclose 
certain information. There are three standards of disclosure which will be discussed 
further.
205 
  
First is the reasonable physician or physician based standard. This standard 
requires physicians to disclose information that a reasonable physician would disclose.
206
 
The standard arose in the beginning since physicians were the only ones able to inform 
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patients about the risks and benefits. Since the physician does not know specifically what 
the patient believes to be important, this standard generally requires the physician to 
make value judgments. If information was left out that a reasonable physician would 
disclose, then the physician could be held accountable. Spottswood W. Robinson in the 
ruling for the Canterbury case expressed that holding strictly to a reasonable physician or 
professional standard is generally contradictory to the autonomy of the patient. Since 
medical groups and boards typically determine what information is necessary to provide 
in this standard, the patient‘s rights are not emphasized.207 Instead, this standard 
demonstrates more of a paternalistic attitude. Second is the patient based or reasonable 
patient standard. This standard, promoted in the Canterbury v. Spence case, discloses the 
information that a normal or reasonable patient would like to know about a similar 
situation or procedure.
208
 Because a patient‘s decision should be based on a certain level 
of information he or she has, Robinson suggests that the physician should be focused on 
what the patient wants to know.
209
 Thus, the patient‘s need for certain information was 
more important than what the physician might believe to be important. However, while 
this standard is accepted in several states, the physician based standard is generally more 
popular.
210
 Third is the specific patient standard. This standard looks at what an 
individual patient would want to know about treatment or the disease.
211
 The physician 
should look at the needs of the patient and then determine what information to present 
accordingly. Benjamin Freedman suggests that physicians should ask how much 
information the patients would like.
212
 Because this standard is more in-depth, few states 
use it.
213
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These three standards are the main standards of disclosure for informed consent. 
While each standard is typically used individually, James Childress argues that the 
objective, reasonable patient standard should be used in conjunction with the subjective, 
specific patient standard. If a patient asks for specific information, that information 
should be given even if the reasonable patient standard is being used.
214
 Taking those 
ideas further, Katz argues that it would be better if there were not objective and 
subjective labels for standards of disclosure. In reference to the Canterbury case, he says 
that the courts could have encouraged new guidelines. Rather than being bound to one 
standard, the new guidelines could promote communication with patients about 
disclosure needs and discuss any questions or fears the patient had in terms of treatments 
or other options.
215
 Ideally, Katz‘s view of disclosure would help physicians broaden the 
meaning of disclosure and communication.  
c. Information Disclosed  
The disclosure of adequate information is essential to the consent process. 
Engelhardt argues that point further, because physicians and patients do not always share 
the same values and thoughts.
216
 The goal of professional disclosure is giving information 
to encourage understanding and decision making.
217
 Another way of noting this idea is 
made by John Beahrs and Thomas Gutheil when suggesting that patients should be 
familiar with the choices in order to evaluate and weigh the options before making an 
autonomous informed decision.
218
 While there are no standardized areas for disclosure, 
generally the risks, benefits, and alternatives need to be discussed for each potential 
procedure.
219
 Some procedural areas to discuss include the length of procedure and 
hospitalization, recovery time, and what to expect after treatment or no treatment.
220
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Some additional issues to consider about the treatment include issues such as the 
seriousness, likelihood, and timing of the risks and benefits.
221
 While physicians need to 
disclose certain information to their patients, physicians also should know what is 
expected of them in order to identify possible conflicts with a proposed treatment.
222
 In 
conclusion, all the material information of both the patient and physician should be 
disclosed to encourage adequate decision making.
223
   
For medical treatment, there are three basic standards, but for human subject 
research, Regine Kollek suggests that the question of what should be disclosed is a little 
more complicated.
224
 Disclosure still needs to address the nature, purpose, risks, and 
benefits of the study, but other areas need to be disclosed as well for human subject 
experimentation. Disclosure should also look at how to withdraw from the trial, who will 
get the results, how the results will be disclosed at the end, and what the compensation 
for injury is.
225
 Also sometimes research experiments will need to keep some parts of the 
experiment hidden until the end of the project in order to keep the validity of the 
experiment. As clarified by the Belmont Report, these cases are justified if partial 
disclosure is required, if the undisclosed risks are minimal, and if there is a plan in place 
for disclosing the information after the study. It is important to differentiate between 
cases that require partial disclosure and cases where disclosure would be hard to obtain so 
partial disclosure is encouraged.
226
 Another important aspect in research is the idea of 
therapeutic misconception. Laura Roberts analyzes this principle in relation to four areas: 
developmental factors like participation of minors, illness-related factors like mental 
disorders, psychological issues and religious values, and external pressures like 
institutional settings.
227
 In order to protect against therapeutic misconception, disclosure 
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should identify the differences between research and medical treatment.
228
 Since the 
UCLA case did not emphasize the difference between research and treatment, the consent 
forms most likely suffered from therapeutic misconception.
229
 This is probably one of the 
most common problems with human subject research and disclosure.  
There are some general exceptions to disclosure such as emergency situations, 
therapeutic privilege, and the patient waiver.
230
 First, Ernst and Fish explain that in an 
emergency situation, there is not enough time for disclosure, because either disclosure is 
unreasonable or it is just not possible.
231
 Second, therapeutic privilege is used in 
situations where disclosure would result in significant harm to the patient. By claiming 
therapeutic privilege, the doctor says that irreversible harm will come to the patient if 
certain information is disclosed. While many times irreversible harm is difficult to justify, 
sometimes there can be a debate on the application of therapeutic privilege, like in cases 
of disclosing news about an incurable disease to an elderly patient.
232
 Third, if a person 
voluntarily waives his right to decide, then aspects of disclosure are not necessary.
233
 
However, Susan Marr argues that even when patients refuse care, he or she still should be 
informed of the risks, benefits, and alternatives of treatment.
234
   
Also from the debate of disclosure comes another idea. Emphasized in the Cobb 
v. Grant case, the right not to be informed began to be addressed. Disclosure is not 
necessarily a right to know but an opportunity to know information. Press and Browner 
argue that if there was a right not to know, then sometimes that right could place more 
pressure and problems on others.
235
 While there might not be a responsibility to know or 
not to know, there should still be the chance to learn more.
236
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While disclosing all the applicable information is helpful and necessary, 
disclosure by itself does not always encourage appropriate decision making.
237
 Felt, 
Bister, Strassnig, et al. argue that more information does not always lead to a better 
informed consent.
238
 Informed consent is an ethical ideal.
239
 Because of this, Manson and 
O‘Neill suggest that even though consent forms are the legal requirement, the forms often 
do not satisfy ethical principles or indicate meaningful consent has occurred.
240
 Rules and 
guidelines can promote a positive image for an institution, but focusing solely on the 
legal requirements for disclosure can lead to a narrow view of disclosure with little regard 
for understanding of that information.
241
 The law cannot promote adequate discussions of 
consent or advance ethical communication.
242
 One example is the consent for IRBs. As 
clarified by Levine, the actual process of informed consent and IRBs tend to focus solely 
on information being disclosed and the language used to disclose them. As a result, this 
view of consent and disclosure does not universally align with the ideas set forth in the 
Declaration of Helsinki which emphasize the importance of respect for persons.
243
 Thus 
Engelhardt notes that increased bureaucracy can lead to a more ritualistic consent, which 
typically does not encourage appropriate decision making.
244
   
3. Voluntariness  
 The third section looks at voluntariness in informed consent. The beginning looks 
at the history of voluntariness citing specific historical examples where patients 
consented either voluntarily or involuntarily to procedures or treatments. Then the second 
section analyzes the concepts behind voluntariness and freedom of choice including the 
concepts of eugenics, coercion, and vulnerable populations.  
a. History 
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 The voluntariness of consent is often a major principle for genetic testing. In 
research participation, there were many examples of coercive, manipulative, and 
involuntary consent. However, Jonsen explains that the Walter Reed yellow fever 
experiments in the 1880s demonstrated a strong focus on voluntary consent, saying that 
the subjects freely consented to participate. In 1886, Dr. Charles Francis Withington 
argued in his dissertation that people should be able to choose whether or not to 
participate. In 1912, Dr. Hideyo Noguchi‘s research, using participants from mental 
hospitals and orphanages, was questioned on the grounds of voluntariness.
245
 The 
physician, in Schloendorff v. the Society of the New York Hospitals in 1914, consented to 
surgery for the patient who did not want surgery.
246
 In 1900 and 1931, the Prussian 
Ministry of Religious, Educational and Medical Affairs developed guidelines that 
recognized the importance of voluntary consent. However the Nazi experiments, some of 
the worst cases of involuntary research, came shortly after those guidelines. The Nazi 
experiments often took advantage of a cost-benefit analysis and had strong links to 
coercion.
247
 The Nuremberg Code of 1946 sought to obtain consent without coercion, 
deceit, and/or force. In the Code, voluntary consent comes from the social contract 
tradition volenti non fit iniuria, meaning ―no injury is done where the subject is 
willing.‖248 The Code was a strong justification for the requirement of voluntariness in 
consent.  
Sara Rosenthal explains that Susan M. Reverby found a government funded 
experiment done in 1946-1948 which gave Guatemalan people syphilis without their 
consent. The goal was to determine the appropriate dosage for penicillin.
249
 In 1956, the 
Willowbrook study raised the issue of parents consenting for their children to enter 
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research studies. Manipulation and coercion was evident when the researchers told 
parents the only room left in the hospital was on the experimental unit. In 1963, the 
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital also had questions of voluntary consent, because the 
participants did not know they were being injected with cancer cells. The Helsinki 
Declaration in 1964 did not recognize the need to have outside help in ensuring the 
voluntariness of consent, because at that time, the burden of obtaining consent was up to 
the researchers alone. Then in 1972, the Tuskegee Syphilis study demonstrated that 
Americans could follow the unethical practices of the Nazis as well, with involuntary 
research and coercion.
250
 In this study, the socioeconomic level of the individuals made it 
increasingly hard to resist signing up for the study, and that vulnerability led to increased 
manipulation and coercion of the subjects. Beauchamp and Childress point out that 
sometimes vulnerable people are in need of something so badly that it creates a situation 
in which manipulation flourishes naturally. In these situations, it appears that people are 
left without a significant decision. Research with children was discussed in 1974 with the 
National Commission.
251
 During that time, Paul Ramsey argued that children should 
never be used for research.
252
 However, Fr. Richard McCormick based parental consent 
on what the child should want to do and not on the actual desires of the child at the 
time.
253
 
During World War 2, consent to research participation was even allowed in 
prisons. It was not until Jessica Mitford raised questions that the practice of research 
participation in prisons was investigated further. The case of Kaimowitz vs Michigan 
Department of Mental Health demonstrated that a prisoner was not able to make a 
voluntary choice about research participation, because of the coerciveness of the prison 
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system.
254
 Beauchamp explains that the Commission said the circumstances of the prison 
system led to questions about the voluntariness of consent. Thus, individuals should be 
protected from conditions that eliminate liberty.
255
 Then, the 1996 version of the 
Declaration of Helsinki expressed that extra protection should be provided and 
encouraged if there is a relationship with the doctor that might infringe on the 
voluntariness of consent. If that is the case, then an independent physician should get the 
informed consent of the person.
256
  
The beginning of consent emphasized the physician‘s authority and the lack of 
voluntary consent for the patient. At that time, each case involved some type of 
manipulation, coercion, and/or vulnerable population. However, over time the 
voluntariness of the individual was recognized as an important aspect of consent.  
b. Freedom of Choice  
One requirement for informed consent is voluntariness.
257
 A person demonstrates 
voluntariness when he or she is allowed to make independent decisions without coercion. 
Rosenthal argues that voluntariness demonstrates the freedom of individuals to make 
decisions. 
258
 In order for valid consent to occur, the competent person should be free to 
choose and make decisions without undue pressures.
259
 While there can be both external 
and internal pressures that might influence a person, not all influences will limit the 
freedom of choice.
260
 Roberts takes the freedom to choose further and suggests that 
voluntariness has the opportunity to demonstrate respect for persons. A respect for 
persons is encouraged when the individual‘s values, morals, and rights are protected.261  
Voluntariness needs to be exercised for both medical treatment and research 
participation. People have to be free to choose to participate in research or medical 
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treatment.
262
 Since there is not a duty but an opportunity to participate in research, Jonsen 
connects the choice to participate with autonomy and voluntariness. When participants 
volunteer for research experiments, those volunteers need adequate knowledge and 
understanding to demonstrate autonomy and appropriate decision making. True 
volunteering is actively recognizing that the researcher‘s goals are the same as that 
individual‘s. Thus a person actively engaged in the research experiment demonstrates a 
solid justification for participation.
263
  
This section will analyze the freedom of choice further by addressing the ideas 
and principles of eugenics, coercion, and vulnerable populations.   
1). Eugenics  
In 1869, Francis Galton invented the word eugenics, meaning the study of 
improving genetics and natural characteristics of individuals.
264
 Although originally 
having an amoral connotation, today eugenics most often has controversial, if not 
detrimental, positions associated with it. For example, Debora Spar explains that in early 
Greece, the ideas of eugenics led to abandoning deformed babies to die.
265
 While trying 
to improve genetics can be voluntary, there are many examples in history of involuntary 
eugenics such as the sterilization programs in the United States. Because the ideas 
involved in the programs were not overtly unethical to people at the time, the programs 
led the way for increasingly harmful cases that would later lead to the killing of 
undeserving and unhealthy people in concentration camps.
266
  
Eugenics was heightened with the establishment of involuntary sterilization 
programs. Philip Reilly suggested that the renewed interest in genetics stressed the idea 
that some people had more genetic defects and flawed genetic structures than others. In 
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1878, feeble-minded women were put into asylums in New York to limit reproduction. 
However, people started to realize in the 1890s that institutionalization was not 
automatically the solution. As a result, some groups wanted to put laws in place to 
prohibit feebleminded or flawed women from marrying, like Connecticut in 1895. 
However, since the state could not completely control the marriage and segregation of 
defective individuals, discussions about sterilization of criminals started. The state had 
more control over the prisoners. Performing the first vasectomy, Albert Ochsner 
expressed that it would help with criminals, the poor, and uneducated. By the beginning 
of the 1900s, sterilizations were common procedures supported by law. Laws went into 
place in 1907 in Indiana. The laws said that sterilizations would be performed on any 
recurrent criminals in a state facility if there was a limited chance of improvement. These 
laws were first aimed at males, because the procedures for women were still too risky. 
Because of that, segregation was still the norm for defective women. As clarified by 
Reilly, there were over 3,000 sterilizations done on criminals, the uneducated, and 
mentally ill. While sterilization was generally accepted, one judge in Iowa questioned the 
procedure and said that sterilization was demeaning and caused mental and physical 
suffering. However, sterilizations did not decrease, and in fact, forced sterilizations were 
becoming more accepted in the 1920s. As a result, Buck v. Bell in 1927 ruled that forced 
sterilization should take place, because ―Three generations of imbeciles are enough.‖267 
Also in the 1920s a major group, the American Eugenics Society, realized that positive 
eugenics would be better than sterilization laws, and as a result, the group turned to 
family planning. In the 1930s, the Germans implemented a eugenics law, and the Nazis 
sterilized over 50,000 people in a year of the new law. By 1950, involuntary sterilizations 
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had dropped significantly. In the 1960s, legislatures thought about having voluntary 
sterilizations linked to welfare payments, but that did not occur. Then in 1973, DHEW 
funded several programs that provided involuntary sterilizations, but later, some sterilized 
individuals decided to sue. These cases led to the requirement of ensuring competency 
and having extensive consent measures before voluntary sterilization took place.
268
 
Throughout the years, the arguments for sterilizations and eugenics have 
continually changed. However, even now the eugenics movement has principles that can 
threaten the voluntary nature of consent.  
2). Coercion  
Often medical testing and the staff have the ability to manipulate people into 
participating in research studies or treatment. But in order to be voluntary, a decision has 
to be free from pressures that could manipulate or coerce.
269
 The Belmont Report 
expresses that coercion normally exhibits a power differential that causes one person to 
have control over another. Many times the threat is so strong that the individual 
succumbs to the pressure.
270
   
There can be other influences like manipulation and persuasion, but often 
coercion is the most overtly detrimental to voluntariness.
271
 Beauchamp points out that 
while all manipulation is not inevitably coercive, manipulation with deception is.
272
 
Sometimes offering rewards can be even more coercive, because it is an intentional act to 
influence or deceive another.
273
 The Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS) and the World Health Organization (WHO) developed guidelines to 
address the issue of payment for research. If a sum of money is large enough to influence 
an individual to make a different decision, then that money is a coercive incentive.
274
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Since coercion can be hidden and not easily identified at times, Engelhardt cautions 
people against assuming manipulation is acceptable.
275
 Another area is persuasion. There 
is a difference between using reason to persuade people and using intimidation. 
Reasoning by itself is not coercive, but if a person is persuaded by other pressures, then 
sometimes the individual‘s freedom to choose is reduced.276 However, people make 
decisions all the time while being influenced by conflicting viewpoints. Sometimes 
differing views can be appreciated like recommendations by doctors, and other times 
conflicting views can encourage coercion and intimidation. Because there will always be 
certain underlying influences, Beauchamp suggests that the main question is whether 
people are free enough to choose.
277
 Choices involving additional pressures raise 
concerns about the validity and voluntariness of the resulting consent.
278
 Simply applying 
autonomy and giving consent does not get rid of coercion. There is still the opportunity 
for abuse through the distortion of facts and deceptive details about treatment possibilities 
like the eugenics programs.
279
 If a person consents under intimidation or duress, the 
consent is actually rescinded, because it ignores the voluntariness of the individual.
280
   
Since decisions often affect more than one person, decision making does not have 
to be isolated.
281
 Post, Blustein, and Dubler note that independent decision making is 
different from isolated decision making. Isolated decision making would exclude 
recommendations from doctors and a patient‘s family, which is generally not ideal.282 
However while family support is important, sometimes the family could have coercive 
influences.
283
 Since genetic information can have an impact on the patient and the 
patient‘s family, informed consent needs to take into account the patient and his or her 
family values and beliefs about genetic testing.
284
 As a result, family coercion needs to be 
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addressed as well with genetic testing. The CIOMS and the WHO developed 
recommendations that include obligations to eliminate coercion and influencing 
pressures.
285
   
While coercion eliminates a person‘s freedom to choose, sometimes there can also 
be situations that eliminate freedom as well. The next section will look at vulnerable 
populations. 
3). Vulnerable Populations  
This last section deals with vulnerable populations and settings. As clarified by 
the Belmont Report, some incentives can put an undue amount of pressure on already 
vulnerable people.
286
 Certain groups of people will be more influenced by and susceptible 
to coercion than other groups. Vulnerable populations are different because of the degree 
of coercion and exploitation that are put upon them.
287
 Exploitation demonstrates the 
power discrepancy that can occur in medicine and research.
288
 As a result, there are 
generally special protections for vulnerable populations. Some vulnerable populations 
include prisoners, pregnant women, children, disabled, and institutionalized 
individuals.
289
 Ross, Sundberg, and Flint give the Tuskegee study as an example in 
history of vulnerable populations.
290
 Even with some of the added protections, the NBAC 
explains that sometimes certain populations should not be sought for research 
involvement at all due to their vulnerable position.
291
  
Sometimes there are also situations that can be inherently coercive such as 
prisons. Tom Beauchamp points out that prisons are naturally coercive, and it is generally 
unrealistic to try to eliminate the pressures that exist in that setting. Coercion is generally 
thought of as intentional, but sometimes there can be unintentional coercive situations 
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where nobody is putting pressure on another person. In the case of prisons, the 
Commission was afraid prisoners would be coerced into participating in research. 
However, just because a situation might have more opportunity for undue influences, 
people should not assume there are no other options than the coercive pressures.
292
 Even 
though populations can be vulnerable, it does not mean that informed consent cannot ever 
take place. Earlier the debate focused on protecting vulnerable populations, but now the 
debate focuses on encouraging equal opportunity to participate in research by balancing 
coercion and having safeguards.
293
 
Consent is a way of protecting against coercion and threats.
294
 When the 
voluntariness of an individual is not emphasized, the best interests of patients are 
ignored.
295
 Even if the risks are minimal, the voluntary consent of the individual should 
not be overlooked, because true voluntariness strengthens informed consent.
296
 Thus, if 
coercion is not controlled adequately, informed consent is suspect. According to 
Engelhardt, true voluntary consent has the possibility of promoting the dignity of the 
person while addressing the errors inherent in research participation and consent.
297
 
However, Berg, Applebaum, Lidz, and Parker note that even though courts have 
supported the idea of voluntariness, they have not specifically defined this idea. As a 
result, voluntariness will be even more problematic in the future if doctors have to deal 
with cost analysis of treatments.
298
     
C. Conclusion 
The history of informed consent is extremely important when analyzing the 
current and revised models of consent for PGT. Jonsen explains that the philosophical, 
theological, and legal perspectives of some of the most esteemed individuals in society 
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were analyzed in the discussion of consent. Because of that, the history illuminates the 
high expectations and goals for consent.
299
 The background of informed consent analyzed 
both the clinical and research history looking at the patient treatment and research subject 
model of consent. After looking at the history, the main components of the current model 
of consent were identified and analyzed in the second part of this chapter.  
The history has demonstrated a couple of points. First, history has shown that 
establishing policies can help to reduce potentially bad outcomes. Ross, Sundberg, and 
Flint note that the regulations surrounding consent arose from unfavorable cases like the 
Nazis experiments and eugenics movements.
300
 Some bad outcomes have already been 
reduced since undesirable consequences are not standard. However, more work could be 
done to reduce negative outcomes.
301
 Second, history has demonstrated some limitations 
to consent. The principles of voluntariness and autonomy cannot justify acts that go 
against ethical values, like murder.
302
 Another limitation is the amount of information. 
Currently doctors and researchers are not able to inform the patient adequately 
concerning genetics. The last limitation concerns the gap between the legal aspects of 
consent and the ethical ideals of consent. According to Dolgin and Shepherd, this gap 
exists because of the limitations of the medical system and the doctor-patient 
relationship. Because of that, the gap can be difficult to reduce without significant 
change.
303
  
Even though history has progressively shaped the concepts of informed consent, 
Katz argues that more work needs to be done integrating the reality of consent today with 
the legal aspects and ethical goals of consent.
304
 An evaluation of the history of informed 
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consent is necessary in order for the current model of consent to be identified and 
evaluated in the subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Four: Revised Model of Informed Consent 
The fourth chapter explains the revised model by aligning the three distinguishing 
characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized components in the current model. 
The practice of the current model of informed consent in matters related to genetics tends 
to be more of an event, disclosure model.
1
 Tom Beauchamp explains that some 
technologies make it more difficult to encourage growth of both technological and patient 
rights.
2
 The new genetic technologies being developed and implemented today have 
many implications for informed consent that are not being adequately addressed in the 
current model.  
According to Ulrike Felt, Milena Bister, Michael Strassnig, and Ursula Wagner, if 
actual practices are different than what the ideal goals are, then some changes need to 
occur. As a result, the authors question if revising disclosure methods are the only 
necessary changes.
3
 While one of the foundations of consent is disclosing information, 
the revised model seeks to go further. The revised model focuses on a process approach 
that promotes understanding over time with assessment mechanisms. The process of 
consent encourages respect for persons by supporting self-determination for decisions.
4
  
To explain the significance of the revised model of consent, the following main 
categories of comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and patient safety are discussed. 
The first three categories will analyze both the current and revised model of informed 
consent for PGT, and the last category will discuss patient safety in the revised model.  
A. Comprehension of Risk Assessment 
 The first area is the comprehension of risk assessment in informed consent for 
PGT. This section will look at how comprehension is applied in the current model. Then 
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the second section will discuss how the revised model addresses some of the weaknesses 
of the current model and analyze how comprehension is applied in the revised model.  
1. Current Model   
First, PGT involves a risk analysis of the related probabilities that can be very 
complicated for patients to comprehend. Indeed a few diseases can be linked to specific 
genes. However, typically gene-related diseases involve probabilities that are difficult to 
calculate, including the interaction with the environment (epigenetics).
5
 This point 
develops the importance of understanding in the current model of consent.  
Risk assessment involves calculating probabilities to determine the likelihood of 
developing a disease. To accomplish this, the relation between autonomy and 
comprehension is crucial. Beauchamp and Childress note that understanding is related to 
the information that is disclosed about the circumstances and side effects of their 
decisions. The authors also suggest that full understanding about every detail is not 
required, but adequate understanding of the main concepts is needed. Sometimes not 
knowing a certain risk or detail about a test can reduce a person‘s understanding and can 
eliminate informed consent if that fact was material to the person‘s decision. Not only 
can disclosure influence decision-making, but communication has the ability to help and 
hinder comprehension.
6
  
This section will analyze three main ideas involved with comprehension: 
autonomy, understanding genetic risks, and the doctor-patient relationship. Each idea will 
be evaluated in relation to the current model. 
a. Autonomy 
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Informed consent focuses on the self-determination of people by requiring 
permission for doctors to start medical treatment or research.
7
 The current model uses a 
standardized approach to consent that typically focuses on the autonomous patient 
signing a consent form without much discussion. This section will look at the degree of 
autonomy and paternalism and standardization of the current model.  
1). Degree of Autonomy and Paternalism  
Consent is often based on autonomy by respecting the individual‘s decision.8 
However, even if people consent, Robert Veatch points out that the consent might not be 
legitimate or encourage enough autonomy.
9
 As a result, there are often differing levels of 
autonomy within consent. In America, autonomy and choice has always been promoted.
10
 
However in some cultures, presenting patients with options rather than a recommendation 
is viewed as a failure of the doctor for not having adequate abilities. As clarified by 
Michael Brannigan and Judith Boss, autonomy has an emphasis in individualism. 
However, that emphasis is not always true to people‘s actions, because many decisions 
and behaviors can affect others.
11
 Thus, autonomous decisions can have an impact on the 
individual as well as consequences for others.  
In a broad sense, autonomy often means accepting a patient‘s decision even if that 
decision does not make sense or ignores medical recommendations.
12
 As a result, the 
consequences of a person‘s actions can also play a part in identifying the degree of 
autonomy, looking at whether autonomy is emphasized over beneficence or beneficence 
is emphasized over autonomy. Dan Brock argues that a patient‘s welfare should be 
protected if his or her autonomous decision results in negative consequences. Typically 
the emphasis on beneficence is higher if there is a higher risk to the patient, and as a 
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result, the capacity of the patient is often analyzed more.
13
 Thus, ideally the autonomy 
and beneficence of the patient should be comparable.
14
  
However, Veatch explains that under examination, the current model of consent 
has ―more of the traditional, authoritarian understanding of clinical decision-making than 
many people realize.‖15 The history of consent has gone through two extremes from the 
excessive paternalism to excessive autonomy.
16
 While the history of consent 
demonstrates the importance of autonomy that is free from eugenic thinking, sometimes 
autonomy is emphasized so much that the other principles and values are disregarded. 
Michael Burgess notes that if the decision of the participant is emphasized to the 
exclusion of some other values, then sometimes tests come out before the utility and 
benefit of the test is determined, like susceptibility testing.
17
 Often there is little 
agreement about an appropriate degree of autonomy within the current model.  
2). Standardization 
In the current model, autonomy is emphasized by letting the patient decide 
whether or not to get tested. The current model uses an approach to autonomy that is 
standardized and generic, focusing on consent by providing a signature to accept or reject 
a test. Robert Arnold and Charles Lidz express that many doctors do not recognize the 
ability of consent to promote autonomy, but rather physicians see it as a legal doctrine 
that promotes a mechanical emphasis of disclosure and often leads to patient confusion or 
worry.
18
 In this model, consent is generally given right before a treatment, or an event, is 
started. The current model uses a homogeneous approach to patients leading to 
standardization in the consent forms. However, not all information has the same meaning 
to each patient. Sometimes consent forms emphasize more of the legal ritualistic aspects 
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of consent rather than the ethical, patient-centered approach.
19
 Another way of noting this 
is made by Felt, Bister, Strassnig, and Wagner when suggesting that this ―one-size-fits- 
all solution‖ can focus more on protocols and the law than ethics.20 Standardization can 
decrease autonomy by implying all patients have the same basic needs, values, and 
informational requests.
21
  
In conclusion, simple consent of accepting or rejecting a treatment demonstrates a 
nominal form of autonomy. Focusing solely on disclosure of information for a simple 
choice is not an adequate justification for consent.
22
 Onora O‘Neill states, ―What is rather 
grandly called ‗patient autonomy‘ often amounts simply to a right to choose or refuse 
treatments… and the corresponding obligations of practitioners not to proceed without 
patients‘ consent.‖23 Hence, Katz argues that the ideas of making an informed decision 
and promoting patient respect are more make-believe. According to Katz, the current 
state of informed consent has encouraged an environment of autonomy and liberty, but 
has not given clear directions for applying autonomy to the current medical practice.
24
 
Without having an appropriate level of autonomy and emphasis on individual patients, 
informed consent with PGT will remain a legalistic tradition. 
b. Understanding Genetic Risks  
Since this model emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time and 
communication for understanding the meaning of PGT risk. Inadequate understanding 
and comprehension is demonstrated by the fact that people cannot remember important 
risks on the signed consent form. Stephen Wear explains that in one study by Morgan and 
Schwab, a small percentage of people actually remembered the risks that were involved 
with the study.
25
 Since PGT is typically not diagnostic and has many influencing factors, 
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risk assessments might encourage people to assume they will develop the disease while 
many people will not.
26
 Both of these points illustrate the importance of understanding 
genetic risk assessments and probabilities. In this section, misunderstandings and 
education will be discussed further in order to understand the perspective of the current 
model.  
1). Misunderstandings  
Having a misunderstanding is to interpret something incorrectly or misconstrue 
something. From this definition Robert Klitzman suggests that there is a range or 
different degrees to understanding and misinterpreting. Misunderstandings in one area 
can cause misunderstandings in other areas as well. Misunderstandings for risk 
assessments can occur from statistics, the actual genetic test, and the mechanisms of the 
test.
 
All three of those categories can be related to misconceptions for risk assessments 
with PGT. For example, one study suggested that testing for diseases like Huntington‘s 
disease (HD) involves a lower level of uncertainty than tests for the breast cancer gene 
(BRCA). Thus, the study concluded that understanding for the less ambiguous diseases 
was higher. On the other hand, misunderstandings for diseases with environmental 
factors led to more ambiguity and less understanding. In this study Klitzman noted that 
the misunderstanding in absolute and relative risks was higher for uncertain diseases like 
breast cancer than for diseases like HD.
27
 Because PGT has many uncertainties, the 
predictive value for developing a specific disease is typically low. If the importance of 
uncertainty and the likelihood of false results are minimized and thus misunderstood, 
then understanding the genetic risks of PGT can be challenging for informed consent.
28
 
2). Education and Time 
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Many studies conclude that, even after signing the consent form, research 
participants and patients do not have enough understanding of the information presented, 
consent forms, and/or research trials and do not know the patient rights and 
responsibilities.
29
 Thus it is important to recognize some barriers that can impact the 
general comprehension of risk assessments.
30
 One of the biggest barriers to understanding 
is an inadequate amount of time.
31
 Because the current model emphasizes a one-time 
event focusing on the consent form, this approach does not allow for sufficient time to 
process and understand all of the information presented. If there is not enough time for 
education and communication, then a patient and research subject‘s understanding will be 
diminished.  
Another barrier is an inadequate level of education. Often patients and research 
subjects are not educated enough on PGT to understand the nuances of the testing 
procedures and results. Even physicians can have differing levels of education on PGT. 
James, Geller, Bernhardt, et al. evaluate one study that looks at physician practices and 
the implications of PGT on informed consent. The study concluded that fourth-year 
medical students had a better idea of how to calculate the predictive value of a BRCA test 
than current physicians or first-year medical students. Studies suggest that oncologists 
typically did well in interpreting the predictive value, but gynecologists did not do as 
well. Since physicians often have varying levels of education concerning PGT, 
physicians can sometimes misinterpret and misrepresent the predictive value of the 
testing. This study concluded that physicians did not take into consideration the 
possibility of false-negative, and as a result, the test was misinterpreted and the patients 
had a lack of understanding.
32
 However, simple education is not always enough either. 
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Sometimes there are differing views of the natural world that can result in a lack of 
understanding certain information.
33
 Even after appropriate education, there can also be 
emotional and/or family issues that can impact a person‘s understanding as well. In this 
case, at times the faulty information or long-held inaccurate assumptions take precedence 
over the appropriate views.
34
  
According to Arnold and Lidz, as it is right now informed consent appears ―either 
to promote uninformed—and thus suboptimal – decisions, or to encourage patients to 
blindly accept healthcare professionals‘ recommendations.‖35 Without appropriate 
comprehension, risk probabilities have the potential to cause fear, confusion, and false 
assurances.
36
 Hence, patients need more sophisticated consent approaches to ensure they 
understand the complexities of risk probabilities.   
c. Doctor-Patient Relationship 
The current doctor-patient relationship focuses upon the patient freely signing the 
consent form without sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. 
Currently patient risk assessments are discussed with a clinician. However Wear explains 
that the current model typically does not dedicate a significant amount of time to doctor-
patient discussions of risk assessment of the related probabilities.
37
 Because as Arnold 
and Lidz suggest, physicians often think informed consent is too time-consuming and 
ritualistic and leads to lower medical care.
38
 Standard consent forms could diminish the 
relationship between the doctor and patient or researcher and subject.
39
 Instead of having 
increased communication, often the consent forms assume understanding once signed.
40
 
Once the providers assume understanding, typically there is a silence between the doctors 
and patients and/or researchers and subjects.
41
 This section will first explain the current 
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interaction of the doctor and patient and then discuss the state of communication and 
education in the current model.   
1). Current Doctor-Patient Interaction  
In the mid 1970s, doctors viewed the requirements of consent as not practical and 
in some cases not aligned with appropriate medical care. The doctor-patient relationship 
was impacted in the shift from paternalism, because patients wanted more involvement 
and an equal footing in the decision-making process.
42
 However, that shift has continued 
and has generally increased the emphasis of autonomy in the doctor-patient 
relationship.
43
 At this time, since autonomy is held in high regard, generally the physician 
merely sees his role as informing the individual of the risks and benefits of a procedure or 
study. Howard Brody explains that typically doctors are responsible for the medical 
information and patients are responsible for that information within the context of their 
values. Usually, the physician or researcher imparts information and then allows the 
patient or subject to either sign the consent form or not. However, often there is little 
education and communication for the patient and/or subject to make an adequate 
informed decision. The current interaction with doctor-patient and researcher-subject is 
typically seen as more of an ―informative,‖ rather than an ―interpretive‖ or ―deliberative‖ 
role.
44
  
However, even when there is a discussion about that information, sometimes the 
amount of doctor or researcher interference can be difficult to balance.
45
 One example, 
the emergence of the so-called Nocebo Effect needs to be considered here. This Effect 
argues that providing patients or subjects with too much information can result in harm 
when the patients or subjects are not able to handle the amount of information properly.
46
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The Nocebo Effect is also related to the placebo effect. The Nocebo Effect relates to 
PGT, because often there can be insufficient or overwhelming detail that can cause an 
increased risk to the patient and/or subject.
47
 Doctor-patient and researcher-subject 
interaction in the current model is typically limited to presenting certain information 
while not allowing for adequate communication or education.  
2). Communication and Education  
At this time, more doctors are going into genetics and genomic medicine, and 
those doctors will have to educate patients appropriately about PGT. Francis Collins and 
Victor McKusick explain that this will necessitate more physicians understanding 
genetics.
48
 Because patients generally do not understand PGT adequately by themselves, 
doctors play a crucial role in helping patients to make informed decisions about testing. 
However, some confusion can exist in the doctor-patient relationship about the 
appropriate level of communication and education.  
The current model generally shows a lack of doctor-patient and researcher-subject 
education and communication. One study showed that if a doctor offered a test, generally 
patients assumed the test would be valuable. As a result, the patients agreed to testing and 
did not even consider the risks. While doctors would not recommend procedures that 
cause intentional harm, PGT is a little different in that this testing almost always has 
potential benefits and harms. This study demonstrates that the physicians did not 
communicate adequately to the patients concerning the goals of testing. The patients were 
not educated enough to make an informed decision.
49
 This area also applies to researchers 
and subjects. One study by Fitzgerald, Marotte, Verdier, et al. looked at the research 
consent procedures of Europe and the USA. This study demonstrated that the current 
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guidelines requiring one discussion session with the researcher and subject was not 
necessarily enough, and the authors suggested creating better regulations.
50
 With the 
amount of information that is becoming available with PGT, both physicians and 
researchers should encourage additional communication and education to promote 
informed decisions.
51
  
2. Revised Model 
Typically gene-related diseases involve probabilities that are difficult to calculate, 
such as environmental interactions. Since risk assessments are the foundation of PGT and 
are often very complex, it is essential that patients understand these related risk 
probabilities. This model enhances the link between risk and comprehension by looking 
at autonomy, understanding, and the doctor-patient relationship. The development of the 
relationship between autonomy and understanding is important when analyzing risk 
assessments for determining the likelihood of developing a disease.  
a. Autonomy  
Often respecting patients‘ rights and obtaining consent are the basic goals and 
guidelines for promoting autonomy.
52
 James Childress explains that when people 
―acquiesce in another person‘s wishes, choices, and actions for that person‘s own 
benefit,‖ autonomy is promoted.53 The revised model adopts a personalized approach to 
consent that emphasizes extensive discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent. 
This section looks at personalization and competence first, and then it will discuss the 
impact of paternalism on autonomy.  
1). Personalization and Competence  
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The revised model, rather than merely accepting or rejecting a physician‘s 
recommendation, enhances patient involvement by adopting a more personalized, 
extensive approach, described as a process rather than as an event.
54
 Personalization of 
consent can be promoted in a couple of ways. First, the revised model takes into 
consideration the fact that PGT has risks and values at stake that can only be evaluated by 
the specific patient. The doctor has technical knowledge and experience; the patient has 
life circumstances.
55
 As a result, the revised model assumes each person can contribute to 
the consent and decision-making process.
56
 Utility of a genetic test cannot be presumed 
on the basis of availability as a medical test, but rather the individual patients and 
participants have to weigh the available information against their personal goals, values, 
and sometimes culture. Since expectations can be distorted at times, it is important to 
identify the benefits and risks such as psychological and social risks. Some risks can be 
more harmful than others, and as a result, having the individual evaluate the benefits even 
with future uncertainty can increase the individual‘s sense of autonomy.57 Having a better 
sense of control and personal responsibility over an individual‘s health can assist in 
decision-making.
58
  
Second, the revised model emphasizes heterogeneous decisions and informational 
needs of each patient. This model is against unrealistic demands of specific and explicit 
uniform processes of informed consent, because each person has different values and 
requests. Third, the revised model strives to turn abstract statistics and risks into more 
personalized medical information, which is an added measure for enhancing autonomy.
59
 
Hence, the patient‘s values and goals guide the outcome more clearly. Another way of 
noting this point is made by Lewis Vaughn when he points out that bioethicists promote 
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informed consent and autonomy because ―knowledgeable, autonomous patients who 
choose for themselves will advance their own best interests as they themselves conceive 
them.‖60 Personalization of risk assessments is important for comprehension. An 
individual cannot make an informed decision accurately, unless he or she recognizes the 
impact PGT can have on his or her life.
61
 An individual‘s informed consent needs to be 
based on personal analysis rather than abstract, generic information.  
Adapting consent to an individual‘s aptitude level can also help encourage 
understanding.
62
 However, Joseph Goldstein argued against an emphasis on 
comprehension on the basis that sometimes people make choices for those with limited 
capacities which would limit autonomy.
63
 Just because a person might have limited 
competence, does not necessarily mean he or she cannot make an informed decision with 
enough time and communication.
64
 Sometimes situations that can limit capacity can be 
resolved or addressed, for example when a person is in pain, on strong medication, or in 
depression. As clarified by the Belmont Report, generally it is necessary to ensure a 
higher level of competency and decision-making capacity if the risks are greater than 
normal.
65
 Sara Rosenthal states that capacity ―operates on a sliding scale that permits 
lesser standards of capacity for less consequential medical decisions (such as getting a flu 
shot) and requires higher standards of capacity for decisions of greater consequence (such 
as consenting to high-dose radioactive iodine therapy).‖66 In many studies, the 
MacArthur Competency Assessment Tool-Clinical Research (MacCAT-CR) proved to be 
helpful in assessing an individual‘s level of capacity to make informed decisions.67 If 
autonomy is based on the exercise of an individual to make a voluntary decision, often 
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the number of potential choices will expand.
68
 With PGT, because there is a wide range 
of possible decisions, ensuring comprehension before a decision is crucial.   
2). Impact of Paternalism on Autonomy 
The practices put in place as a result of the history of consent can guard against 
paternalism.
69
 By respecting a person‘s choice, medical paternalism can be minimized.70 
However, because of past abuses, the focus on paternalism was replaced with a strong 
focus on autonomy. While autonomy is typically beneficial, Berg, Applebaum, Lidz, and 
Parker argue that if there is too much of an emphasis on autonomy, physicians could be 
taken to court more often and patients might make increasingly inappropriate choices.
71
  
Autonomy, justice, and beneficence need to be balanced. If not, opportunities can 
arise that might take advantage of other people and situations.
72
 To illustrate the problems 
that can arise when those principles are not balanced, two models are analyzed briefly. 
First, the public health model of the past led to an increase in the eugenics movement. 
This model, more paternalistic in nature, focused primarily on the beneficence of the 
public, while often ignoring the rights of the individual. The second model, a newer 
model, is the personal service model which is based primarily on autonomy of the 
individual. This model argues that genetic tests are just medical services for people to 
take advantage of if desired. In this model, participating in PGT is based on an 
individual‘s decision, because how people use genetic information and services is up to 
them and not the public. Unfettered choice and an exaggerated emphasis on autonomy 
can lead to a different type of eugenics based on individual choice rather than the 
government coercion of the past. Having an improper view of autonomy can promote the 
freedom of choice of one person while infringing upon the autonomy of another. Even 
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though autonomy can result in individual liberty to choose, unlimited autonomy should 
be regulated in PGT to prevent harm and promote justice.
73
 Since both models have the 
opportunity for a level of discrimination and/or eugenics, a proper balance of autonomy 
and beneficence is necessary in order to promote comprehension.  
b. Understanding Genetic Risks  
The revised model focuses on a process that provides time for communication to 
foster an understanding of the complex meaning of PGT risk. The revised model seeks to 
encourage understanding and address the current model‘s misunderstandings of risk 
assessments. Stephen Wear suggests that understanding can be promoted through 
increased education and communication of related risk probabilities.
74 
Clear 
communication of risk assessment and understanding of probabilities can often lead to 
increased patient satisfaction, better clinical outcomes, and adaptation to needs.
75
 This 
section will describe the process approach and then look at methods to encourage 
understanding in the revised model.   
1). Process Approach 
Klitzman suggests that the current model views understanding as more static, but 
the revised model recognizes that understanding is continually developed through a 
process over time.
76
 One study looking at procedures in Europe and the USA concluded 
that people can understand consent information if given adequate attention, and that the 
current procedures could be inadequate for understanding.
77
 As a result, the revised 
model dedicates a significant amount of time to understanding and comprehending risk 
assessment probabilities through a process. The Institute of Medicine‘s Committee on 
Assessing Genetic Risks, consisting of Andrews, Fullarton, Holtzman, eds., et al., says 
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that ―An informed public is the best societal protection from possible abuses of genetic 
technology and information in the future.‖78 An informed public implies that the ―public‖ 
has been educated, but patient education is not adequate in itself. Neil Sharpe and Ronald 
Carter note that there is more to testing than just interpretation. Having appropriate 
communication, understanding, and genetic counseling can encourage a greater 
perspective.
79
 In addition many times emotions and experiences have a higher impact on 
understanding than pure information or reasoning.
80
 As a result, the process approach 
focuses on the ―communicative, emotional, psychological needs to assist [the] patient to 
understand, adjust, and cope with implications posed by genetic test and information.‖81 
By analyzing each aspect over time, understanding can be achieved.
82
 
2). Methods to Encourage Understanding 
If a person does not understand the information appropriately, that misperception 
can lead to faulty consent. Even once the misunderstanding is corrected, patients can still 
choose to hold onto their incorrect views. As long as a person has a misconception about 
a certain aspect of the test or genetics that is important to decision-making, that 
individual‘s consent or refusal is suspect.83   
The revised model promotes different ways to ensure patient understanding of 
risk assessment probabilities. First, many times understanding is impacted by the way 
risk is presented.
84
 Often consent forms can be vague with inadequate information or with 
confusing information.
85
 Breaking up large amounts of information into more 
manageable segments over a period of time can encourage appropriate communication.
86
 
If less information is presented at a time, then people might understand that information 
better before moving on to other information about risks. Thus, Pinals and Applebaum 
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suggest making consent forms shorter to encourage increased understanding.
87
 Second, 
statistical information can be simplified. Making comparisons of statistical information 
with typical risks the patient knows, like statistics for car accidents can help to increase 
understanding and make it practical.
88
 Studies have shown people understand and apply 
risk better when actual risk is given than relative risk. Sometimes if relative risk is given, 
people can misinterpret the benefits of the treatment as being better than the actual risk.
89
 
Also when discussing risk, many times people like risks in terms of odds. One family 
wanted their risk information in gambling terms. So instead of saying .25, a physician 
could say there is a 1 in 4 chance of developing the disease or a 25% chance. On the 
opposite side, a physician could say there is a 3 out of 4 chance the individual will not 
develop a disease. Third, patients should understand the meaning behind the results and 
be given more details about the risk.
90
 Childress points out that risk could be in relation to 
developing a disease or complication in the future. While the severity of the disease 
cannot be predicted, the revised model can encourage understanding of the meaning of 
risk assessment for PGT so that people can make decisions based off of accurate views.
91
   
c. Doctor-Patient Relationship  
The revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive 
process to ensure sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. The 
additional time and complexity involved in comprehending the connection between risk 
and probability has significant implications for patient education by the doctor, thereby 
developing the meaning of the doctor-patient relationship.  
1). Interactive Process  
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Wear explains that the revised model tries to eliminate the idea of ―strangers 
taking care of strangers‖ by having an ongoing, interactive doctor-patient relationship 
that strives for comprehension.
92
 In the revised model, doctor-patient and/or researcher-
subject interaction and education are important aspects. The providers should educate and 
interact with patients and subjects about risk assessments and predictions to encourage 
understanding.
93
 Often additional education can promote learning and understanding for 
testing.
94
 Francis Collins and Victor McKusick suggest that public education should start 
now and be realistic about the risks and benefits of PGT in general.
95
 By having increased 
public education of PGT and genetics, some of the misunderstandings of the current 
model might be eliminated. Research has suggested that education in science could 
encourage more understanding about risk assessments rather than just education in 
general, but no studies have looked specifically at different areas of education, just the 
quantity of education.
96
 Education and interaction can prove beneficial in eliminating 
misunderstandings and encouraging comprehension. One study looked at the potential 
impact mental illness had on decision making capacity, and concluded that even those 
with limitations could improve their competency scores after having additional education 
and communication.
97
 Thus Felt, Bister, Strassnig, and Wagner argue that if the goal is to 
develop patient understanding about the risks, benefits, and limits of genetics and science 
in general, then engaging patients at the beginning would be best. If not, then patients 
might not comply if trust is restricted.
98
 Strengthening the doctor-patient and researcher-
subject relationship can encourage additional comprehension of risks involved with 
PGT.
99
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A study by Fitzgerald, Marotte, Verdier, et al., illustrates that having a couple of 
meetings to focus on education helped to increase patient comprehension. When 
presenting information to uneducated people, research has suggested that smaller 
amounts of information should be given at a time to increase understanding.
100
 This 
process helps to ensure comprehension, and the interaction between doctor-patient and 
researcher-subject strengthens the relationship. One area which can be strengthened by 
this interactive process is the Nocebo Effect.
101
 At times presenting too much information 
with PGT and risk assessments can be difficult for patients to comprehend and can cause 
additional stress in thinking about the potential options. Having too much information or 
too little information can be challenging for consent. Thus, the revised model encourages 
physicians to cut down on overloading patients with information and instead try to help 
patients organize and prioritize the information.
102
 Pinals and Applebaum point out that 
since the current model does not emphasize a process, a large amount of information is 
typically given at one time. Asking the patient questions can help physicians identify 
which areas the patient understands and which areas need more discussion.
103
 This 
process can also help to balance the doctor-patient and researcher-subject relationship. 
2). Balancing the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
Terrence Ackerman notes that respect for persons involves a more comprehensive 
view of the doctor-patient relationship. Ackerman argues that the current view of 
autonomy is based on the legalistic view of the doctor-patient relationship. This view 
falls short of the ideal, because it does not take into consideration how sickness affects 
independent decision-making. Sickness can hamper a patient‘s ability to have appropriate 
decision-making skills and relationships with the healthcare staff. The doctor‘s aim 
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should be helping patients achieve their goals, and in order to do that, the physician has to 
have a personal interest in the patient. As a result, physicians should not have to be 
detached and uninvolved in order for autonomy to be emphasized. Instead of being 
inactive, physicians could encourage communication that fosters autonomy and freedom 
without needless limitations. If emotional and societal aspects can influence autonomy, 
then doctors should evaluate the patients in regards to those issues.
104
 This is the balance 
that exists between interference and noninterference in relation to autonomous actions.  
 The interactive process encouraged in the revised model inherently promotes a 
balance in the relationship. The revised model encourages doctors and researchers to take 
more of a guiding approach with patients and subjects. The physicians and researchers 
should educate the individual while helping to sort through the person‘s opinions about 
the decision. Having this supportive relationship with a doctor and/or researcher can help 
balance out the affiliation.
105
 Physicians and researchers should communicate regularly 
and inquire openly as to what the patient and subjects wants to know. Howard Brody 
suggests that assuming certain information will not encourage a balanced relationship. 
Brody explains this further when he states, it ―will not do to reduce communication to a 
cold and legalistic catalogue of medical facts, options, risks, and benefits. Real dialogue 
lies between these two extremes, but exactly where, for each relationship, is a tricky 
question.‖106 Balancing these extremes can be problematic, but adhering to an interactive 
process can help to eliminate some of the difficulties within the relationship. 
B. Disclosure to Select an Appropriate Treatment Option  
In looking at the risks of research in the past, Jonsen and Dr. Katz realized that 
physicians had to change their way of thinking for disclosing information. It was no 
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longer solely up to the physicians‘ views and the professional guidelines.107 Instead 
throughout history, patients were progressively given more and more information in order 
to be able to make an appropriate decision. As a result, today there are clear guidelines on 
what to present to the patient and how to present that information in order to have an 
informed consent. This section will look at the standards for disclosure and genetic 
counseling in both the current and revised models for informed consent of PGT.  
1. Current Model 
In PGT, there are complex treatment options, including no treatment for some 
diseases, which require genetic counseling to select an appropriate option. This point 
develops the importance of disclosure in the current model. The first part will look at 
what information and options are typically disclosed in the current model. The second 
part will evaluate the current guidelines for genetic counseling.   
a. Disclosure  
The current model focuses on medical information in a standardized approach of 
consent. While patients can be educated about the procedure, selecting an appropriate 
treatment option can be more difficult.
108
 There are studies that suggest disclosure of 
potential risks can sometimes cause patients to twist information or have unfounded 
worries.
109
 Robert Arnold and Charles Lidz state that ―using technical jargon, trying to 
give all of the available information in one visit, and not asking what the patient wants to 
know is a recipe for confusing even the most intelligent patient.‖110 This section will 
discuss what to disclose and the guidelines that go along with disclosure.   
1). Information to Disclose  
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If information material to a person‘s decision is left out of the disclosure, then 
informed consent will not be present. James, Geller, Bernhardt, et al. performed a study 
that looked at essential information for physicians to disclose to patients thinking about 
PGT. In comparing the levels of education, this study concluded that many of the levels 
had similar conclusions about what should be disclosed before making a decision about 
treatment. In the case study, the majority of physicians said if a test was positive, the 
likelihood of getting the cancer, the possible treatments to reduce the cancer, issues of the 
actual value and beneficence of the treatments, and insurance aspects should be 
discussed. The only difference in the results of the study was that medical students 
thought the more practical side of the disease or test should be discussed like the 
processes and painfulness of testing. James, Geller, Bernhardt, et al. argue that sometimes 
doctors can get caught up with more of the medical aspects and overlook the more 
practical side of PGT, which patients can be more interested in at times. Since those with 
a lower income and education can have a greater interest in the practical aspects, a more 
pronounced disparity among those groups can emerge if physicians do not discuss both 
the medical and practical factors involved in PGT.
111
 However, the current model 
typically places more emphasis on disclosing the medical issues rather than the practical 
or non-medical issues. 
2). Disclosure Guidelines 
Disclosure for informed consent is more of a formal ritual, because often people 
can disregard disclosure guidelines and consent forms. In the current model, these 
guidelines focus on the standardized approach for disseminating information, which 
generally involves a physician or researcher giving information. Childress explains that 
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simply presenting information, which people might or might not understand, does not 
fulfill the duty to disclose. Merely disclosing information without any support falls short 
of the ethical ideal. However, in certain instances, there are exceptions to disclosure. One 
exception that can apply to PGT is waiving a person‘s rights. If a patient waives his or 
her rights, then the doctor does not have a responsibility to inform the patient or to ensure 
the material is understood.
112
 However, even if a person‘s rights are waived, the person 
still might want support with his or her decision. While physicians cannot force patients 
to reflect on disclosed information, the providers should support patients in order to be 
able to make an appropriate decision.  
In the current model, many times the sole purpose of disclosure is to find out 
treatment options. Since PGT has numerous variables and uncertainty, the disclosure 
guidelines for PGT are often a little different. With PGT, there is often a lack of specific 
treatment options for many diagnosed genetic traits involved with PGT. However, some 
general possibilities include preventing the disease, lessening the severity, and 
monitoring the disease. Though with most diseases PGT tests for, Harris, Winship, and 
Spriggs explain that completely preventing the disease is typically rare. Since many of 
these diseases have no acceptable treatments, lessening the severity can be difficult. 
Thus, sometimes surveillance is the only option with PGT.
113
 
However, not all patients understand the 
problem of treatment options with PGT.
 The current disclosure guidelines for PGT do little to 
emphasize this potential lack of treatment options for PGT. By focusing mainly on 
medical information for treatment purposes, the current model can overlook some of the 
more relevant information which would be material to an informed decision. As a result, 
169 
 
patients and subjects need more sophisticated consent approaches to disclose 
antecedently the treatment options, including the possibility of no treatment.  
b. Genetic Counseling 
Genetic counseling often includes information about a disease while looking at 
the emotional aspects of the at-risk diagnosis or the test.
114
 These personal issues are 
crucial to the decision-making process. Angus Clarke suggests that genetic counseling 
emphasizes more of a listening and communication ―process‖ rather than the 
―conclusion.‖115 Genetic counseling can include looking into the family history, assessing 
a patient‘s understanding, discussing possible options, and making treatment decisions 
based on the person‘s values and opinions.116  
The current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does not require 
counseling. While the current model emphasizes disclosure and signifies a decision is 
coming, mere disclosure is not enough.
117
 In response, Stephen Wear argues that genetic 
counseling can supplement disclosure and help to enhance selection of an appropriate 
option.
118
 However, even when counseling does occur, the process can be more difficult, 
since there are limited mechanisms in place to assess the patient. This section will look at 
the current counseling guidelines and counseling methods and then discuss disclosure to 
family.   
1). Current Counseling Guidelines and Non-Directiveness 
One potential problem with the current model in relation to PGT is the fact that 
often the people at increased risk for a particular disease are not having genetic 
counseling before or after PGT. Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, and Clarke note that the people 
who participate in genetic counseling often think like a consumer. Some people think if 
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there is a test, then he or she should have it to know more about their future. One 
counselor said that he thought people should focus on being at risk first, and then after 
the implications of that settled in, the person can participate in PGT. Many times people 
are still in denial when participating in PGT. A person who assumes the test is going to 
be negative does not demonstrate an accurate understanding of the risks involved and is 
most likely rejecting the idea that he or she is at risk. Unless a person is prepared for the 
risks, benefits, and implications of PGT, this type of testing can cause more fear and 
uncertainty than is necessary.
119
 
Typically when genetic counseling occurs, the counselor emphasizes non-
directiveness. Since patients come in with different values than the counselor, the 
principle of non-directivess emphasizes ―value neutrality‖ in counseling and requires the 
counselors not to judge other people‘s values.120 This idea was made popular after the 
harms of the past. This idea has both positive and negatives. The patient can benefit from 
this type of counseling since the counselor is not influencing the patient either way. As a 
result, Ensenauer, Michels, and Reinke explain that the patient can choose options that 
are based on their values and not another individual‘s values.121 Also because the 
counselors do not have to be as involved personally, this type of counseling can protect 
against coercion and eugenics that were evident in the last chapter. However this view of 
counseling can also encourage information-oriented disclosure which can impact 
autonomy and reduce meaningful consent. As was seen before, the current model can 
emphasize a narrow, restricted form of autonomy as simple consent either accepting or 
rejecting a treatment.
122
 As a result, the non-directiveness of typical genetic counseling 
can impede a more extensive, meaningful consent.  
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2). Disclosure to Family 
Often people assume results need to be disclosed to family members, but 
disclosure is not always possible or emphasized for PGT.
123
 Because information 
resulting from PGT often impacts family members, disclosure to family should be an 
important aspect, but the current model does not always emphasize the need to disclose to 
family members. One study suggests that while intentional nondisclosure was typically 
low, there were some people who were not informed about a relative‘s PGT results. 
Many factors can contribute to not disclosing information such as family dynamics, 
location, and communication problems. While counseling might help some people with 
disclosure efforts, counseling by itself does not always solve the problem. If part of the 
family has not talked in years, then disclosing information will be difficult. However, 
counseling and disclosure has the possibility to help some families work together to tell 
other members about an increased risk as a result of PGT results.
124
  
2. Revised Model  
This next section will look at both disclosure and genetic counseling in the 
revised model. The first section will look at the standards of disclosure and discuss the 
link between disclosure and decision-making. The second section will include an analysis 
of the purposes and goals of genetic counseling for the revised model.  
a. Disclosure 
The revised model addresses not only medical information but all other relevant 
information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT 
diseases might not have any available treatment. Manson and O‘Neill suggest that if 
consent focuses mainly on standardized disclosure processes, then there is limited 
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flexibility for personalized information which is often needed for decision-making.
125
 
This section will look at the information to disclose and the revised disclosure guidelines 
for PGT. 
1). Information to Disclose 
Since some genetic diseases have no cure or appropriate treatments, some of the 
important aspects of decision-making for consent can be nonmedical and family 
factors.
126
 The revised model discloses both medical and non-medical information to 
patients before PGT in order to have a better grasp of possible future consequences. 
Many times the limitations of testing are not emphasized enough.
127
 Trepanier, Ahrens, 
McKinnon, et al. suggest that one of the important areas with PGT is disclosing and 
understanding the severity of risk or the positive predictive value of the test.
128
 Even if a 
person is at-risk for a particular disease, that does not mean the person will develop the 
disease.
129
 If a patient assumes PGT is a diagnostic test, then he or she will have a faulty 
view of the potential treatment options and will most likely not chose appropriately.
130
 A 
group at Johns Hopkins University concluded that after understanding the limits and 
predictive value of BRCA, women were less likely to get tested. The group cited the 
uncertainties of BRCA inheritance and treatment and the potential adverse consequences 
on employment and insurance as the main reasons for rejecting PGT.
131
 Often the 
uncertainties continue even after testing. Young explains that the actual aspects of the 
disease are important as well. A study of genetic counseling concluded that actual risk 
was not necessarily as important as some of the practical aspects of the disease.
132
 The 
treatment options need to be discussed even if there are no options other than 
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surveillance.
133
 Sometimes even surveillance can have risks associated with it like the 
radiation for mammograms.
134
  
Some nonmedical factors are important as well such as the patient‘s objectives, 
concerns, and beliefs about genetic testing, the possibility of discrimination, privacy 
protections, and personal and family values.
135
 One study concluded that less than half of 
the consent forms discussed anything about discrimination or privacy concerns.
136
 David 
Orentlicher argues that because genetic information has implications for family members, 
if a person‘s privacy is violated, then family information could be violated as well.137 
Lori Andrews points out that sometimes because of a person‘s position in a company, 
that individual might be more likely to suffer adverse consequences of PGT.
138
 Financial 
and psychological implications should also be considered and discussed with the 
counselor. Another important aspect is addressing the policies on what groups can see the 
test results after PGT.
139
 Discussing a couple of future implications of having either a 
positive or negative test can help patients to understand their current and future 
options.
140
 Anticipating some of the important factors and decisions that will need to be 
addressed after testing can help patients deepen their appreciation of the possible 
consequences. 
141
 Klitzman, Thorne, Williamson, et al., suggest that often PGT can have 
consequences on employment, insurance, and family aspects.
142
 Disclosure for PGT 
should emphasize education and the rights of patients.
143
 
2). Revised Disclosure Guidelines  
The common belief demonstrated in the current model is that the exchange of 
information is enough for disclosure.
144
 However, mere disclosure of information does 
not promote adequate decision-making. The revised model encourages additional 
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communication between doctor and patient in order to promote appropriate decision-
making.
145
 Open discussions and analysis of potential options can promote a patient‘s 
well-being. Doctors cannot predict how involved patients want to be unless asked. Arnold 
and Lidz point out that some patients do not always want to be involved in decision 
making, but many times the patients would like more information.
146
 Often there is a 
discrepancy between what the physician discloses and what the patient would like to 
know.
147
 The National Bioethics Advisory Commission encourages disclosing 
information and understanding of that information over the formal consent documents. 
Disclosure of information and consent forms still need to take place, but the disclosure 
should be personalized more to the individual patient and flexible for different 
circumstances.
148
  
Benjamin Freedman suggests that the amount of disclosure a patient wants to 
know should be established at the very beginning of the conversation. Giving the 
example of a cancer patient, he says that instead of focusing on competence and 
information at the outset, understanding how much information the patient really wants to 
know can help in the end. This method of disclosure can also help the families that might 
think disclosing every detail is not in the patient‘s best interest.149 Instead of burdening 
the patient with unnecessary information, this approach can be more personalized and 
sensitive to different patient preferences for the amount of information desired.
150
 
Because of the large amount of information being presented, if there are no suitable 
options discussed, then coming to an appropriate course of action to take after PGT 
would be difficult. A study in Genomics & Genetics Weekly, looking into behavioral 
changes after PGT, suggested that actions were about the same before and after the test 
175 
 
for breast cancer. It was also suggested that PGT for breast cancer could decrease 
people‘s need to alter their actions, because the people believed those risks were 
absolute.
151
 Felt, Bister, Strassnig, et al. suggest that sometimes a person‘s lack of 
understanding about medicine and science can be deliberate, because the patient has no 
interest in the information that was disclosed. As a result, the revised model addresses the 
discrepancies between the current medical disclosure and the more personalized 
disclosure to ensure the information is understood and applied appropriately. The revised 
model emphasizes appropriate disclosure and counseling so that the medical aspects are 
merged with the patient‘s perspective in order to select a suitable option.152   
b. Genetic Counseling  
The revised model requires counseling both before and after testing. Michael 
Hayden suggests that counseling before testing should focus on reasons for participating 
in, emotions involved in consideration of, and an analysis of the possible risk with 
PGT.
153
 Requiring genetic counseling can help understanding as well. Counseling 
programs have the opportunity to eliminate or reduce the psychological consequences 
that can come from PGT.
154
 Having a better understanding of risk can also decrease 
emotional harms after testing.
155
 While some patients might be nervous talking to a 
physician about certain issues, counselors can help patients relax more and ask questions 
to evaluate the options and encourage open discussions.
156
 Klitzman explains that since 
some misunderstandings can be very personal and hard to identify, doctors should look at 
the emotional issues behind misunderstandings such as control issues, feelings of 
vulnerability, confusion, and anxiety. Also patients might choose to believe they have the 
disease in order to eliminate feelings of vulnerability and helplessness. However, those 
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assumptions can expose patients to increased risks, because the patients base their 
decisions off of inaccurate information.
157
 Post-test counseling should focus on 
discussing the results, addressing the consequences of the results, and determining an 
acceptable treatment option.
158
  
Since people often seek control of their lives, sometimes a lack of control over 
inheritance can cause problems when receiving the results. Depending on the results, 
people might try to take control of their health even if their decisions could have harmful 
consequences like agreeing to a prophylactic double mastectomy.
159
 Ball, Tyler, and 
Harper note that counselors can help people examine their emotions so that the patients 
do not decide on something quickly in order to reduce the current amount of stress and 
anxiety.
160
 When patients receive bad news or ―toxic knowledge‖ in regards to PGT, 
genetic counselors can encourage enhanced decision-making skills by determining how 
people will react to the information.
161
 Some people will be able to handle potentially bad 
news and some might become overwhelmingly distraught or permanently harmed. The 
medical staff should emphasize that communication is more important than disclosing 
information.
162
 Having follow-up after PGT is important to discuss a person‘s reactions 
and encourage appropriate methods of coping with the results.
163
 If the counselor feels 
that additional follow-up might be needed, the counselor can monitor the consequences 
of the test at that time.
164
 
In order to assist genetic counselors in their discussions with patients, Goetz 
argues that counselors should use patient assessment and feedback mechanisms like 
feedback loops, a decision tree, linear steps, and nomagrams. Through the use of a 
decision tree, patients can better internalize the risks, benefits, and future impact of their 
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decision in order to facilitate appropriate decision making. Patient assessments in pre-test 
counseling can help to encourage additional questions about PGT. Also an IES 
questionnaire, another useful tool in both pre- and post-test counseling, can help to 
determine a patient‘s stress level and emotional status during this process of discussing 
new information.
165
 This tool can help counselors predict the possibility of having severe 
emotional or psychological side effects after PGT. Feedback mechanisms and 
assessments are essential to the counseling process.   
The revised model requires counseling and adopts value transparency and non-
directive counseling. Leon Eisenberg suggests that counseling for PGT brings another 
level of difficulty, since the counselors are often discussing future risks that have not 
occurred yet.
166
 PGT can be complex with implications for more than just the individual 
patient, and as a result the revised model requires genetic counseling both before and 
after testing.
167
 One study in Canada concluded that risks were more tolerable when there 
was pre- and post-test counseling for PGT.
168
 This model changes emphasis from simply 
information to a broader more in-depth focus on communication.
169
 Thus the revised 
model requires genetic counseling in order to help clarify personal values, help establish 
patient views, and develop a treatment plan.
170
 This section will look at non-directiveness 
and value transparency and disclosure to family.    
1). Non-Directiveness and Value Transparency 
While the current model often uses non-directive counseling to reduce the amount 
of external pressures or coercion put on patients, the amount of external pressures is not 
simply eliminated because the counselor did not give his or her own advice. Barbara 
Biesecker suggests that there are many social perspectives and influences that are 
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prevalent today. As a result, non-directiveness is not always practical even in counselor 
settings.
171
 Even if this principle was realistic and could eliminate external pressures, 
non-directivess is not always a good method of counseling.
172
 Sometimes non-
directiveness promotes a distanced view between the patient and the counselor which can 
lead to patients feeling neglected or even more confused about potential options. Since 
most of the time patients do not know the important questions to ask, counselors are 
needed to give them additional information that might help. Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, and 
Clarke explain that there can be many sensible decisions, but often patients are helped 
more when counselors illustrate how to get to an intelligent decision. Thus counselors 
should give input on a patient‘s decision-making skills. Counselors should not exert 
pressure on a patient about PGT or the results, but counselors should be able to question 
and/or have the patients explain their decisions. Unless patients consider certain aspects 
of PGT, the patients will not be adequately informed about the decision and treatment 
option. Counselors can help patients evaluate and reflect on the possible consequences 
and future options of having a positive test.
173
 If non-directiveness is emphasized solely, 
then counselors merely present the information so patients can make decisions which 
would be in line with the current model of consent.  
Instead of value neutrality, which is really not achievable, there should be value 
transparency as argued by Diana Buccafurni. The revised model encourages value 
transparency, where the counselors make their values known before counseling.
174
 Since 
all genetic counselors have certain views and biases, this idea promotes a more practical 
approach to addressing those opinions. The revised model encourages open 
communication and value clarification so patients and counselors can think through the 
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entire process of PGT in order to arrive at a meaningful consent and appropriate course of 
action.  
2). Disclosure to Family 
The revised model encourages increased disclosure to family members. There can 
be increased disclosure by having genetic counselors help the patients in this aspect.
175
 
Counselors do not have to contact family members, but during the patient‘s counseling 
session, the patient can identify people who should know about the results. Then the 
patient and counselor can work together to encourage increased disclosure to family 
members. Gaff, Collins, Symes, and Halliday studied the issue of family disclosure, and 
concluded that many people do not have a problem with medical centers telling family 
members about their increased risk for a certain disease. Another study suggested that 
counseling encouraged participants to disclose information and helped in knowing how to 
disclose certain information to family members.
176
 There can be increased disclosure by 
having frequent discussions and establishing methods to help patients inform the family 
while in counseling both before and after testing.
177
 Having more counseling has been 
shown to have improved family disclosure.
178
 In the revised model, Catherine Hayes 
suggests that counselors can also encourage family members to come to the counseling 
sessions as well to consider the implications for both the patient and the family.
179 
Then, 
after disclosure, the family members can have access to the same genetic services and 
resources to help them make an informed decision as well.
180
 Another way to note this 
point is made by Angus Clarke when he argues that there is a moral responsibility to 
disclose information to family members so that those members will be able to participate 
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in PGT as well if so desired.
181
 In the revised model, proactively knowing when and how 
disclosure will take place is important to the counseling process.
182
  
Often counselors will look at a family history to help in knowing what relatives 
might be at-risk, recognizing some of the side effects their family had in the past, and 
assessing the risk of serious psychological factors in their family history.
183
 While those 
practices are beneficial, the revised model promotes additional measures. Goetz and 
Wear suggest that individual patient concerns can be addressed by offering a more 
flexible and personalized consent process through ongoing counseling in order to 
recognize an individual‘s unique values and goals of testing.184 Since a genetic 
counselor‘s training is different than what the revised model suggests, this model 
encourages changes to the curriculum and additional guidance with the updated goals of 
counseling and disclosure to facilitate better decision-making for PGT.
185
  
C. Voluntariness 
Consent is a deliberate action demonstrating understanding, and those actions 
should have limited controlling influences.
186
 Roberta Berry notes that the views of 
autonomy as permission will have an impact on coercion and the voluntariness of 
consent.
187
 Voluntariness requires autonomy and disclosure of appropriate information in 
order to be able to make a decision free from controlling interferences.
188
 Coercion can 
be exhibited through many areas and based on varying justifications. Engelhardt suggests 
that medicine can be influenced by people voluntarily deciding on a course of treatment 
and by those wanting to do what is best for a patient even if those actions use 
intimidation or external pressures.
189
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This section will look at voluntariness in informed consent and apply it to PGT. 
The first part will look at the current model and discuss how coercion plays a part in 
informed consent and give some implications for family-related information on consent. 
The second part will develop the revised model of consent. The revised model will also 
look at coercion and family-related implications of this information. The principles of 
voluntariness will be applied to the revised model of consent for PGT.  
1. Current Model  
Voluntariness is an important aspect of informed consent. Engelhardt suggests 
that both medicine and research has to emphasize consent without coercion.
190
 In 1960 a 
study by Boston University‘s Law-Medicine Research Institute looked at issues of 
informed consent and research with children and prisoners. The study discussed the 
significance of coercion on consent and the issues of beneficence in research.
191
  
The current model will look at coercion and family-related implication. Types and 
examples of coercion are discussed in relation to the current model of consent. Then 
family-related implications are discussed and analyzed further. Since genetic information 
affects more than the individual person, consent for PGT should emphasize some of those 
implications for families. 
a. Coercion  
Coercion exists if there is a threat so significant that a person has no other choice 
but to submit to the person‘s intimidation. Types of coercion and controlling influences 
include manipulation, not telling the truth, intimidation, and even kind actions for 
incentives. However, feeling vulnerable without an actual warning of intimidation is not 
enough to categorize that as credible coercion. Some controlling influences are more 
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powerful than others, and some like persuasion are not controlling at all. Beauchamp and 
Childress explain that a persuasion to get treatment involves reasoning; on the other hand, 
controlling influences use emotions to intimidate.
192
 A physician who says that medical 
treatment will stop if the patient does not follow instructions demonstrates coercion.
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Tauber suggests that the differences of having influences that persuade and control are 
crucial for understanding the amount of coercion or voluntariness present in a person‘s 
consent. 
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In the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple 
sources of external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and 
community, and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon 
the individual. This section will discuss the importance of voluntariness on consent and 
analyze the external pressures in the current model. 
1). Importance of Voluntariness on Consent 
As history illustrates, voluntariness of consent was one of the most important 
aspects. Many of the medical and research failures seen in the past were because of 
coercion and a lack of voluntariness for consent. Generally voluntariness is linked with 
autonomy and decision-making that has limited controlling pressures. The problem with 
coercion is that it seeks to control another person‘s actions and behaviors and nullifies 
consent by eliminating voluntary choices.
195
  
While autonomy and voluntariness have similar concepts, an autonomous patient 
can still disregard some options because of being uneducated or having influencing 
forces. Encouraging more than an autonomy-based justification for voluntariness, 
Beauchamp and Childress hold that a person should be able to choose an action free of 
183 
 
controlling pressures. Voluntariness is a result of a patient making his or her own 
decisions based on individual goals, lifestyle, and available information without being 
pressured into an action. One example of voluntariness is illustrated by organ donation. 
Often questions arise as to the degree of voluntariness that can be present with living 
organ donors. Even a friendship can encourage coercive pressure and strain on a person 
to consent to donating an organ. While donating an organ does not in itself justify cause 
for coercion, often there are more emotions and hidden pressures at stake than is first 
evident.
196
 Sometimes even liability can be a cause for coercion. Kilner, Pentz, and 
Young explain that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
gave a statement in 1985 recommending physicians inform their patients about maternal 
serum alpha-fetoprotein screening. However, the group had previously taken the stance 
that the test had a high level of false results and uncertainty. Because there were some 
lawsuits against certain newborn diseases and defects, the group thought informing 
patients about the availability of that test would protect them from liability.
197
 Both of 
these examples illustrate the importance of emphasizing voluntariness, while reducing 
external pressures like coercion.  
2). External Pressures 
All of the cases in the history of consent demonstrate the pressures of coercion on 
consent. One example in particular, the Nazis experiments, illustrates how dangerous 
presuppositions and thoughts affect consent. Glover explains that the attitudes of the 
Nazis, such as stigmatization, supremacy views, and eugenic thinking, can be just as 
harmful as the way in which many were killed during that time.
198
 In order to fully 
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understand voluntariness, it is important to point out the external pressures that might 
reduce voluntariness in the current model.   
The current model illustrates some ways in which coercion can be common in 
consent. While not all pressures eliminate the freedom of choice, there should be extra 
measures in place to eliminate as many coercive influences as possible.
199
 The current 
model of consent for PGT tries to promote voluntariness, but since there are multiple 
sources of external pressures for those undergoing PGT, the current model does not 
address each area adequately. As a result, people should try to eliminate coercion and 
deception by encouraging voluntariness.
200
  
 There are several different types of external pressures. Many times there can be 
emotional, social, institutional, and government pressures.
201
 The first type of external 
pressure is emotional. As previously mentioned, living organ donation can cause 
pressures with friendships due to emotions.
202
 Sometimes emotional reactions can lead to 
an individual pressuring or manipulating another individual. Second is social pressure. 
These social pressures are typically seen in areas of stigmatization and cultural norms. 
These cultural and social norms can often lead people to pressuring others in order to 
maintain the status quo.
203
 Often decisions related to disabilities will have social and 
cultural pressures associated with them. Another example of social pressures can be the 
doctor-patient or researcher-subject relationship. Physicians can try to persuade an 
individual to make a decision, but sometimes that persuasion can lead to significant 
unwanted pressure.
204
 The third type of pressure is institutional. Institutional pressures 
are illustrated by the ACOG case for liability concerns.
205
 Liability concerns generally 
fall into pressures from professional and institutional guidelines and regulations. 
185 
 
Professional guidelines such as the AMA can have some regulations that might put 
pressure upon individuals as well. Fourth, there can also be pressure from government 
regulations like the past group eugenics programs. These pressures are based on the 
views of the government or public policies of the top down approach.
206
  
 External pressures are often used to coerce and manipulate people into taking 
some action. Beauchamp and Walters suggest that PGT can lead to increased social and 
economic risks if coercion and external pressures are allowed in consent discussions.
207
 
However, Watson warns against having limits put on genetic testing and decision-making 
from societies‘ or the public‘s view, because often limitations like these will appear better 
than they actually are. The views can be based on positive principles, but the application 
and end results are often outward regulations that do little to promote genuine good.
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Since there are not specific measures in place to address coercion and external pressures 
for PGT in the current model, the revised model will address those issues.  
b. Family-Related Implications  
PGT involves family-related information with accompanying implications that 
can compromise voluntariness. The current model does not take into consideration all 
family related implications which can lead to coercion of family members. This section 
looks at influencing pressures and discusses the concept of the right to know.  
1). Influencing Pressures  
Wear notes that PGT has the potential to cause discrimination, stress, fear, and 
coercion.
209
 Since the results can impact the entire family, there is an opportunity for 
external pressures and coercion of the entire family which could result in negative 
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feelings for the family as well. However, in the current model, the discussion of coercion 
typically emphasizes the specific patient, and not necessarily family pressures.  
Typically when an individual consents to a particular treatment or test, the 
potential risk is specifically for that individual person. But with PGT, individual risks can 
be applied to the whole family if that individual is positive or at-risk for a genetic disease. 
As a result, family-related implications are not recognized as an influencing pressure in 
the current model. Often in the current model, family-related coercion is difficult to 
identify.
210
 Thus, the revised model will address the problems with family-related 
implications in the current model. 
2). Right to Know 
The current model addresses this situation by recommending people tell their 
family about the possible results of PGT. Ideally, carriers should undergo PGT before the 
rest of the family in order to eliminate unnecessary testing. Michael Burgess expresses 
that a right not to know can make PGT more difficult. Typically PGT cannot be stopped 
by a family member who does not want to know certain information, but this example 
should raise additional concerns with consent for PGT and family-related implications. 
Consent for groups with many different views is often complicated needing additional 
education and analysis.
211
 
In America, the right to know discussion is often different than in cultures that 
emphasize community. Robert Wachbroit states, the ―thought that someone ought to 
know seems to go against our cultural assumptions, interference in private relationship, 
[the] problem of solitary individuals contemplating whether or not to know is that it fits 
so few of us; decisions affect others as well.‖212 In today‘s society, the people of America 
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are thought of more as individuals rather than a community. As a result, individuals make 
decisions according to themselves and not family members or society as a whole. In the 
current model, physicians might recommend that patients inform family members, but the 
right of family members is typically not emphasized. As a result, sometimes family 
coercion can increase when family members are not included in a discussion of PGT 
results. 
2. Revised Model  
This third point of voluntariness develops the importance of avoiding coercion of 
both the patient and the patient‘s family when information is presented. The third 
distinctive characteristic of PGT is the relevance of genetic information for the patient‘s 
family. The revised model emphasizes the necessary inclusion of family implications to 
ensure the voluntary nature of consent. 
The revised model analyzes coercion in the current model and addresses that 
coercion with an emphasis on voluntariness within the revised model of consent for PGT. 
Then the family-related implications of genetic information are discussed within the 
revised model of consent. 
a. Coercion  
As clarified by Arribas-Ayllon, Sarangi, and Clarke, many times people undergo 
PGT because of a feeling of responsibility towards their family.
213
 PGT is personal, but 
this type of testing impacts both the individual and the family. Thus family coercion can 
be just as detrimental as or more than other sources of coercion.
214
 Klitzman, Thorne, 
Williamson, et al. illustrate in their article that family pressure has been used on many 
occasions.
215
 The revised model shifts the focus from coercion of the patient alone to 
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family-related coercion regarding PGT. However, this type of coercion is not the norm, 
because often the person making threats is the beneficiary of that decision as well.
216
 
Third party coercion is often more apparent in PGT, because of the nature of the family-
related information with this testing.
217
  
The revised model addresses external pressures on the patient and the family 
(such as pressures by the family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family 
regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external coercion upon the patient. 
This section will analyze the external pressures and then discuss methods to reduce 
coercion in the revised model. 
1). External Pressures 
Often coercion and a lack of voluntary consent can come in many forms of subtle 
and obvious pressure.
218
 There is the more dramatic type of coercion using a knife or 
weapon, but often there are lesser forms of coercion like being excluded. While everyone 
recognizes the coercive nature of bodily harm, Miller and Wertheimer express that the 
more emotional or social influences are more difficult to identify as coercion.
219
 Even the 
subtle forms of negative influences like ostracism and peer pressure can arise among 
anyone applying enough pressure such as the patient‘s family. In PGT, coercion among 
family members can take on emotional intimidations or threaten to disrupt the family 
dynamics. A husband demonstrates coercion if he informs his wife that he will leave if 
she does not agree to have surgery for a condition.
220
 The current model typically focuses 
on external pressures for the individual, but the revised model emphasizes the importance 
of both patient and family coercion.  
2). Reducing Coercion 
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The revised model ensures voluntary consent by establishing procedures to avoid 
two forms of coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be tested and pressure 
upon the family regarding the testing outcome. Coercion of the patient by the family is 
illustrated by the following example. If there is a family genetic trait already known, 
there can be pressure upon a child to be tested to ascertain if he or she is a carrier. If a 
trait emerges that affects other siblings, measures need to ascertain whether the sibling 
wants to know.
221
 This example demonstrates the possible coercion of the family by the 
patient. Both examples can be addressed previously by discussions about the reasoning 
for participating in PGT and with the family beforehand in order to determine which 
family members want to know information and which if any do not want to know the 
results.  
Often the level of voluntariness and coercion depends on a person‘s views and 
sensitivities to certain aspects.
222
 Jehovah‘s Witnesses have certain religious views that 
result in the refusal of blood products. Ruth Macklin explains that when a person comes 
in with these views, before being allowed to refuse transfusions, the patients are 
encouraged to communicate their reasoning with a physician in order to ensure the 
voluntariness of their refusal.
223
 In the revised model, the physician or counselor should 
also inquire into the possibility of family coercion if the entire family is Jehovah‘s 
Witnesses.
224
 Laura Weiss Roberts proposes that discussing the patient‘s views without 
his or her family could sometimes help eliminate some of the family‘s pressure. 
Identifying and evaluating all the pressures involved can help to recognize and address 
some possible coercive situations or influences.
225
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Since physicians and researchers can help to identify where and when 
intimidating influences might arise, physicians and researchers have a role to play in 
encouraging the voluntariness of consent. If a doctor or researcher believes there is some 
sort of coercion being exerted on a patient, then it is the doctor‘s responsibility to inquire 
into the source of or reasoning behind the external influence. If the physician does not, 
then the consent is not adequately informed and the treatment options that were agreed 
upon would be subject to question.
226
 Because those with limited autonomy and capacity 
to consent are often more affected by subtle pressures, those groups of people should be 
last in line to participate in research to protect against coercion. When those individuals 
are allowed to participate, then the justifications should be stronger and more persuasive, 
and the mechanisms to protect against coercion should be followed strictly.
227
  
Ensuring voluntariness of consent involves paying attention to the patient and his 
or her situation, asking questions, and addressing certain family dynamics that might 
limit voluntariness.
228
 PGT should not take place if there is any doubt as to the 
voluntariness of consent.
229
 The revised model establishes more extensive processes to 
identify and address possible sources of external pressure. Unless policies or the ethical 
landscape changes, overt and subtle coercion will resume.
230
 
b. Family-Related Implications  
Since there is such an emphasis on patient autonomy in the United States, many 
times family members are not as involved with decision-making and participating in the 
treatment protocols.
231
 Gaff, Lynch, and Spencer explain that the current model 
emphasizes and discloses information only to the specific patient, but the family has more 
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at stake with PGT than other types of testing.
232
 Since genetics is shared by family 
members, this model promotes more emphasis on the family for voluntariness.
233
 
The revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. This section will 
analyze the right to know and discuss methods to identify family-related implications.  
1). Right to Know  
Because there are many implications that can affect other family members, some 
people have the view that genetics is family information and not just personal 
information.
234
 Often the problem with focusing on the family as well as the individual 
patient is the inherent differences of the two arguments.  
The right to know vs. the right not to know summarizes the potential conflicts.
235
 
Andrews suggests that many times the right not to know is harder to control. When 
people undergo PGT, it is difficult to keep the results quietly contained to a couple of 
family members.
236
 There is really not a right not to know, because often family members 
need to start thinking about the future consequences and options for themselves as well. 
A right not to know goes against autonomy, because if the person chooses not to know 
certain aspects, that person is not making a decision based off of accurate entire 
information. Since people often have less anxiety after finding out some results, the right 
not to know that information cannot be addressed by the principle of nonmaleficence. On 
the opposite side, some could argue that a family might be harmed because a person 
chooses not to know their risk-status for a disease like Huntington‘s. Sometimes people 
do not even participate, because the burdens of knowing can have harmful consequences 
for their relatives.
237
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The revised model emphasizes the importance of family-related information, and 
thus physicians and researchers should discuss those aspects before and after testing. If a 
patient or subject has a better idea of how the results will affect his or her family, then the 
individual will be able to communicate better with the family concerning the PGT results.  
2). Identifying Family-Related Implications 
 While each family cannot consent separately, a discussion with the patient before 
testing should elucidate whether or not the patient has discussed testing options with his 
or her family. The first meeting with the counselor should address family implications, 
and if there has been no discussion with the family, then the physician or counselor 
should strongly recommend having the patient at least tell the family that he or she is 
considering PGT. Having a brief discussion will let the patient know the family‘s views 
and feelings on PGT for the future. Catherine Hayes suggests that sometimes when a 
patient chooses not to inform relatives, the patient demonstrates a lack of understanding 
or reflection about future implications of the results on either the family or him or herself 
personally.
238
 The revised model encourages more attention on the family whether it is 
having additional family discussions or analysis of family dynamics for disclosure in 
counseling sessions.   
Family members can have a significant impact on whether or not people 
participate in PGT. While families should know information that might affect them in the 
future and help them to make life choices, a family should not manipulate or threaten 
people into participating in PGT in order to identify future consequences.
239
  
D. Patient Safety 
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The revised model of consent requires an additional component to the 
traditionally recognized three components (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness): 
the culture of patient safety. That is, the revised model of consent enhances the traditional 
components of consent within a medical culture that emphasizes patient safety. This 
emphasis has continued to grow in the area of medicine. Safety measures are related to 
systems and structure changes with an emphasis in organizational ethics.
240
 By focusing 
on improving the system and processes of informed consent, Runciman, Merry, and 
Walter explain that risk factors can be decreased.
241
 This culture of safety requires 
nationally established systems of accountability for PGT that implement the revised 
components of consent in a transparent manner to foster trust in the emerging system of 
genetic-related services. In order for this model to implement appropriate systems of 
accountability and transparency, Goetz argues that a shift from treatment and diagnosis to 
prevention and early detection needs to occur.
242
 This shift will in turn emphasize a 
culture of patient safety in the area of PGT.  
1. Current Model  
 This last section of patient safety is a new component for informed consent of 
PGT. Patient safety is not a component found in the current model of consent. Thomas 
Goetz expresses that without proper planning, genetic testing can result in ―ambiguous 
probabilities and poorly calibrated risks.‖243 In order to protect patients, the revised 
model adds a new component to informed consent, which is patient safety.  
2. Revised Model 
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This section will look at accountability, transparency, trust, and patient safety 
systems in the revised model. All of these issues will focus on ways to promote the 
principles in the revised model, and in the end, those aspects will increase patient safety.  
a. Accountability  
The revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and institutional policies. David Shore 
suggests that the first part of increasing patient safety is the focus on accountability.
244
 
Accountability of the doctor and medical services arose during the history of consent, 
because sometimes there was limited accountability for doctors.
245
 George Lundberg 
notes that without adequate regulations doctors have been known to do many unethical 
activities.
246
 As a result, the revised model promotes accountability to increase patient 
safety. This section will focus on accountability and institutional policies.  
1). Types of Accountability   
Accountability is often broken up into two categories: internal and external 
accountability measures. Internal accountability measures are guidelines implemented by 
a specific hospital or medical practice, and external accountability measures are 
regulations that overarching groups or agencies establish like the AMA. Professional 
accountability typically falls into the external accountability measures, because those 
measures look at areas of physician licensing, specific medical qualifications and medical 
misconduct or litigation. In each of these categories, departments can hold other 
departments accountable for their actions.
247
 Thus, by having greater communication 
among departments and professional groups, accountability of physicians and medical 
practices can be encouraged.   
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2). Consistent Institutional and Professional Policies 
While there are general guidelines for physicians, the revised model also seeks to 
encourage accountability of PGT laboratories for informed consent. Since there is the 
possibility for patients to be harmed from misleading or faulty results, the revised model 
has more extensive system measures in place to ensure the accountability and quality of 
results and accuracy of information presented. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
suggests added communication with the labs and physicians about accountability 
measures.
248
 The Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendment (CLIA) Task Force 
proposes that laboratories should have some type of consent documentation before testing 
begins in order to promote accountability of the labs and PGT in general.
249
 Also in the 
revised model, the labs conducting PGT will be required to participate in a genetics 
quality assurance program. The American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) explains 
that even though CLIA develops guidelines for quality, those regulations only 
recommend, not require, participation in specific genetics programs.
250 At
 this time CLIA 
is looking into establishing a genetics specialty, but clear guidelines have not yet been 
established.
251
 However, WHO notes that genetic assessment evaluations can be done 
through the College of American Pathologists (CAP), the American College of Medical 
Genetics (ACMG), or American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG).
252
 ASCO holds 
that programs to ensure accountability will look at measures within laboratories and 
testing clinics to confront regulatory challenges that can increase false accountability. 
Measures will also be in place to examine the accuracy of materials presented to both the 
patient and family.
253
 As a result, the revised model will promote consistent, appropriate 
institutional and professional policies that ensure enhanced accountability measures.  
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The
 
revised model promotes accountability measures to confront regulatory 
challenges that increase false accountability and decreased quality.
254
 ASCO promotes 
the creation of nationally established measures to increase quality and accountability for 
PGT.
255
 In order to adhere to appropriate accountability standards, the WHO is in the 
process of developing guidelines to assist with the quality and accountability of PGT.
256
 
When there are specific, consistent guidelines, an organization‘s accountability measures 
should be disclosed to patients in order to encourage understanding of the regulations and 
transparency of implementation.
257
  
b. Transparency  
The revised model requires transparency with physician discussions and consent 
requirements. Transparency along with accountability measures work to advance trust 
and patient safety of PGT. The revised model can have a stronger focus on accountability 
by having greater transparency in implementation.
258
 This section will discuss medical 
transparency and methods to implement transparency.  
1). Medical Transparency 
Engelhardt points out that a medical practice can establish individual regulations, 
but transparency is needed to promote trust in that system.
259
 Often with managed care, 
there is not enough time to clarify the aspects of informed consent such as the 
accountability or transparency measures.
260
 However, the revised model recognizes that 
additional communication about the measures taken to ensure transparency is needed to 
promoting trust and patient safety. 
Until recently, transparency measures were not emphasized much in regards to 
health care. Still, Goetz explains that at times encouraging public openness and 
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evaluation is difficult for the medical community. However, if transparency is going to be 
emphasized, then the doctor needs to facilitate more openness concerning consent and 
decision-making, especially about PGT.
261
 While decision-making for PGT is not as easy 
as a simple recommendation, the patient and physician could discuss possible suggestions 
and encourage added transparency within the revised model of consent. 
2). Implementing Transparency  
The revised model adheres to transparency measures that focus specifically on 
PGT. This model strives to improve the previous components by requiring transparency 
of implementation. Implementing the revised model in a transparent manner is crucial for 
patient safety and decision-making.
 
If there is a lack of transparency, often 
communication with the doctors and counselors can suffer and lead to patient 
apprehension and a lack of trust. The revised model seeks to eliminate the idea of the 
―silent world‖ of doctors and patients so that communication and openness can 
flourish.
262
 Howard Brody encouraged transparency for consent by suggesting that 
patients should be informed about the physicians reasoning for suggesting a course of 
action.
263
 David Shore encourages medical practices and doctors to be open about the 
procedures and regulations that the organization and/or doctor is taking to produce trust 
or another goal like patient safety.
264
  
The revised model seeks to eliminate institutional barriers and establish a system 
of accountability and transparency in order to foster trust.
265
 Whether it is due to fear of 
incomplete or inaccurate consent forms or other ideas, generally hospitals keep consent 
forms private. However, sometimes making forms openly accessible can encourage 
additional transparency and trust. Having consent forms available to the public on sites 
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like ClincalTrials.gov could help patients evaluate whether or not they will participate in 
the study. If the forms are public, then more people can scrutinize the forms for accuracy 
which can encourage both accountability and transparency.
266
 Since there are no 
internationally accepted consistent guidelines for implementing consent principles, the 
revised model of consent can help to improve regulatory standards by promoting 
transparency in implementation.
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c. Trust  
Trust is the ultimate measure for a hospital and physician. However, trust can be 
harder to maintain at times, because of the abuses in the history of consent. As a result, if 
patients trust an institution or doctor, that practice will be recognized for its 
dependability.
268
 The revised model encourages trust in the organizations and physicians 
by having open discussions with patient participation in the revised consent process. This 
section will look at the history and roles of trust and discuss trust in the revised model.  
1). History and Roles of Trust in Medicine 
In the beginning, people assumed that an increase in patient rights and autonomy 
would increase public trust in the ways medicine, science, and biotech were practiced and 
regulated. However even after promoting those two ideas, public trust was still not 
encouraged. O‘Neill points out that the doctor-patient relationship has the potential to 
exploit patient trust as evidenced by paternalism.
269
 Roberta Berry explains that while 
autonomy and patient rights were highlighted, trust became an unpopular area of 
emphasis due to its connection with paternalism at the time. However, trust became more 
important when people saw the shortcomings of autonomy in the doctor-patient 
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relationship, when relationships were encouraged more than individual actions, and when 
those interactions were threatened by medical systems like managed care.
270
  
Trust in medicine is not the same as it once was when a physician would care for 
generations of family members. In the beginning, there was more emphasis on the doctor-
patient relationship rather than the distanced business model of medicine today. The new 
commercialization and changing values of medicine has fostered mistrust in many 
areas.
271
 As a result, David Shore notes that trust today often requires faith in procedures 
and organizations.
272
 Traditional trust has been replaced with trust in contracts, because 
of the commercial focus of medicine and genetics. However, contracts alone cannot 
guarantee trust in the physicians or institutions, and as a result, trust has decreased over 
the years in medicine.
273
  
Trust is foundational to informed consent. Since the patient is dependent on the 
doctor for information and recommendations, the doctor-patient relationship is based on 
fiduciary responsibilities which imply trust in the physician to act in the patient‘s best 
interest. Informed consent therefore assists patients in balancing trust in the physician 
with personal decision making.
274
 Medicine is different than other professions, because 
the product of good medicine should be a trusting doctor-patient relationship.
275
 David 
Shore argues that patients who trust their medical team are more likely to be responsible 
for their health leading to better outcomes and to have a stronger doctor-patient 
relationship causing patients to follow the physician‘s suggestions more.276   
2). Trust within the Revised Model  
Trust can be built when physicians help patients to understand their full potential 
in medical decision making.
277
 When there is no clear treatment, the counselor can 
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discuss the possible choices with the patient which can encourage trust.
278
 Shore holds 
that trust is advanced by having better communication and recognizing that the doctor-
patient relationship needs reciprocal disclosure to encourage patient participation.
279
 
Steve Lee explains that patients have to have faith that the doctor is looking out for their 
best interest, because ―If trust is lost, all is lost.‖280 If patients do not believe physicians 
are promoting their beneficence, an increased skepticism can occur towards the 
physician‘s recommendations. If trust erodes in the physician or healthcare system, 
sometimes patients will try to address the mistrust themselves by attempting to reduce 
feelings of helplessness and protecting their welfare.
281
 Sometimes those actions might be 
acceptable, but many times those actions can produce increased harm. If there is mistrust 
of the physician or institution, the utilization of other medical tests can be reduced as 
well.
282
    
Trust is developed in the revised model by measures ensuring accountability of 
PGT regulations and transparency in implementation.
283
 Accountability within 
laboratories and medical practices can promote trust in organizations and processes. 
When the revised model implements the informed consent components transparently, 
patients will be able to put more trust in the contracts and consent forms involved in 
PGT. When trust in the informed consent process is fostered for the emerging system of 
genetic services, the culture of patient safety is enhanced further.   
d. Patient Safety Systems 
The last aspect for the revised model of informed consent for PGT is patient 
safety systems. Patient safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and 
transparency to establish preventive measures as systems that promote the safety of 
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patients considering PGT. This section will look at the systems of patient safety and 
preventive and organizational measures. 
1). Systems of Patient Safety 
Accountability and transparency are the two main aspects of having a system for 
patient safety. Lundberg explains that systems of protection can emerge in the form of 
accountability measures, and truthfulness can take the form of transparency measures for 
procedures and results. Both of these measures are needed in the revised model.
284
 If 
those two requirements are met, then patients will have more confidence and trust in the 
revised system for consent of PGT. As a result of patient trust and an emphasis on 
prevention and early detection, the revised model will promote the culture of patient 
safety that is often sought in medicine.
285
  
2). Preventive and Organizational Measures 
By focusing on systems change, the revised model can encourage a broad, 
organized method to patient safety.
286
 Nelson, Neily, Mills, et al. suggest that this model 
also uses preventive measures to increase patient safety for PGT. Rather than focusing on 
treatment like the current model, the revised model chooses to emphasize the value of 
prevention.
287
  
The medical system focuses on incorrect principles. The revised model should be 
able to identify and address institutional and personal barriers to consent before PGT 
takes place. One barrier might include faulty reimbursement policies that favor treatment 
and advance potentially unnecessary medical services. Another barrier can be 
foundations of consent that seemingly allow for choice but do not adequately promote 
understanding, disclosure, or voluntariness.
288
 By focusing on prevention instead of 
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treatment, the revised model can reduce the amount of harm done to patients and improve 
patient safety. Education can help to prevent any future misunderstandings and concerns, 
which can led to patient safety in the end.
289
 George Lundberg points out that looking at 
the organization, procedures, and end products can help to assess patient care. While all 
three are important, typically the end result is emphasized more, and in the revised model 
of consent for PGT, patient safety should be the outcome.
290
  
E. Conclusion  
If all people in society had the same ethics and values, then there would be no 
reason to have numerous laws and guidelines to protect patient‘s rights. However, the 
history of consent has illustrated what happens when there are no regulations in medicine. 
Because of the abuses of the past, there is a strong requirement to have ethics and 
informed consent in medicine and research.
291
 Pellegrino argues that ethics is about 
protecting individuals from information and tests that do not benefit the patient. If 
medicine puts aspects like financial or social categories above patient beneficence, then 
medicine runs the risk of encouraging persecution and abuse and infringing upon 
rights.
292
 Because respecting persons and encouraging beneficence are key elements of 
medicine, an appropriate model of informed consent is needed to support those 
principles.
293
 Thus, the revised model strives to establish appropriate regulations in order 
to ensure an appropriate consent for PGT.  
Broadstock, Michie, and Marteau explain that in the beginning of genetic 
services, there were more protections in place with required counseling and follow-up. 
But as genetic testing became more common and available in many different settings, the 
protections and regulations were relaxed.
294
 Since genetics is central to us, if people get 
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genetic information without adequately thinking through the consequences, then that can 
lead to unnecessary and possibly harmful outcomes for a patient and his or her family.
295
 
Thus, the revised model recognizes the importance of meaningful informed consent and 
regulations in the field of PGT.   
The revised model tries to establish the necessary protections while still 
promoting accessibility and practicality. Tom Beauchamp notes that a balance between 
overly complex and excessively simplistic regulations for informed consent needs to be 
established. If guidelines are too challenging to adhere to like requiring complete 
disclosure, then getting consent will be too difficult and impractical. However on the 
other side, if consent is too simple focusing mainly on obtaining a signed consent form, 
then consent will emphasize the wrong values and will lose meaning.
296
  
Kahn argues that consent should emphasize a process to promote meaningful 
decision making instead of focusing mainly on forms which can support a more legalistic 
view of consent.
297
 In conclusion, according to Engelhardt, informed consent is justified 
when it authorizes an action, respects human dignity, supports individual freedom, 
encourages personalized evaluation of risks, promotes autonomous and voluntary 
decision-making, and recognizes the responsibility of a proper doctor-patient relationship 
that discloses appropriate information.
298
 Thus, the healthcare system should promote a 
model of consent that has substantive information and guidelines in regards to PGT.
299
 
Comprehension of risk assessment includes autonomy, understanding genetic 
risks, and the doctor-patient relationship. The current model uses a standardized approach 
to consent that typically focuses on the autonomous patient signing a consent form 
without much discussion. Since this model emphasizes the consent form, there is 
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insufficient time and communication for understanding the meaning of PGT risk. The 
current doctor-patient relationship focuses upon the patient freely signing the consent 
form without sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. On the other 
hand, the revised model adopts a personalized approach to consent that emphasizes 
extensive discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses 
on a process that provides time for communication to foster an understanding of the 
complex meaning of PGT risk. The revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient 
relationship as an interactive process to ensure sufficient education of the patient about 
the meaning of PGT.  
Disclosure to select an appropriate treatment option involves disclosure and 
genetic counseling. The current model focuses on medical information in a standardized 
approach of consent. The current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does 
not require counseling. Whereas, the revised model addresses not only medical 
information but all other relevant information for the patient to consider for consent, 
including the fact that some PGT diseases might not have any available treatment. The 
revised model requires counseling and adopts value transparency and non-directive 
counseling. 
Voluntariness of consent discusses coercion and family-related implications. In 
the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources of 
external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and community, 
and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
The current model does not take into consideration all family related implications which 
can lead to coercion of family members. Conversely, the revised model addresses 
205 
 
external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the 
patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate 
or resolve external coercion upon the patient. Because genetic information impacts the 
family, the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. 
Patient safety consists of accountability, transparency, trust, and patient safety. 
This is a new component that is not in the current model. The revised model encourages 
internal and external accountability by promoting communication among medical 
departments and institutional policies. The revised model requires transparency with 
physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised model encourages trust in 
the organizations and physicians by having open discussions with patient participation in 
the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient safety is fostered by having 
systems of accountability and transparency to establish preventive measures that promote 
the safety of patients considering PGT.   
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Chapter Five: Application of the Revised Model 
Since the Human Genome Project, the world of health care and medical 
intervention has rapidly been transformed into the genomic era, where the number of 
genetic interventions and tests are increasing at an alarming rate. There are a plethora of 
genetic tests, but this chapter will focus on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing and 
pleiotropic genetic testing. The revised model of informed consent will be applied to both 
of these tests. Both types of testing approach the subject of informed consent from a 
different perspective. DTC genetic testing focuses more on the research model of 
consent, and pleiotropic genetic testing emphasizes more of the patient treatment model. 
Because DTC genetic testing does not require physician involvement, the discussion 
around this type of testing focuses more on the results and the testing companies. 
Pleiotropic genetic testing emphasizes the education and disclosure needs in order to 
understand what this testing involves. All of those differences will be evident through 
each analysis.  
 Each section will give an introduction to and a discussion of the specific genetic 
test, apply the four components of the revised model, and then present a case study. Then, 
the chapter will conclude with summarizing the differences between these two types of 
genetic tests and discussing the implications for those tests in relation to informed 
consent.   
A. DTC Genetic Testing and Informed Consent 
Genetic testing is seen everywhere in health care, but most of the time physicians 
have to order the tests for their patients. Today however, consumers can go online and 
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buy genetic tests themselves with DTC genetic testing. This section will analyze the ideas 
involved with DTC genetic testing. 
The revised model will first be applied to DTC genetic testing. This section looks 
at the background of DTC testing, applies the revised model of consent, and analyzes a 
case study. First, the background of DTC genetic testing gives an introduction to this 
technology and different types of tests, evaluates the test results and testing companies, 
and then analyzes the risks and benefits of this type of testing. Second, the four 
components of the revised model (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and patient 
safety) are applied to DTC genetic testing. Third, the case study discusses the issues that 
are involved with DTC genetic testing and informed consent.  
1. Background of DTC Genetic Testing 
 The first part will give an introduction to DTC genetic testing. This section will 
explain the meaning of DTC genetic testing, give an overview of the test results, and then 
evaluate the risks and benefits. Analyzing the risks and benefits will help to identify the 
areas that the revised model of informed consent needs to address.  
a. DTC Genetic Testing  
DTC genetic testing refers to genetic tests that are marketed and sold directly to 
consumers through the internet, television, or mail. There are numerous DTC genetic 
testing companies, including the two most popular in the United States, 23andMe and 
Navigenics. DTC genetic testing companies send consumers a test kit for collecting a 
DNA sample by either spitting into a tube or swabbing the inside of the mouth.
1
 Within 
weeks, the consumer is given their results.  
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In order to understand what DTC genetic testing is, this section will look at the 
science of the testing and the types of testing available.  
1). Science of DTC Genetic Testing  
The science behind DTC genetic testing is just like the science of PGT. DTC 
genetic testing looks at the other samples and compares an individual‘s sample to the 
general population risk for a particular disease.
2
 DTC genetic testing also looks at genetic 
variants in order to determine a person‘s risk of disease.3 However, as was described 
before, different variants have different functions and significance.
4
 While Huntington‘s 
disease only looks at a single genetic variant, many other diseases like the mutation for 
breast cancer, BRCA, analyze many genetic variants. Because part of this science 
depends on the number of variants analyzed and identified, DTC genetic testing 
companies should have a broad range of samples in order to establish appropriate 
predictions.
5
 Having a stronger database of samples could increase statistical probabilities 
when predicting genetic risks.  
2). Types of DTC Genetic Tests 
Since there are so many different tests a consumer can get, it is important to 
understand the different types of DTC genetic testing available. There are the more 
recreational types of testing including ancestry information and information about 
individual characteristics and traits such as athletic performance, eye color, and bitter 
taste perception. Some companies have nutritional and metabolic assessment testing 
including tests for caffeine metabolism, oxidative stress levels, and skin health. Then 
there are the more common genetic tests such as prenatal testing, newborn screening, 
pharmacogenomic testing, and diagnostic testing. Carrier testing is done to see if a person 
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can pass on a disease to their children like cystic fibrosis, hemochromotosis, or Tay-
Sachs. Some companies also participate in predisposition testing and genome wide 
association studies (GWAS). Predisposition testing will give your predicted risk for 
developing diseases like hereditary cancers, cardiovascular disease, depression, age-
related macular degeneration, Celiac disease, Crohn‘s disease, Parkinson‘s disease, 
diabetes, and others. This section will focus on the predictive or predisposition testing for 
certain diseases.
6 
b. Test Results 
 Often, DTC genetic test results are very complicated. The first section will look at 
how to interpret the results. The second section will look at the DTC genetic testing 
companies and the viewpoints the companies have in regards to those results. 
1). Meaning of the Results 
Often with DTC genetic testing, consumers do not know what the results of a 
positive or negative risk assessment means. A test with a positive result means that the 
individual has a higher chance of developing the disease. While a negative test result 
means that the individual has the same percentage of risk as people in the general 
population.
7
 Determining the meaning of the results can be very difficult, and many times 
these concepts are rarely discussed by the DTC genetic testing companies. Although, 
most companies recommend talking to their personal physician after the test in order to 
discuss the results. While some companies offer genetic counselors to interpret the test 
results, most do not require them.
8
 As a result, many times the individual is responsible 
for determining what to do with the information. 
2). DTC Genetic Testing Companies and Result Perspectives 
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Within the DTC genetic testing companies, there are different perspectives about 
the testing results and testing interpretation process. The two most popular DTC genetic 
testing companies in the United States are 23andMe and Navigenics. 23andMe has its 
foundation in the principle of autonomy and a fundamental right to know one‘s genetic 
makeup.
9
 According to a recent article in the New York Times, 23andMe is the market 
leader for DTC genetic testing companies.
10
 23andMe puts more emphasis on the 
database collection, because the company believes the database will be worth a lot in the 
future. Navigenics, one of 23andMe‘s top competitors, has a more traditional approach to 
DTC genetic testing. Navigenics changed their model, and now their DTC genetic testing 
is to be used under a physician‘s supervision.11 Also Navigenics is one of the only DTC 
genetic testing companies to have 5 genetic counselors on staff to discuss results with 
their consumers.
12
 Navigenics thinks the best way to market DTC genetic testing is 
through a physician, which goes against 23andMe‘s foundation. Vance Vanier, the 
company‘s chief medical officer, says that DTC genetic testing is a ―very young market 
and there‘s a lot of missing information and even misinformation. We‘re better off having 
trusted intermediaries through whom a customer gets their information.‖13  
While these companies differ in their approaches to DTC genetic testing, there 
testing methods and end results are similar. These two companies illustrate the two 
approaches to DTC genetic testing. One approach looks at this testing as more 
informational, and thus the company does not see the need to involve medical 
professionals. The other approach sees the information as medical information, and 
therefore it needs to go through a physician. This is probably one of the biggest debates 
within DTC genetic testing. Because there are companies that perform both recreational 
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tests and more of the medical test, the solution to informing people about their results is 
more complex. This issue will be discussed further in the application of the revised model 
of informed consent. 
c. Risk/Benefit Analysis  
There are risks and benefits to almost every technology today. As such, this 
section performs a risk/benefit analysis of DTC genetic testing. Risks include 
inappropriate test utilization, misinterpretation of results, and a lack of necessary follow-
up. Benefits can include consumer empowerment, lower chance of genetic 
discrimination, and assist in future planning and preventive measures.
14
 The first section 
will analyze the risks of DTC genetic testing. The second section will evaluate the 
benefits of testing.  
1). Risks 
There are three main areas of risk within DTC genetic testing. First, inappropriate 
test utilization is the idea that people should not be participating in some of these tests. 
Often doctors will prescribe a patient a specific drug for a specific purpose. By applying 
the pharmaceutical example to DTC genetic testing, in effect, consumers could be able to 
buy prescriptions for everything even if a specific medication was not medically 
indicated. In DTC genetic testing, the consumer can buy any test he or she wants. The 
main concern is the fact that there are people participating in the tests who should not be. 
An excessive emphasis upon participation can be encouraged by misleading 
advertisements or just from the emphasis of consumer autonomy.
 15 
As a result, people 
could suffer from inappropriate test utilization by hearing about results for late-onset 
diseases like Alzheimer‘s and not being prepared for that knowledge. With this type of 
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testing, harm could arise, because there is no gatekeeper to prevent consumers from 
buying tests that are unsuitable or that could be misinterpreted.
16
 
 
Second, misinterpretation of results can come from the patient and/or the actual 
test results.
17
 Misinterpretation can come from a lack of education on the part of the 
consumer so that the consumer misinterprets the results. Many times people do not 
understand what their results mean, because there is not enough consumer education and 
results are easily misunderstood.
18
 The other aspect of misinterpretation lies in the testing 
itself. DTC genetic testing companies just take into account the genes and chromosomes, 
but the results do not take into account other areas of medical information or 
environmental aspects.
 
When analyzing a complex disease, all information relating to the 
person should be discussed including a family history, environmental interactions, 
lifestyle, and the person‘s current medications and medical condition.19 Robert Green, a 
neurologist at Boston University, says ―At this point, nongenetic factors, such as family 
history, body mass index, and history of smoking, often provide a better predictor of 
disease risk than does genetics.‖‘20 Unless all parts of a person‘s health are analyzed, 
results for an individual can be misinterpreted easily. While the major DTC genetic 
testing companies have a 99 percent accuracy rate in locating the genetic variants, not all 
the variants have equal meaning.
 Some SNPs can increase a person‘s disease risk by a 
hundred percent, while others only increase risk by 1 to 2 percent. Because of the 
uncertainty involved in this testing, there is a high risk for misinterpretation.
21
 
Third, a lack of necessary follow-up is a risk and concern for DTC genetic testing. 
Some companies have genetic counselors and doctors for the consumers to talk to, but 
overall there is a lack of physician involvement and follow-up.
22
 After positive results, a 
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person might get extremely depressed or anxious, since the test shows there is a higher 
risk for developing a specific disease. However, there is also the fact that a person might 
have gotten a false reassurance. The person might assume a negative result meant that the 
individual would not get the disease. Sometimes poor health decisions can arise from that 
thinking as well.
23
 If the individual does not share the results with a physician or 
counseling, he or she could be making medical decisions on misinterpreted and 
incomplete testing results causing harm to the individual.
24 
Dr. Robert Marion, a clinical 
geneticist, says the main part of the problem for DTC genetic testing is that ―without 
careful explanation, without accompanying genetic counseling to explain their meaning, 
the results are not only meaningless, they can actually be harmful.‖25 Ignoring the 
communication process can cause faulty decisions and harm.
26
 Follow-up and counseling 
are major areas that will be discussed more in the revised model. 
 
2). Benefits 
 There are three potential benefits to DTC genetic testing. First, the advocates say 
it can help consumers feel empowered by knowing their genetic makeup, can cut down 
on the amount of genetic discrimination, and can help with future treatment plans. 
Consumers say that this type of testing is based on autonomy and a right to know one‘s 
genetic makeup, like the company 23andMe. If a person wants to claim more 
empowerment over their body, there are several DTC genetic testing companies that will 
fulfill this desire and satisfy curiosity. However, completely understanding the process of 
DTC genetic testing is essential for true autonomy and empowerment. While consumer 
empowerment might be a benefit to DTC genetic testing, consumer autonomy could be 
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taken advantage of in this type of testing and could potentially cause harm to 
individuals.
27
 
 
Second, oddly enough, genetic privacy was cited as a potential benefit for DTC 
genetic testing.
 
Consumers thought that if they received their genetic testing results 
outside of their physician‘s office, then their genetic report would never make it into their 
medical records. This idea can point out the lack of information concerning genetic 
testing. Most, if not all, DTC genetic testing companies recommend going to your doctor 
to review the results of your genetic testing. Once a consumer goes to their doctor and 
discusses specific results, that information makes it onto a person‘s medical record. 
However, since the passing of the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act of 2008 
(GINA), patients do not have to worry as much anymore about genetic discrimination.
28
 
Because of GINA, protecting genetic privacy and genetic discrimination is no longer a 
true benefit of DTC genetic testing. In fact, when looking at the possibility of the 
company selling consumer‘s DNA databases to scientists, there might be a risk to genetic 
privacy with this testing.  
Third, helping patients with future treatment plans and preventive measures is 
another commonly cited benefit. Advocates say that once a person knows that he or she is 
at an increased risk for a particular disease, then the person will take precautionary 
measures such as having more screening tests or changing lifestyle habits.
29
 The 
consumer will be more motivated and aware of his increased risk of disease, and as a 
result, he or she will therefore make better decisions.
30
 A study, conducted in 2008, sent 
online surveys to 1,880 physicians asking if they had patients that had used DTC genetic 
testing. Out of the small percentage of patients that had used those services, the 
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physicians said, after seeing the results, that about 75% of the cases had some change in 
the patient‘s care.31 Participating in DTC genetic testing can be a benefit for preventive 
medicine, but there are also concerns with this point. The first is that while people say 
having a more active role in their health is a positive benefit for DTC genetic testing, 
there is no proof that that is what people are using these tests for.
32
 In actuality, these 
tests could have the opposite effect either by instilling more anxiety or by creating an 
attitude of apathy. Another concern with this point is the fact that these treatment 
decisions could be based on inaccurate results, because there is no positive way of 
predicting a person‘s actual risk of developing a disease.  
2. Application of the Revised Model  
This section will apply the revised model of informed consent to DTC genetic 
testing. The four components of the revised model, comprehension, disclosure, 
voluntariness, and patient safety, will be applied to DTC genetic testing.  
a. Comprehension  
First, comprehension of DTC genetic testing will be analyzed. In this section, 
autonomy, genetic risks, and the doctor-patient relationship is discussed in regards to 
comprehension.     
The current model uses a standardized approach to consent that typically focuses 
on the autonomous patient signing a consent form without much discussion. Since this 
model emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time and communication for 
understanding the meaning of PGT risk. The current doctor-patient relationship focuses 
upon the patient freely signing the consent form without sufficient education of the 
patient about the meaning of PGT. On the other hand, the revised model adopts a 
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personalized approach to consent that emphasizes extensive discussion with the patient as 
an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses on a process that provides time for 
communication to foster an understanding of the complex meaning of PGT risk. The 
revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive process to 
ensure sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT.  
1). Autonomy 
DTC genetic testing recognizes the importance of autonomy and self- 
determination. One company, 23andMe, has its foundation in the principle of autonomy 
and a fundamental right to know one‘s genetic makeup.33 Since DTC genetic testing is 
different than some of the other types of testing in that it focuses on a patient and 
research subject model of consent, the application of autonomy can be a little different in 
this approach. Unlike the current model which uses a standardized approach to consent, 
the revised model emphasizes more patient involvement through a process of increased 
education and discussion with the patient. In order to encourage enhanced autonomy and 
also understanding, the revised model encourages turning abstract statistics and risks into 
more personalized information.
34
 Adopting a more personalized approach to consent with 
DTC genetic testing encourages the patient to act as an autonomous agent. 
2). Understanding Genetic Risks 
Risk assessments are often very complex to understand, but it is crucial that 
patients understand these assessments before making a decision based off of 
misunderstood information.
35
 Having a positive result on a specific cancer test like 
prostate cancer does not mean that a person has prostate cancer right now, nor is it certain 
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that he will ever get prostate cancer in the future.
 36
 The positive result just means that the 
individual has a higher risk of developing prostate cancer sometime in his life.  
In order to enhance understanding of DTC genetic testing, the revised model 
focuses on a process that promotes increased time for patient education and 
communication with physicians or genetic counselors. Beauchamp and Childress point 
out one way understanding can be encouraged in the revised model. The authors explain 
that having an evaluation of other individuals after DTC genetic testing could help in the 
future. By having a post-test evaluation, individuals working for these companies can 
identify and address areas that other people did not understanding concerning genetic 
risks. One difficulty with understanding risk assessments for DTC genetic testing is the 
application of risk to the research realm. Because research seeks to gain knowledge, often 
the results of research do not benefit the individual subject at the time of the study. With 
DTC genetic testing, many times the individual functions as both a research subject and 
patient. As a result, the individual needs to understand both aspects of testing. In order to 
do that, the revised model encourages more time for communication. Research indicates 
that understanding can be increased with research subjects when there are one-on-one 
discussions with the individual and a ―neutral educator.‖37  
3). Doctor-Patient Relationship 
The doctor-patient relationship is a little different with DTC genetic testing, 
because often there is no direct contact with a physician. Companies encourage 
discussing the results with a physician, but often discussions are limited with DTC 
genetic testing.  
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The current doctor-patient relationship focuses upon the patient freely signing the 
consent form without sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. The 
revised model emphasizes an interactive doctor-patient relationship to ensure sufficient 
education of the people participating in DTC genetic testing. In order to do that, 
physicians need to be able to educate patients adequately. However, an article in the 
American Journal of Bioethics, entitled ―Direct to Confusion: Lessons Learned from 
Marketing BRCA Testing‖ illustrates that not all physicians are able to educate people 
participating in DTC genetic testing adequately. Matloff and Caplan point out that 
research ―shows that physicians lack adequate knowledge of even basic genetic concepts, 
making them likely to mishandle, misinterpret, and misadvise these patients on what is 
one of the most important pieces of medical information they will ever receive.‖38 As a 
result, the DTC genetic testing companies need to ensure that there are individuals, 
whether physicians or genetic counselors, that can explain the process and meaning of 
DTC genetic testing sufficiently.
39
 Even though this testing is sent directly to the 
consumer, there still needs to be appropriate communication with a physician or 
counselor to ensure adequate understanding. The revised model ensures the doctor-
patient relationship is an interactive process for encouraging understanding of DTC 
genetic testing.  
The revised model adopts a personalized approach to consent that emphasizes 
extensive discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses 
on a process that provides time for communication to foster an understanding of the 
complex meaning of PGT risk. The revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient 
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relationship as an interactive process to ensure sufficient education of the patient about 
the meaning of PGT.  
b. Disclosure  
 Second, disclosure to select an appropriate treatment option involves disclosure 
and genetic counseling.  Each area will be analyzed further. The current model focuses on 
medical information in a standardized approach of consent. The current model 
recommends non-directive counseling, and does not require counseling. Whereas, the 
revised model addresses not only medical information but all other relevant information 
for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT diseases might 
not have any available treatment. The revised model requires counseling and adopts value 
transparency and non-directive counseling. 
1). Disclosure Guidelines 
The current model focuses on medical information in a standardized approach of 
consent. However, the revised model includes both medical and non-medical information 
within the disclosure processes. Disclosure also includes the fact that some diseases 
might not have any available treatment such as Huntington‘s disease (HD).   
Most, if not all, companies use the samples for participation in research, but not 
all consumers are aware of this fact. The company 23andMe plans to sell their databases 
of DNA in the future so that other research companies can benefit from the amount of 
information. 23andMe combines customers‘ DNA samples and completed surveys on 
health information, and the company plans to sell those databases so that scientist can 
make new discoveries by comparing the samples with the survey information.
40
 Thus, 
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disclosure for DTC genetic testing should include disclosure information for research 
purposes as well as all other typical information like the risks, benefits, and purpose.
41
   
Since this type of testing relies on large number of samples, disclosure should 
address the storage policies of these samples including the privacy regulations.
42
 
Individuals should be aware of who has access to their samples and information, how 
their privacy will be protected, and what the uses of their samples will be in the future. 
Beauchamp suggests that the ―content of the consent will be roughly dictated by current 
and anticipated future uses of the samples.‖43 The future uses of genetic samples are 
increasingly important with this type of testing when determining what to disclosure to an 
individual. Also another important aspect of disclosure for DTC genetic testing is the 
level of research. In order to establish better predictions, DTC genetic testing companies 
need to have a broad range of samples.
44
 If the company has done little research and/or 
their database is relatively small, the results might be extremely varied or simply 
incorrect. As a result, disclosure for DTC genetic testing should discuss the level of 
research the results are based on. The companies should disclose the amount of 
information the results are based on. In order to protect against unsubstantiated claims, 
the revised model encourages adopting a research confidence rating system to illustrate 
the difference between preliminary and confirmed research.
45
 This type of increased 
assurance can help the individual to be able to make a better decision about DTC genetic 
testing.  
2). Genetic Counseling 
With many DTC genetic testing companies, genetic counseling is not required.
46
 
However, unlike the current model, the revised model requires counseling and adopts 
231 
 
value transparency and non-directive counseling. As Dr. Robert Marion suggested, 
without an individual explaining and/or discussing the results, the person undergoing 
DTC genetic testing can be negatively impacted by the testing.
47
 Having results that are 
not adequately explained can cause people to make harmful and risky decisions.
48
  
The revised model requires genetic counseling both before and after testing to 
enhance decision making about appropriate options. Genetic counseling is needed for 
knowing when to utilize a certain test and then after the testing in order to evaluate the 
results.
49
 Pre-test counseling can help with psychological assessments in order to evaluate 
whether the individual is competent and whether the individual will be able to handle the 
amount of information appropriately.
50
 Post-test counseling ensures the patient meets to 
assess the results with either the DTC testing company or the patient‘s personal 
physician. While most companies only have a genetic counselor, Navigenics uses their 
testing under a physician‘s supervision.51 One study by Aktan-Collan, Mecklin, de la 
Chapelle, et al. illustrates the basic foundations of pre- and post-test assessments. After 
disclosing the basic information needed, the study began with a pre-test assessment. This 
assessment included a questionnaire to evaluate the individual, pre-test counseling, a 
required wait time in between counseling and testing, and then a telephone call in order to 
find out about the individual‘s decision. Once the pre-test assessment concluded, if the 
person decided to participate in the test, the test was then performed. After completing 
the test, the study concluded with a post-test assessment which included post-test 
counseling and follow-up questionnaires for one month and one year after the test.
52
 This 
example shows the general principles that guide pre- and post-test assessments for 
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counselors. In the revised model, the consent process for DTC genetic testing should 
require some type of pre- and post-test counseling.  
In the revised model, genetic counseling also should include patient assessment 
and feedback mechanisms. Feedback mechanisms like an Impact of Event Scale (IES) 
survey and a decision tree can encourage appropriate decision making about potential 
options. An IES is a survey that assesses the individual‘s ability to handle a lot of 
information. This survey can evaluate the amount of stress a person is likely to have with 
new a lot of information. Counselors can use this assessment in order to identify the 
people that might not be able to handle the amount of information DTC genetic testing 
reveals. Another assessment tool is a decision tree. A decision tree can break up the 
amount of information that is presented into more manageable segments by outlining the 
options, factors, and decisions. The decision tree can help patients determine whether or 
not to undergo testing and/or start a certain treatment. A patient can participate more in 
decision making by drawing or outlining the concepts involved in his/his decision.
53
  
The following is an example of a decision tree for an individual that has a family 
history of cervical cancer. First, the patient asks the question of whether or not he or she 
should get tested for a particular gene mutation, in this case the BRCA mutation. If the 
patient decides to undergo testing and finds out she is positive for this mutation, then she 
needs to review the possible treatment options. After reviewing the options, then she 
needs to make a decision about whether she is going to under screening only or whether 
she will have a prophylactic surgery. If surgery is decided, then she needs to look at the 
different types of surgery. Once she decides on a type, then she needs to choose a doctor 
to perform the surgery. After identifying a doctor, the woman will need to decide when to 
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have the surgery. If she decides to have both her ovaries and uterus taken out as part of 
the treatment, she needs to analyze whether or not she would like to have another child or 
whether she needs to wait until after breastfeeding her current child. All of these aspects 
need to be included when determining when to schedule the procedure. Then finally, if 
she is undergoing a mastectomy, she will need to look into reconstructive surgery. These 
are all areas that can be analyzed in a decision tree.
54
 
Also within patient assessment and feedback, there needs to be time to think 
before making a final decision about DTC testing.
55
 In one study by Aktan-Collan, 
Mecklin, de la Chapelle, et al., the pre-test counseling session was done and then a two 
week period was required before the individual participated in the test.
56
 This time was 
given in order to reflect on the counseling sessions and the individual‘s concerns and 
values. The revised model requires at least two weeks before a final decision can be made 
to participate in DTC genetic testing. During this time, the individual can have a 
discussion with family members in order to determine their feelings on the test. By 
requiring genetic counseling with feedback and patient assessment mechanisms, the 
patient will be able to make an appropriate decision about possible options.   
The revised model addresses not only medical information but all other relevant 
information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT 
diseases might not have any available treatment. The revised model requires counseling 
and adopts value transparency and non-directive counseling. 
c. Voluntariness 
This section will look at the voluntariness of consent for DTC genetic testing. 
Since DTC genetic testing is a little different than other types of testing in that it does not 
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always require a physician to be involved, the voluntariness focuses almost solely on 
family-related implications. As a result, the voluntary nature of consent is crucial in order 
to ensure meaningful consent for DTC genetic testing.
57
 This section will look at coercion 
and family-related implications of consent in regards to DTC genetic testing. 
In the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources 
of external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and community, 
and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
The current model does not take into consideration all family related implications which 
can lead to coercion of family members. Conversely, the revised model addresses 
external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the 
patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate 
or resolve external coercion upon the patient. Because genetic information impacts the 
family, the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. 
1). Coercion 
Often the differences in negative and positive influences are the motivations and 
methods the individual uses to control or persuade. Sometimes external influences can 
actually support and benefit a person‘s decision-making by giving additional information. 
However, other times external influences exhibit deception, weakened choices, and faulty 
reasoning.
58
 The detrimental influences most often ―subvert autonomous action by 
distorting individual choice through coercion or deception.‖59 Beauchamp says that in 
research, individuals should be protected from discrimination, stigmatization, and other 
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pressures.
60
 Thus the revised model of consent for DTC genetic testing seeks to avoid 
these types of detrimental influences.  
In the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple 
sources of external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and 
community, and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon 
the individual. On the other hand, the revised model addresses the external pressures on 
the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the patient to be tested and 
pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external 
coercion upon the patient. In the revised model, the pre-test questionnaires and surveys 
can help counselors to identify some of the external pressures that people might have 
before participating in DTC genetic testing. Pre-test counseling can also help to identify 
individuals that might have more emotional or social pressures.
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Since DTC genetic testing can influence both the individual and his or her family, 
the revised model looks at family coercion as well.
62
 The revised model ensures 
voluntary consent by establishing procedures to avoid two forms of coercion: pressure by 
the family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding the testing 
outcome. If there is a known family genetic trait, there can be pressure on individuals to 
get DTC genetic testing done before becoming pregnant or just for informational 
purposes. On the other hand, if one sibling discovers a higher disease risk from a specific 
trait that can affect other siblings, the revised model ensures a process is undertaken to 
ascertain whether the other sibling wants to know. In order to avoid both types of 
coercion, the revised model encourages individuals to discuss his or her reasoning for and 
concerns of DTC genetic testing with a counselor and/or physician.
63
 By assessing a 
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patient‘s motives for DTC genetic testing, physicians and/or counselors should be able to 
identify any coercive elements. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress say that 
professionals in the healthcare and medical research areas should ―probe for and ensure 
understanding and voluntariness‖ of consent.64  
2). Family-Related Implications 
Because genetic information impacts the family, the revised model includes 
family-related concerns before testing and identifies ways to help the patient struggle 
with family-related PGT information. Unlike the current model, the revised model strives 
to take into consideration all family related implications which can lead to coercion of 
family members.  
Since DTC genetic testing produces results for many different diseases, the 
implications for the entire family is significant. Often those results cannot be contained 
with that single individual; at some point, the family will find out at least some of the 
results.
65
 As a result, the revised model addresses family-related implications by having 
the counselor or physician communicate those areas to the individual.  
By having a discussion with the individual before participating in DTC genetic 
testing about family-related implications, the individual will have a better idea of what to 
discuss with his or her family.
66
 Then, the individual can make a decision to participate 
voluntarily in DTC genetic testing based on a better view of the family-related 
implications.  
The revised model addresses external pressures on the patient and the family 
(such as pressures by the family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family 
regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external coercion upon the patient. 
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Because genetic information impacts the family, the revised model includes family-
related concerns before testing and identifies ways to help the patient struggle with 
family-related PGT information. 
d. Patient Safety 
DTC genetic testing has many possibilities for risk to patients. Some potential 
problems with this testing are stress, confusion, false assurances, and unreliable results. 
False assurances can come because either a certain genetic variance has not been 
identified yet or the test failed to detect the genetic variance.
67
 Risks from false 
assurances and unreliable results can be minimized by adhering to the patient safety 
component within the revised model for PGT.  
The revised model of consent requires nationally established systems of 
accountability for PGT that implement the revised components of consent in a transparent 
manner to foster trust in the emerging system of genetic-related services. One article in 
the Journal of Molecular Diagnostics said ―It is the consumer‘s responsibility to exercise 
caution to avoid becoming a victim of marketing ploys that prey on humanity‘s innate 
curiosity and fears.‖68 While ultimately DTC genetic testing is up to the consumer, there 
should also be mechanisms in place to ensure accountability, transparency, and trust in 
order to promote patient safety. This section will discuss accountability, transparency, 
trust, and patient safety within the context of consent for DTC genetic testing.  
This is a new component that is not in the current model. The revised model 
encourages internal and external accountability by promoting communication among 
medical departments and institutional policies. The revised model requires transparency 
with physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised model encourages trust 
238 
 
in the organizations and physicians by having open discussions with patient participation 
in the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient safety is fostered by having 
systems of accountability and transparency to establish preventive measures that promote 
the safety of patients considering PGT.   
1). Accountability 
The revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and consistent institutional policies. Since 
DTC genetic testing companies can also conduct research from the samples being sent in, 
this area focuses on both the research subject and patient treatment models of informed 
consent.
69
 As a result, accountability measures focus on the labs performing the research, 
the DTC genetic testing company, and the physician or counselor involved. Because 
individuals can be harmed by misleading or unsubstantiated info, labs conducting testing 
will be required to participate in genetics quality assurance program to ensure accuracy 
and validity of materials and results. This can help to ensure accountability, accuracy, and 
validity of materials and results.
70
 Genetics quality assurance programs encourage 
consistent institutional policies for analyzing testing samples.  
While the companies are giving consumers their results, those companies are also 
keeping the results to establish a database of DNA. The co-founder of 23andMe, Anne 
Wojcicki says that the company never gives out identifiable information to scientists 
unless consent of the person is given. She says that she is ―careful when I say we‘re going 
to have a revenue stream from the database. We will not sell individuals‘ data, but the 
database as a whole will have enormous value.‖71 To encourage accountability, the DTC 
genetic testing companies need to communicate the consent and research policies to the 
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individuals and counselors or physicians. Accountability for DTC genetic testing is 
encouraged by having consistent policies and increased communication among testing 
labs, DTC genetic testing companies, physicians, and consumers.  
2). Transparency 
Since this is a new component not found in the current model, the revised model 
of consent also recognizes and emphasizes the significance of transparency in 
implementation. It is crucial to implement this model in a transparent manner in order to 
promote patient safety. The revised model requires transparency with physician 
discussions and consent requirements. 
One aspect of transparency that is a little different with DTC genetic testing is 
research. There needs to be greater transparency with the patients concerning the research 
being done with their samples. While 23andMe says that consumer samples will not be 
sold with identifiable information, many individuals are not even aware their samples are 
being stored.
72
 Thus physician and counselor discussions can help to encourage 
transparency in regards to research participation with DTC genetic testing. Another 
aspect of transparency in research is the reliability of the risk assessments. One DTC 
genetic testing company recognizes the need for increased transparency with reliable risk 
assessments. Anne Wojcicki from 23andMe says the company realizes the possibility 
―that people may misunderstand their genetic data if they are given incorrect or 
incomplete information.‖73 She recognizes the company‘s responsibility towards their 
customers, and as a result, the company has tried to encourage transparency with their 
consumers. As a result, the company started a star system, a research confidence rating, 
which explains the amount of research the results are based off of. One star means that 
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the results are based off of introductory research, and the rating goes up to four stars 
which means the research is reputable and well-recognized. 23andMe is trying to increase 
their transparency with consent requirements and consumers.
74
 When consumers see the 
accountability and transparency measures that 23 and Me is starting to take, the level of 
trust can start to increase as well.  
3). Trust 
By having increased accountability and transparency measures, trust will be 
encouraged as well. The revised model encourages trust in the organizations and 
physicians by having open discussions with patient participation in the revised consent 
process.  
Because genetic testing leads to very personal information, if there is not 
complete trust, then the individual and their family can be harmed from a lack of privacy 
and/or mistrust in the system. If a person does not trust his or her physician or counselor, 
then often that mistrust will continue into other areas which will eventually lead to 
mistrust of the medical organization.
75
 An example of mistrust in medicine can occur 
among physicians and pharmaceutical companies. If a physician sells some patient 
information to drug companies, then the physician is not acting on the patient‘s best 
interest. David Orentlicher says that once physicians ―become dual agents, they can no 
longer provide assurances to patients that it is safe to place their trust in their 
physicians.‖76 As a result, once trust is compromised, it is often hard to regain that trust 
in the process of informed consent.  
Since DTC genetic testing has the opportunity to merge research with medical 
care, trust is extremely important to informed consent in this area. As a result, there 
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should be trust among all the organizations including the researchers, the laboratories, the 
DTC genetic testing companies, and the medical professionals. There should also be trust 
in the consent process of the revised model. Trust in the revised model encourages 
physicians and counselors to make sure the individuals are in agreement with and have 
consented to the process of DTC genetic testing.
77
 Trust among all levels of the DTC 
genetic testing process can help individuals to feel safe in giving his or her consent for 
testing. This new component of trust is important to the revised model of consent. 
4). Patient Safety Systems 
Patient safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and transparency to 
establish preventive measures that promote the safety of patients considering DTC 
genetic testing. By having more accountability and transparency measures, the revised 
model can encourage better systems of patient safety.
78
 One aspect of patient safety 
involved with research participation is the Common Rule. This Rule, focusing on 
compliance, IRB reviews, and informed consent, can help to create better systems of 
patient safety for DTC genetic testing.
79
  
Another aspect of patient safety in DTC genetic testing is preventive and 
organizational measures. By focusing on prevention and communication, the revised 
model decreases some of the institutional barriers of patient safety.
80
 One example of a 
preventive measure is illustrated by a DTC genetic testing company, Psynomics. 
Psynomics offers testing for psychological problems like depression, mania, and bipolar 
disorders. This company has a different process of returning results. While most, if not 
all, companies return the results directly to the consumer, Psynomics returns the results to 
a physician of the patient‘s choice. By allowing the patient‘s doctor or a geneticist to 
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discuss the results with the individual, the model that Psynomics takes encourages patient 
safety by preventive measures.
81
 Patient risks can be decreased by having ―trusted 
intermediaries‖ to discuss concerns and results with.82  
Another example of patient safety is the idea of opting out of or opting in for 
certain diseases. Donna Messner suggests that opting in is ―preferable.‖ In this case, 
people select which diseases or traits he or she would like to be tested for. By doing this, 
Donna Messner says that the individual ―actively sets the parameters for the information 
she will receive; she is forced to make a conscious choice and is less likely to be 
frivolous in selection since each test is priced separately.‖83 Instead of having the typical 
consent form, the form can have a list of which diseases or traits the individual is 
consenting for. This type of opting in could promote patient safety, because the 
individual is not getting risk information that he or she does not wish to know.
84
 The 
revised model encourages patient safety of DTC genetic tests by focusing on 
accountability, transparency, and prevention. 
The revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and institutional policies. The revised model 
requires transparency with physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised 
model encourages trust in the organizations and physicians by having open discussions 
with patient participation in the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient 
safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and transparency to establish 
preventive measures that promote the safety of patients considering PGT.   
3. Case Study 
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This last section will present a case study that discusses DTC genetic testing and 
informed consent. The first part will present and discuss a case study about Josh. The 
second section will contrast the two models of informed consent in relation to the case 
study on DTC genetic testing. 
a. Josh  
Donna Messner describes and analyzes some case studies pertaining to DTC 
genetic testing. One of the case studies involved a man in his forties, Josh. Josh was 
employed in a medical research company, which was looking into PGT. In order to 
encourage better statistics, his company encouraged all workers to take part in the 
research study. Since he thought he might have a predisposition to type II diabetes, Josh 
thought the research study might be beneficial. Also because Josh understood many of 
the techniques involved in medical research and testing, he thought he would be better 
able to interpret and handle the results. Thus he decided to participate. However, while it 
was his company that was doing the study, the company had an agreement with a DTC 
genetic testing company. The DTC genetic testing company would perform the research, 
but Josh‘s company was interested in the lifestyle choices the individuals made along 
with the research. Genetic counseling was optional through the DTC genetic testing 
company after the results were given. After reading and signing the informed consent 
form online, Josh gave a sample to the DTC genetic testing company. When the results 
returned, Josh discovered that he did not have a higher than normal susceptibility to type 
II diabetes, but that he did have a higher susceptibility to Alzheimer‘s disease. While he 
was ready for results about diabetes, he was not ready for results about Alzheimer‘s 
disease. After thinking about the results, Josh did remember that his family had a history 
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of Alzheimer‘s disease, but at the same time, he was not ready to deal with that type of 
information yet. After calling the DTC genetic testing company for a counselor, the 
counselor informed him to eat better and exercise more. Josh did not feel that the advice 
was helpful, because he assumed all people should have a healthy diet and exercise 
regularly. He wanted to know about measures to predict or slow the progression of 
Alzheimer‘s disease, but in all his research he did not find any concrete preventive 
measures.
85
 
b. Application 
 This section will apply the revised model of informed consent to the case study. 
In doing so, the contrast between the two models of consent will be evident. Each of the 
four components, including comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and patient safety, 
will be discussed.  
Comprehension is one of the most important aspects of DTC genetic testing. First 
in the current model of consent, the consent form is emphasized for the standardized 
approach without much discussion. In this case study, Josh read and signed the consent 
form online, and after that, consent for DTC genetic testing was assumed. It should not be 
assumed that reading and signing a consent form online is enough to satisfy the 
requirements for an autonomous decision. However the revised model adopts a 
personalized approach to consent that emphasizes extensive discussion with the patient as 
an autonomous agent. Before signing the consent form, Josh‘s company or the DTC 
genetic testing company should have discussed the procedure and consent form with him. 
Second, in the current model, there is insufficient time and communication for 
understanding the meaning of PGT risk. In the case study, Josh did not have enough time 
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or communication for adequate understanding. Even though Josh was educated and 
familiar with research protocols, he did not fully understand the meaning and results of 
DTC genetic testing. In the case study, Josh said that the results were confusing, because 
the DTC genetic testing company had his Alzheimer‘s risk at 69%, but that a study from 
Duke had it at 91%. He did not understand that companies could have different results 
because of the different variants being analyzed. The revised model focuses on a process 
that provides time for communication to foster an understanding of the complex meaning 
of PGT risk. In the revised model, Josh would have had time to ask questions and 
communicate adequately in order to foster understanding. Third, the current doctor-
patient relationship focuses upon the patient freely signing the consent form without 
sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. This was clearly evidenced 
in the case study, because Josh signed the form without having a clear understanding 
about what DTC genetic testing entailed. Josh said that even after giving the results to his 
primary physician, the physician did not understand how to interpret the results.
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However, the revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive 
process to ensure sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. In this 
model, the doctor needs enough information to be able to help Josh understand and 
comprehend what he is consenting to.
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Disclosure is another aspect of the current and revised models. First, the current 
model focuses on medical information in a standardized approach of consent. However, 
the revised model addresses not only medical information but all other relevant 
information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT 
diseases might not have any available treatment. This was probably one of the most 
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important aspects for Josh in this case study. The DTC genetic testing company might 
have disclosed some important medical information, but the company did not see the 
need to inform Josh that there could be disease results for which there is no treatment. 
Second, the current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does not require 
counseling. This was evidenced in the case study. However, the revised model requires 
both pre- and post-test counseling and adopts value transparency and non-directive 
counseling. Josh said that if there had been pre-test counseling, most likely the counselor 
would have asked about medical conditions that ran in the family. He said that had he 
understood the fact that there could be results about Alzheimer‘s disease, then he would 
not have sent his sample in.
88
 Pre- and post- test counseling is important to the revised 
model of consent.
89
  
Voluntariness is the third aspect of the current and revised models. First in the 
current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources of 
external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and community, 
and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
In this case study, Josh‘s company could have been a possible source of coercion, 
because the company encouraged all employees to participate. However, the case study 
did not mention the possibility of coercion. The fact that this case study did not 
specifically mention coercion illustrates the need for the revised model, because the 
revised model recognizes the need to specifically address coercion. The revised model 
addresses external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the 
family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing 
outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external coercion upon the patient. Somebody in either 
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Josh‘s company or the DTC genetic testing company should have inquired into the 
likelihood of Josh being coerced into participating. Second, the current model does not 
take into consideration all family related implications which can lead to coercion of 
family members. The companies did not discuss family-related implications at all. 
However after having the results, Josh was very concerned about his family. He said that 
while his family said the results did not matter much, Josh understood the implications 
for his entire family. He informed his family that ―you’re going to be suffering from this 
if I get sick! It‘s going to affect you more than it‘s going to affect me at some point in 
time.‖90 Eventually the results had a harmful effect on his family relationships. Because 
genetic information impacts the family, the revised model includes family-related 
concerns before testing and identifies ways to help the patient struggle with family-
related PGT information. Josh would have benefited from having a discussion about how 
the results would impact his family antecedently, rather than having to try to control the 
damage already done.
91
 
 Patient safety is a new component that is not in the current model. First, the 
revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and institutional policies. In this case study, 
there was a clear lack of communication among Josh‘s company and the DTC genetic 
testing company. Second, the revised model requires transparency with physician 
discussions and consent requirements. Transparency among the companies was not clear 
in this case. Third, the revised model encourages trust in the organizations and physicians 
by having open discussions with patient participation in the revised consent process. 
Because there were not clear discussions, trust was not evident in this case. Josh said that 
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he ―feels let down by a system that allowed him to have this information‖ while there was 
insufficient information about the preventive measures and inadequate support after 
testing.
92
 As a result, trust in the entire process was distorted. Fourth, in the revised 
model, patient safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and transparency to 
establish preventive measures that promote the safety of patients considering PGT. Even 
after trying to get help from a psychologist, Josh felt that he had been harmed from 
knowing his susceptibilities. He concluded with the following: it ―boggles my mind. . . I 
can‘t go into a laboratory and say, ‗I think I have an infection. Can you please draw CBC 
on me?‘ [They‘d] say, ‗No, we have to have a physician‘s order.‘ And yet anybody can 
submit a saliva sample and get their genetic testing, which clearly is medical information. 
. . . I question whether it‘s ethical or not to be done that way.‖93 Donna Messner takes 
Josh‘s conclusion further when she says that since there are so many problems with 
consent for multiplex testing, ―then in the DTC environment informed choice is virtually 
impossible to achieve.‖94  
By applying the revised model of consent to the case study, Josh could have had a 
better outcome for his testing process. The revised model of informed consent can 
encourage appropriate decision making for DTC genetic testing.  
B. Pleiotropic Genetic Testing and Informed Consent 
This part applies the revised model of informed consent to pleiotropic genetic 
testing. Pleiotropic genetic testing is where a gene has many different roles, and as a 
result pleiotropic genes give rise to multiple findings for one test.
95
 This section will 
discuss how to handle informed consent when there is additional, and possibly 
unexpected findings.
96
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The first section will discuss the background of pleiotropic genetic testing. This 
includes the science of testing, some specific examples, and a risk/benefit analysis. The 
second section will apply all four components of the revised model of informed consent 
to pleiotropic genetic testing. The revised model will seek to encourage ethical informed 
consent when there are multiple findings. The third section will present a case study. This 
case study will discuss pleiotropic genetic testing and informed consent. 
1. Background of Pleiotropic Genetic Testing 
This first section, which discusses the background of pleiotropic genetic testing, is 
broken up into three aspects. The first aspect is the science of pleiotropic genetic testing 
which includes a discussion on the meaning of the test and the interpretation of the test 
results. The second aspect discusses examples of pleiotropic genes including a discussion 
on Alzheimer‘s disease and coronary artery disease (CAD). The third aspect looks at a 
risk/benefit analysis of pleiotropic genetic testing.   
a. Pleiotropic Genetic Testing  
In order to understand pleiotropic genetic testing, the meaning of pleiotropic 
genetic testing needs to be discussed. The first part of this section looks at the basic 
science of pleiotropy. The second part discusses the interpretation of the test results.  
1). Science of Pleiotropic Genes  
Pleiotropic genes can be traced back to Mendel with genetics. Pleiotropy was 
evident then when there was a disease that had several separate symptoms with a family 
link. However it was not until 1910 that this characteristic of gene expression was named. 
Ludwig Plate first discussed this concept as pleiotropy.
97
 
250 
 
Pleiotropy is where multiple diseases and/or traits can be expressed from one 
gene.
98
 With this, a single gene can express many different phenotypes or physical 
characteristics.
99
 A pleiotropic gene is one in which the same gene can have an influence 
on several different characteristics.
100
 Another type of pleiotropy is antagonistic 
pleiotropy. This type of pleiotropy results in the same gene having a positive effect on 
one disease or characteristic while having a negative effect on a different disease.
101
 An 
illustration of this is a type of dwarfism called Laron Syndrome. When a person has 
Laron Syndrome, the individual is less likely to have cancer or diabetes that a person 
without this Syndrome. Ashley Carter and Andrew Nguyen say that sometimes 
antagonistic pleiotropy can be disregarded, because many times the negative results get 
more attention in regards to research than the positive effects of a certain gene and/or 
allele.
102
  
In the study by Sivakumaran, Shanya, Felix Agakov, Evropi Theodoratou, James 
G. Prendergast, et al., there were 233 genes that were found to have pleiotropic 
characteristics. Pleiotropy is involved in approximately 17% of the disease-related genes 
and 5% of the SNPs. However, there are still many disease-related genes and SNPs that 
are currently unknown, and continual research could cause the number of pleiotropic 
genes and SNPs to rise.
103
  
Since the relationship between some genes can be negligible, sometimes 
pleiotropic genes can be difficult to identify when studying the association between the 
two.
104
 Frederic Guillaume and Sarah Otto explain that the degree of pleiotropy can differ 
between certain genes, because while most pleiotropic genes affect many different 
characteristics and/or behaviors, some pleiotropic genes are responsible for numerous 
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differences and behaviors. Just like many of the genetic diseases, pleiotropic genes are 
multifactorial. Pleiotropic differences can depend on the ―biochemical properties of 
coding genes,‖ assortment and deviation of different characteristics of the genes resulting 
from biological selection, and the degree of gene and allele expression.
105
  
2). Pleiotropic Genetic Testing Results 
 When performing genetic testing on pleiotropic genes, the test will result in 
information about two diseases or characteristics. A common example of this is coronary 
artery disease (CAD) and Alzheimer‘s disease. One of the genes identified to have an 
effect on CAD can also have an effect on the development of Alzheimer‘s disease.106 
When performing a genetic test to identify a person‘s susceptibility to CAD, the 
individual will also receive results about their susceptibility to adult onset Alzheimer‘s 
disease. Pleiotropic genetic testing will produce information about multiple diseases 
and/or health characteristics. Because many diseases are multifactorial and involve 
multiple genetic variations, pleiotropic genetic testing can result in even more 
complicated information since one gene can return information for several different 
traits.
107
  
The main complication of the results for pleiotropic genetic testing is unexpected 
findings.
108
 Unless an individual is told about the possibility of multiple results, 
pleiotropic genetic testing can have some complications. Often for pleiotropic genetic 
testing, there are some controversial aspects involved in the results of testing. One of the 
controversial aspects of testing for CAD is that the test returns results for a late-onset 
disease for which there is currently no treatment.
109
 Another controversial aspect is the 
fact that many professional groups do not recommend PGT for Alzheimer‘s disease 
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unless there is a family history of the disease.
110
 Thus pleiotropic genetic testing can 
return information about untreatable diseases that most physicians and/or researchers do 
not assess in a typical practice. The next section will discuss some more examples of 
pleiotropic genes and the resulting diseases. 
b. Examples of Pleiotropic Genes 
 There are numerous pleiotropic genes which can result in different diseases and/or 
genetic traits. This section will discuss examples of pleiotropic genes and diseases. Then 
there will be an in-depth discussion about one of the most commonly used examples of 
pleiotropic genetic testing, which is the relationship between CAD and Alzheimer‘s 
disease.  
In one study by Shanya Sivakumaran, Felix Agakov, Evropi Theodoratou, et al. 
identified several pleiotropic genes. This study demonstrated that there were many 
variants associated with Crohn‘s disease such as leprosy, intracranial aneurysms, breast 
cancer, prostate cancer, type 2 diabetes, and several others. Sometimes there is a strong 
link between these diseases, but other times the link is relatively small. Some other 
examples include the relationship between fetal hemoglobin and malaria risk, serum 
campesterol and gallstones risk, and possibly narcolepsy and osteroarthritis.
111
 Then 
some common examples of antagonistic pleiotropy include people with Huntington‘s 
disease and sickle cell anemia. Those with Huntington‘s disease have a lower incidence 
of cancer. Those with sickle cell anemia have a higher protection against malaria, which 
can sometimes cause resistance to the disease. These examples are only some of the 
previously identified pleiotropic genes. However there are many other pleiotropic and 
antagonistic pleiotropic genes and alleles that have yet to be discovered.
112
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The next section will discuss the apolipoprotein E gene (APOE). This gene has 
several alleles or segments, and each of the alleles have one difference in their DNA 
nucleotide sequence. Chamberlain, Matt, Paul Baird, Mohamed Dirani, et al. say that that 
slight difference can be enough to change the risk predictions for age-related macular 
degeneration, Alzheimer‘s disease, and cardiovascular diseases.113 The ɛ4 allele on the 
APOE gene can affect the disease risk for both Alzheimer‘s disease and CAD.114 As a 
result, the first part will discuss Alzheimer‘s disease and analyze genetic testing for 
Alzheimer‘s disease. The second part will look at CAD and analyze genetic testing for 
CAD.   
1). Alzheimer’s Disease 
Alzheimer‘s disease is a progressive neurological disease that is incurable. This 
disease typically occurs in the middle to late years of an adult. Alzheimer‘s affects the 
memory, standard living practices, motor skills, and reasoning.
115
 The current treatments 
only slow the progression of the disease, but eventually the disease will lead to death. In 
the United States there are about 4.5 million cases of Alzheimer‘s disease. However, 
Hyman Schipper suggests that the cases of Alzheimer‘s disease will increase to more 
than 13 million by the year 2050. Alzheimer‘s disease involves several genes, which can 
be affected by genetics, environmental factors, and/or lifestyle choices.
116
 However with 
this disease, probably one of the most important factors is age. Donna Messner says that 
the risk of Alzheimer‘s ―doubles every 5 years after age 65.‖117  
The most common form of Alzheimer‘s disease is late-onset which is affected by 
the APOE gene. This gene has 3 alleles, ɛ2, ɛ3, and ɛ4, on chromosome 19.118 While all 
of the alleles can affect Alzheimer‘s disease, the ɛ4 allele has a higher predictive value 
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for Alzheimer‘s.119 If a person inherits this allele, the risk of developing Alzheimer‘s 
disease could increase by three times, from 9% to about 29%, with just one copy of the ɛ4 
allele.
120
 Those with two copies of this allele can increase their risk of Alzheimer‘s 
disease by about fifteen-thirty times the standard risk.
121
 However because of the 
polygenic nature of Alzheimer‘s disease, even with this increased risk, this allele is not 
required in order for a person to develop Alzheimer‘s. Having the ε4 allele is only one of 
the factors for predicting this disease. As a result, there are concerns about using this as a 
predictor for genetic testing.
122 
 
 
  
Due to the uncertainty of the predictive value of Alzheimer‘s, there are many 
professional groups that do not recommend using the APOE gene for PGT of 
Alzheimer‘s disease. Rather, many of those groups encourage clinical diagnosis over 
PGT for Alzheimer‘s, because a clinical diagnosis is more accurate.123 This is illustrated 
by the study conducted by Mayeux, R., M. Saunders, S. Shea, et al. The study explains 
that when compared to a clinical diagnosis with a sensitivity of 93% and a specificity of 
55%, genetic testing using the APOE gene for analysis only has 65% sensitivity and 68% 
specificity.
124
 While a clinical diagnosis has more accurate and valid results, the APOE 
gene with the ɛ4 allele is still probably one of the best indicators to predict late-onset 
Alzheimer‘s disease.125  
Even though the predictive value of the APOE gene is uncertain, genetic testing 
of this gene can help to identify the progression of the disease and to analyze the 
effectiveness of different treatments in research. As a result, many health centers today 
test for the APOE gene in the elderly when there are questions about cognition, and more 
neurological research tests for the presence of this gene in healthy participants.
126
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However, unless there is a family history of the disease and there is an ―identified gene 
mutation‖ in the family, PGT for Alzheimer‘s disease is not the recommended standard 
of care in those without symptoms.
127
 
2). Coronary Artery Disease 
 CAD is another polygenic disease.
128
 The American Heart Association explains 
that CAD can lead to coronary heart disease (CHD). Sometimes people use these names 
to refer to the same disease. However in CAD, the plaque builds up in the arteries, and 
typically when it gets severe, the plaque continues to the arteries of the heart leading to 
CHD. When there is enough plaque build-up, the arteries will constrict, and this leads to 
decreased blood flow to the heart. As a result, CAD can lead to heart attacks and 
ischemia.
129
 CHD is one of the leading causes of death in the United States.  
Approximately 13 million people have CHD, and this disease is responsible for about 1 
million deaths per year.
130
 However if CAD is caught early enough, there are several 
treatment measures that can prevent the disease from getting worse and developing 
plaque in the arteries of the heart.
131
 Since CAD is preventable, there are reliable tests 
which can diagnose CAD and determine the risk of CAD.     
 The genetic test that analyzes an individual‘s risk of developing CAD looks at the 
APOE gene and the ε4 allele. The study by Bassam Nassar, Kenneth Rockwood, Susan 
Kirkland, et al. confirms that there is a higher frequency of the APOE gene with the ε4 
allele and BChE-K in those with early-onset CAD than those with late-onset CAD.
132
 As 
a result, looking at the ε4 allele can help to predict a person‘s risk of CAD. However, 
since the ɛ4 allele can also return results for predicting Alzheimer‘s disease, PGT for 
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CAD will produce a person‘s risk of developing both CAD and Alzheimer‘s disease.133 
This illustrates the pleiotropic effects of the ɛ4 allele on the APOE gene.134  
 If the PGT for CAD comes back positive, then the individual has several 
treatment options and lifestyle changes that can eliminate plaque build-up and CAD. 
However, since the test was positive for the ε4 allele on the APOE gene, the test results 
mean that the individual also has a higher risk for developing late-onset Alzheimer‘s 
disease. As was discussed before, there are no treatment options for Alzheimer‘s disease. 
Knowing a person is at risk might make pleiotropic genetic testing more of a problem
 135 
Tony McGleenan says that a person ―cannot enjoy the therapeutic benefits of one without 
being burdened with predictive information about the other.‖136 This is the crux of the 
controversy concerning pleiotropic genetic testing. This problem carries over into the 
discussion of informed consent, because normally the patient has only given consent to 
find out about their risk for CAD. But since there are additional risk predictions, now the 
doctor has to determine whether or not to present the patient with the risk predictions for 
Alzheimer‘s disease as well.137  
c. Risk/Benefit Analysis 
Since one gene could determine the predictive risks to many unrelated diseases, 
there are several ethical issues involved with this type of testing. Some ethical issues 
include the use of pleiotropic tests in general, the idea of screening for a disease with no 
treatments, the ethics of doctor/patient disclosure about pleiotropic results, informed 
consent, and an obligation to disclose or an obligation to know the results.
138
  
In order to fully understand the implications of pleiotropic genetic testing, the 
risks and benefits need to be analyzed. The first part of this section will analyze and 
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discuss the risks of pleiotropic genetic testing. Then the second part will look at some of 
the benefits of testing.   
1). Risks 
 Since there are often many implications of pleiotropic genetic testing, the risks 
need to be identified before participating in the testing. One of the risks with pleiotropic 
genetic testing is the predictability of disease. Since pleiotropic genetic testing looks at 
susceptibility of certain diseases, sometimes people assume the test results are more 
predictive than they really are. However as was discussed with PGT, many times risk 
predictions are uncertain, and since many genetic diseases are multifactorial, disease 
prediction is based off of many different factors and not just genetic variants.
139
 However 
with pleiotropic genes, sometimes the level of risk can be even more complicated to 
identify. When one gene has implications on multiple traits and diseases, the degree to 
which the gene affects both of the diseases or traits is not always well known. Sometimes 
a gene can simply add to the risk which would only result in a minimal addition of risk; 
while other times the gene can compound the risk which would result in a much greater 
degree of risk. Since not all pleiotropic gene interactions are studied in great detail yet, 
the predictability of risk can be very complicated.
140
 
Another risk is the misinterpretation of the results. There can be the concern that 
getting a negative result for a PGT like Alzheimer‘s disease could cause people to 
overlook some possible preventive measures or beneficial lifestyle changes. However the 
REVEAL study, which looked at Alzheimer‘s disease, showed that with appropriate 
education and communication, most people understood the test results. Although, some 
without the APOE gene ɛ4 allele thought he or she had a much lower chance of 
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developing Alzheimer‘s than even the general population. Also since not all the variants 
of a particular disease are always known, classifying a gene or allele as pleiotropic can 
sometimes be misleading. If a gene is assumed to be pleiotropic, then that gene has 
implications on multiple diseases or traits. However, if the gene is not really pleiotropic, 
then the gene only has implications for one disease or trait. Thus, the results would be 
misunderstood and misrepresented.
141
 
Sometimes there can be psychological problems, depression, and/or worry with 
pleiotropic genetic testing.
142
 If the test returns results for multiple findings, then the 
individual could be depressed after finding out additional unexpected information, 
especially if the information is about an incurable disease like Alzheimer‘s.143 However if 
the individuals are informed about having additional results and what those results could 
include, research has shown that depression is not as common as once thought.
144
 The 
REVEAL study demonstrated that with pre- and post-test counseling, there were fewer 
psychological problems when looking at Alzheimer‘s disease risk results. However there 
can still be harmful psychological problems even with counseling and education. In 
regards to Huntington‘s disease, a study of approximately 5,000 people showed that there 
were still some serious adverse events, like suicide or psychological traumas, in about 1% 
of the individuals tested. Most of those serious events occurred in people with positive 
tests for Huntington‘s.145 While many of the diseases involved in pleiotropic genetic 
testing are not as severe and certain as Huntington‘s disease, the research still illustrates 
that there can be a possibility for some serious adverse psychological harms in those with 
positive test results, especially if people are not expecting some of the results. 
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 Also discrimination can sometimes result after pleiotropic genetic testing.
146
 
Because this test has the potential for multiple disease results, discrimination can occur 
for certain disease predictions. In regards to testing the ɛ4 allele on the APOE gene, 
discrimination can occur with long-term care insurance, because of the risk for 
Alzheimer‘s disease. The REVEAL study showed that there were small differences with 
the long-term care insurance for those with the ɛ4 allele than without the allele.147 
Pleiotropic test results can also have an impact on life and disability insurance and job 
discrimination.
148
  
2). Benefits 
 Sometimes pleiotropic genetic testing can result in information that would help in 
treatment guidelines and options. Genetic testing for presence of the ɛ4 allele with the 
APOE gene could prove beneficial for treating and/or preventing CAD and CHD.
149
 
Sometimes pleiotropic genetic testing can help to increase information on prevention and 
treatment options.
150
 If a pleiotropic genetic test is performed, most of the time the test is 
needed to find out the risk of a treatable disease. Once the results come back, the 
individual can start on a treatment that will either cure or reduce the disease. Risks can 
come when information for the secondary disease is not handled properly.  
 Another benefit can be future planning.
151
 Pleiotropic genetic testing can return 
information that can be helpful for long-term goals and personal decision making.
152
 
Planning benefits can range from helping to make life decisions, career options, and the 
possibility of children.
153
  
 Also while pleiotropic genetic testing can result in additional information, if that 
information is explained properly, the added information can promote healthy behaviors 
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and choices.
154
 Sometimes having additional information can help motivate people to 
make better lifestyle decisions that can prevent or slow down the progression of diseases. 
In the REVEAL study, those with an increased risk of Alzheimer‘s disease adopted 
lifestyle and behavior changes to encourage the prevention of the disease. Some of the 
changes included increased exercise, taking supplements, and altering their diet.
155
 Even 
if information is only needed for one disease, if there is enough education and counseling, 
pleiotropic genetic testing can encourage healthy living. 
One example of the complexity of screening for some diseases is the story of the 
Wexler sisters. Like Alzheimer‘s disease, there is no significant treatment for 
Huntington‘s disease. However, unlike Alzheimer‘s, the certainty of Huntington‘s disease 
is almost one-hundred percent if the test comes back positive. Because her whole family 
had suffered from Huntington‘s disease, Nancy Wexler was an advocate for finding the 
Huntington‘s gene. She was a supporter of creating a pre-symptomatic genetic test for 
this disease. But when the gene was actually found, and the pre-symptomatic test was 
developed, Nancy Wexler and her sister Alice changed their position. In fact, both of the 
sisters became an advocate for not getting the pre-symptomatic genetic test for 
Huntington‘s disease. In an article entitled ―On Not Taking the Test,‖ Alice Wexler said 
―I‘d rather work at learning to live with a certain amount of insecurity than have to adjust 
to a grim future even before the symptoms begin.‖156 The sisters understood the 
complexity of that decision, and as a result cautioned people against making a decision 
without adequately looking at the risks and benefits. Because of the complexity and 
predictive value of pleiotropic genetic testing, the same caution should be used before an 
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individual decides to undergo testing. The risks and benefits of testing need to be 
analyzed.
157
  
2. Application of the Revised Model  
In the second part, each of the components of the revised model of consent will be 
applied to pleiotropic genetic testing. Comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and 
patient safety will be discussed in relation to pleiotropic genetic testing.  
a. Comprehension  
The first component of the revised model of informed consent is comprehension. 
This section will look at autonomy, genetic risks, and the doctor-patient relationship. 
Each area will be discussed and analyzed further.  
In the current model, a standardized approach to consent is used, this approach 
typically focuses on the autonomous patient signing a consent form without much 
discussion. Since this model emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time and 
communication for understanding the meaning of PGT risk. The current doctor-patient 
relationship focuses upon the patient freely signing the consent form without sufficient 
education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. On the other hand, the revised model 
adopts a personalized approach to consent that emphasizes extensive discussion with the 
patient as an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses on a process that provides 
time for communication to foster an understanding of the complex meaning of PGT risk. 
The revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive process to 
ensure sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT.  
1). Autonomy 
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Informed consent for pleiotropic genetic testing cites autonomy as one of the 
foundational principles of testing. The ideas behind autonomy and pleiotropic testing are 
that patients have the right to decide for themselves whether or not to be tested for the 
pleiotropic gene.
158
 However, unless the individual understands the ideas behind and 
implications of pleiotropic genetic testing, the individual cannot truly make an 
autonomous decision.  
Autonomy should be more than just a chance to accept or reject testing for the 
pleiotropic gene.
159
 The revised model of consent encourages patient involvement 
through a more extensive process of consent. Patients undergoing pleiotropic genetic 
testing need to be able to process the information and be able to make a decision about 
testing. Personalization of that information can be helpful in encouraging autonomy for 
each patient. This model recognizes the differences among the patients and suggests 
having more flexible consent for each patient in identifying their particular needs.
160
 The 
revised model adopts a personalized approach to consent that emphasizes extensive 
discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent.  
2). Understanding Genetic Risks 
It is important to understand the ideas of genetic risks associated with pleiotropic 
genetic testing. Genetic risks of pleiotropic genetic testing are generally the same as PGT. 
Since the current model of consent emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time 
and communication for understanding the meaning of PGT risk. However the revised 
model focuses on a process that provides time for communication to foster an 
understanding of the complex meaning of PGT risk.  
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Patients and research participants need to understand the genetics behind 
susceptibility testing, what the implications are of that testing, and how to interpret the 
results of testing.
161 
It is important to help the individuals to understand that most of the 
pleiotropic diseases are multifactorial, meaning that the predictive value is based on 
genetics, environmental factors, social aspects, and lifestyle choices. In the REVEAL 
study, the participants were told the risks assessments included ―the best available 
information,‖ but were also told that other factors like social and environmental 
interactions were not included in the assessments.
162
 In relation to pleiotropic genes, since 
one gene can affect multiple traits, it is also important that the individuals understand the 
complexity of the relationship among the genes and/or alleles. 
Ellen Wright Clayton illustrates the difference between pleiotropic genetic testing 
and some other types of testing that would identify a mutation. She says that people 
would typically recognize the distinction between ―incidental detection of a mutation in 
the APC gene that will cause them to develop colon cancer if their colon is not removed 
and a mutation that mildly increases their risk of developing hypertension, a disorder that 
would ordinarily be detected in the course of routine care.‖163 Participating in a test that 
can return unexpected genetic results can be difficult to handle and understand the 
genetic risks. However, the difference in testing needs to be understood in order to be 
able to make an appropriate decision about testing.   
Research shows that the pubic needs more genetic literacy, because many do not 
understand the concepts of genetic risks. Colleen McBride, Deborah Bowen, Lawrence 
Brody, et al. suggests that people base their understanding of genetics and risks on 
several factors including the nature of the disease and inheritance, possible personal or 
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family experience, treatment options, and communication and discussion of the risks. In 
order to increase the understanding of genetic risks, doctors or counselors should make 
the risk easier to understand by applying the risk information to normal everyday 
occurrences, adding visual aspects as well like charts or graphs, giving the individual 
information to take home, and encouraging additional communication for support.
164
  
The revised model promotes additional conversations and education of the patient 
in order to cultivate understanding when thinking about risk assessments. When 
discussing risk assessments and probabilities, it is important to turn conceptual risks into 
more personal and identifiable risks in order to encourage understanding and 
comprehension. The revised model focuses on a process that provides time for 
communication to foster an understanding of the complex meaning of pleiotropic genetic 
testing which can result in multiple findings. 
3). Doctor-Patient Relationship 
The doctor-patient relationship is important in promoting education and 
understanding of risk assessments for pleiotropic genetic testing. One study suggests that 
not many researchers communicate the ideas of pleiotropic genetic testing fully to their 
participants.
165
 In the article ―Informed Consent for Genetic Research Involving 
Pleiotropic Genes: An Empirical Study of ApoE Research,‖ a study was done that looked 
at pleiotropic research and informed consent with the participants. Zachary Cooper, 
Robert Nelson, and Lainie Ross said that despite the fact that the study was on the ApoE 
gene and pleiotropy, ―only four of 41 researchers (10%) indicated that they discussed the 
multiple associations of ApoE (pleiotropy) in their consent forms. Only one of the 15 
consent forms (7%) that we analyzed mentioned that ApoE had pleiotropic 
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implications.‖166 The authors go on to say that even though the researchers might have 
thought the pleiotropic nature of the gene was not pertinent to their research, the omission 
could have serious impact on the informed consent process resulting in failed consent. 
Zachary Cooper, Robert Nelson, and Lainie Ross say that the participants should be 
informed of the pleiotropic nature of the gene being researched ―because it could affect 
their perception of the risks and benefits of participating for themselves, and it could 
influence the impact their participation has on their families, and their communities.‖167 
Knowing there is a risk of finding out more information than the person would like might 
be enough to forgo testing. The Nocebo Effect can also have implications for 
comprehension of pleiotropic genetic testing, because sometimes having too much 
information can actually cause harm to the patient.
168
 The revised model of consent looks 
at education and communication in order to ensure additional understanding and 
comprehension. 
In the revised model, doctors should participate more in educating patients and 
encouraging discussions about risk in order to foster understanding. However in order to 
do that, doctors and researchers need to be able to make more time available for their 
patients and research participants. Just like with PGT, doctors need to have enough 
knowledge in order to be able to help their patients understand genetic risk assessments 
for pleiotropic genetic testing. In the REVEAL study, the doctors discussed the 
limitations of risk assessments for Alzheimer‘s disease in order to help the participants 
understand better.
169
 Also as was previously addressed, another important aspect of the 
doctor-patient relationship is the need for doctors to address the nature of pleiotropy.
170
 
For example, if testing for CAD, the doctors should make the patients aware of the 
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complication of having risk information for Alzheimer‘s disease as well. The revised 
model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive process to ensure 
sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT.  
The revised model adopts a personalized approach to consent that emphasizes 
extensive discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses 
on a process that provides time for communication to foster an understanding of the 
complex meaning of PGT risk. The revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient 
relationship as an interactive process to ensure sufficient education of the patient about 
the meaning of PGT.  
b. Disclosure 
In order to have appropriate informed consent, disclosure of certain information is 
necessary.
171
 Dorene S. Markel and Beverly M. Yashar say that informed consent should 
present all the needed information in a ―factual, complete, and accurate manner.‖172 
Because pleiotropic genetic testing has many complex treatment options and can result in 
unexpected findings, the revised model requires disclosure and genetic counseling in 
order to select an appropriate option. This section will discuss each of those aspects in 
detail. The first section will look at the disclosure guidelines, and the second section will 
look at the genetic counseling for pleiotropic genetic testing.  
The current model focuses on medical information in a standardized approach of 
consent. The current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does not require 
counseling. Whereas, the revised model addresses not only medical information but all 
other relevant information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that 
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some PGT diseases might not have any available treatment. The revised model requires 
counseling and adopts value transparency and non-directive counseling. 
1). Disclosure Guidelines  
Sometimes disclosure can be difficult with pleiotropic genetic testing, because not 
all of the risks and benefits might be known at the time.
173
 However in order to encourage 
better disclosure, the revised model addresses not only medical information but all other 
relevant information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some 
pleiotropic diseases might not have any available treatment.
174  
One of the most important areas to disclose is the basic nature of pleiotropic 
genes. If the nature of pleiotropic genes were not clearly communicated antecedently, 
disclosure of this type of information can be difficult to communicate.
175
 For example 
when testing the APOE gene, patients might not be expecting to hear about the risks for 
developing Alzheimer‘s disease. Disclosure should focus on what testing means and 
discuss the nature of both diseases that the pleiotropic genetic test might find. If the 
APOE gene is being tested, information on both CAD and Alzheimer‘s disease needs to 
be disclosed, because of the effect of pleiotropic genes.
176
 In regards to research 
participation, Ellen Wright Clayton says that there is still debate about what to disclose 
when participating in research with a pleiotropic gene.
177
 However, even though research 
participation is a little different, in order to have adequate informed consent, the 
participant still needs to be aware of the fact that there can be unexpected results and 
information on multiple disease susceptibilities.  
Another important area of disclosure should be the predictive values of the 
diseases. Risk assessment values need to be disclosed for both the general population and 
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in relationship to the individual. In the REVEAL study, researchers told the participants 
about the standard risk for developing Alzheimer‘s disease, which was about 10-15% for 
the general population. Also if the ɛ4 allele on the APOE gene is being tested, people 
should understand the risk for having either one or two copies of the ɛ4 allele. If an 
individual has two copies of the allele, then the individual‘s risk for CAD and 
Alzheimer‘s disease increases even more.178  
Some other areas of disclosure include privacy and confidentiality measures that 
will be taken when the results come back. The doctor and patient can also discuss 
whether all of the information will go in the medical record. If the APOE test comes back 
positive, the patient might not want the increased risk for Alzheimer‘s disease to be 
included in his or her record.
179
  
In order to encourage adequate disclosure, the REVEAL study suggests that better 
decisions can be made when disclosure uses both written and verbal aspects. Also the 
revised model encourages better decision making by ensuring all of the important 
information is disclosed before testing occurs. If the physician or researcher does not ask 
the patient or participant antecedently which results he or she wants to know, there can be 
significant problems with the disclosure process.
180
 Then if the physician discloses 
unexpected and unwanted information without explicit consent, the patient could be 
harmed, and the informed consent process will have been inadequate.  
Thus significant harm can come if doctors or researchers do not address 
antecedently the nature of pleiotropy and the fact that there will be multiple result 
findings. As a result, more counseling is encouraged before testing in order to help the 
patients or research participants to grasp the information that might result.
181
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2). Genetic Counseling  
Dorene S. Markel and Beverly M. Yashar say that a genetic counselor is 
―uniquely positioned to play an important role in understanding the nuances of the 
genetic research interface between basic/clinical science and genetic counseling.‖182 The 
current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does not require counseling. 
However, in the revised model, genetic counseling is required both before and after 
testing to ensure the selection of an appropriate option.
183
 Also, the counselor should 
ensure there is enough time between the pre-test counseling and the actual test procedure 
in order to make an appropriate, informed decision.
184 
  
The pre-test counseling should focus on what the information will mean to the 
patient, since the test returns results for two diseases.
185
 Serious problems can occur if a 
doctor has already performed genetic testing without discussing the nature of pleiotropy 
with the patient. This is why pre-test counseling is so important. The counselor should 
also ask about disclosure of results. The counselor should inquire into whether or not the 
patient wants to know his or her Alzheimer‘s risk.186 By planning ahead, the doctor and 
patient should be able to arrive at an acceptable course of action before the results are 
returned. Post-test counseling ensures a doctor has discussed the results with the patient. 
As suggested by the REVEAL study, sometimes bringing a support person like a spouse 
or friend to the post-test counseling session can help the patient or participant as an added 
resource. After post-test counseling there should also be appropriate follow-up after the 
test. The REVEAL study had follow-up at 6 weeks, 6 months, and a year after the test.
187
  
Genetic counseling can help with the complex nature of pleiotropy and is essential 
to the decision making process for pleiotropic genetic testing.
188
 Genetic counselors can 
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help educate the patient further about pleiotropic genetic testing and can encourage the 
patients to make an appropriate decision about testing.
189
 Also since the revised model 
adopts value transparency and non-directive counseling, the counselors and physicians 
can give their input and advice if there is a particular treatment or test that might be best 
for the patient. The revised model encourages physician and counselor participation and 
recommendations.
190
  
The revised model also emphasizes the necessary inclusion of feedback and 
patient assessment mechanisms as a tool for genetic counseling. Feedback mechanisms 
and patient assessments like a decision tree will be applied to the patient in order to 
encourage appropriate selection of the options. One of the important assessment measures 
specifically for pleiotropic genetic testing is the IES survey. The REVEAL study that 
analyzed Alzheimer‘s risk sent out IES surveys. These surveys can help professionals to 
identify whether or not the individual is comfortable with the new information received. 
This survey analyzes a person‘s stress level with a particular incident. Since pleiotropic 
genetic testing produces results for two diseases, the IES survey can be helpful in 
predicting a person‘s reactions to testing. IES surveys can be great indicators of a 
person‘s possible stress after having pleiotropic genetic test results disclosed. The survey 
asks people to determine the frequency with which he or she thought the survey 
comments were true during the week. Some of the comments included ―I thought about it 
when I didn‘t mean to‖ or ―I tried to remove it from my memory.‖191 Based off of the 
person‘s answers, the survey can tell if people will either avoid stressful information and 
not deal with it or handle the information.  
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The results of REVEAL study showed that there was not a significant difference 
in the IES ratings for people with the ɛe4 allele on the APOE gene and people without the 
ɛ4 allele. It also showed that there was really not a large difference in the ―distress‖ 
ratings. However, the study required education sessions, counseling, and follow-up of 
participants.
192
 Thus if there are studies with inadequate education, counseling, and 
follow-up, the distress levels after disclosing Alzheimer‘s disease risk might be a lot 
higher. By focusing on genetic counseling and patient feedback mechanisms, the revised 
model should ensure appropriate decision making.   
The revised model addresses not only medical information but all other relevant 
information for the patient to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT 
diseases might not have any available treatment. The revised model requires counseling 
and adopts value transparency and non-directive counseling. 
c. Voluntariness 
The third section is voluntariness. Voluntariness is extremely important when 
discussing informed consent. This section will look at coercion and family-related 
implications. Each area will be discussed in relation to pleiotropic genetic testing.  
In the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources 
of external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and community, 
and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
The current model does not take into consideration all family related implications which 
can lead to coercion of family members. Conversely, the revised model addresses 
external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the 
patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate 
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or resolve external coercion upon the patient. Because genetic information impacts the 
family, the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. 
1). Coercion  
Coercion and voluntariness are key aspects of informed consent. If a physician or 
researcher presents an individual with unwanted information that is involved with the 
pleiotropic test results, the voluntariness of the individual can be questioned. Ellen 
Wright Clayton says that presenting ―incidental findings to unsuspecting people who had 
not previously thought about the issue just does not seem right.‖193 It is up to the patient 
to voluntarily consent to testing and to reveal any information he or she wishes.
194
 Tom 
Beauchamp and James Childress categorize voluntariness as a precondition of consent.
195
 
External pressures and controlling influences are commonly seen in many 
different areas. Sometimes even genetic counselors, doctors, and researchers can 
demonstrate the underpinnings of coercion implicitly.
196
 Since it is common to perceive 
external pressures in most decisions, this third point develops the importance of avoiding 
coercion of both the patient and the patient‘s family when information is presented. There 
can also be internal pressure as well. One question that illustrates the internal pressure of 
pleiotropic genetic testing is the following. Ellen Wright Clayton suggests one of the 
important questions of this testing is ―How can I say I do not want to know when 
someone says they have important information about me?‖197 However the revised model 
strives to address the possible sources of coercion and external pressures.  
Sometimes manipulation and coercion can emerge from the education process. 
Alfred Tauber in his book Patient Autonomy and the Ethics of Responsibility says, ―At 
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one end of the spectrum, patients require instruction, which embeds certain subjective 
points of view, values, and assumptions.‖198 In pleiotropic genetic testing, manipulation 
can arise from the physicians misrepresenting the nature of pleiotropic genes.
199
 Coercion 
can arise from family members with strong opinions on either wanting or not wanting to 
know additional at-risk information for possible Alzheimer‘s disease. Also voluntariness 
can be impacted by the way a doctor or relative explains the information or views of 
pleiotropic genetic testing.
200
 In order to keep the integrity, the consent process needs 
―continual attention to the purpose, process, and impact of external influences.‖201  
In contrast to the current model which has no specific measures in place to 
address or avoid multiples sources of external pressures, the revised model addresses 
external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the 
patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate 
or resolve external coercion upon the patient.  
2). Family-Related Implications  
Pleiotropic genetic information has implications and consequences for the whole 
family. The implications can even carry over into family-planning decisions.
202
 While the 
current model does not take into consideration all family related implications, the revised 
model ensures voluntary consent by establishing procedures to avoid two forms of 
coercion: pressure by the family for the patient to be tested (eg, if heart disease runs in 
the family, there can be pressure upon a younger individual to be tested in to see if s/he is 
at-risk etc); and pressure upon the family regarding the testing outcome (eg, if the patient 
finds out s/he is at an increased risk for Alzheimer‘s disease, there can be pressure on 
other individuals in the family to get tested for the disease as well). Avoiding coercion of 
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the patient and the patient‘s family helps to ensure meaningful consent for pleiotropic 
genetic testing.  
 The revised model takes additional measures to protect family members. Only the 
necessary information should be given, and any additional information that could have 
implications for family members should be addressed and analyzed before the test to 
prevent harm to the family. In order to protect the individuals, family-related implications 
first need to be identified. Once the individual recognizes the family-related implications, 
the physician or counselor can encourage the patient or participant to discuss these 
implications with his or her family before participating in the test. While consent from all 
the family members is not required, the revised model encourages family discussions of 
the consequences of pleiotropic genetic testing. Also during the discussion sessions, 
privacy and confidentiality measures can be identified so that the family members can 
feel protected against unwanted discrimination or harm. While discussing the test with 
family members, the revised model encourages the individual to find out whether or not 
the family wants to know the results of the test. While some members might want to 
know this information, others might not want to know. Thus, having discussions with the 
family is extremely important when determining disclosure of results to family members. 
The revised model seeks to ensure the voluntariness of consent and to protect against 
possible coercion of family members.
203
 Because genetic information impacts the family, 
the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies ways to 
help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. 
The revised model addresses external pressures on the patient and the family 
(such as pressures by the family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family 
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regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external coercion upon the patient. 
Because genetic information impacts the family, the revised model includes family-
related concerns before testing and identifies ways to help the patient struggle with 
family-related PGT information. 
d. Patient Safety  
The last component of the revised model of informed consent is patient safety. 
Patient safety consists of accountability, transparency, trust, and patient safety. 
Pleiotropic genetic testing needs to emphasize a culture of safety in the revised model. 
This culture of safety in the revised model needs nationally established systems of 
accountability that implements this model in a transparent manner in order to foster trust 
with pleiotropic genetic testing services. The revised model applies systems changes in 
order to increase patient safety and decrease risk for informed consent of pleiotropic 
genetic testing.  
This is a new component that is not in the current model. The revised model 
encourages internal and external accountability by promoting communication among 
medical departments and institutional policies. The revised model requires transparency 
with physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised model encourages trust 
in the organizations and physicians by having open discussions with patient participation 
in the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient safety is fostered by having 
systems of accountability and transparency to establish preventive measures that promote 
the safety of patients considering PGT.   
1). Accountability  
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While this is a new component not found in the current model, the revised model 
seeks to establish accountability measures for pleiotropic genetic testing procedures and 
results.
204
 Accountability of results and practices is crucial to ensure patient safety of 
pleiotropic genetic testing.  
The revised model of informed consent ensures accountability by adhering to 
nationally established systems for PGT. This model promotes accountability by 
encouraging additional communication between the doctors and laboratories performing 
the tests. Since there is a possibility of finding out too much information with pleiotropic 
genetic testing, the area of accountability of results is crucial to ensure patient safety. One 
of the most important aspects of accountability of pleiotropic genetic testing is 
communication among the different departments and professional groups.
205
 Establishing 
consistent guidelines among the departments can help to encourage further accountability 
of pleiotropic genetic testing. One of the consistent policies among all departments for 
the testing should be to require physicians and researchers to discuss the nature of 
pleiotropy before participating in the test. Accountability measures also include the 
validity and accuracy of results and tests.
206
 When a person is participating in a research 
study, IRBs note the importance of having tests that are confirmed and results that are 
valid.
207
 The revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and institutional policies.  
2). Transparency  
Transparency in implementing the revised model of consent will also help to 
ensure patient safety for pleiotropic genetic testing. Often specific accountability and 
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transparency measures are hard to identify in informed consent, but the revised model 
seeks to enhance and clarify those measure for pleiotropic genetic testing.
208
  
Transparency can be maintained by the doctors and counselors when educating 
and communicating with the patient about pleiotropic testing. A positive doctor-patient 
relationship is cultivated by an interactive process of communication in the revised model 
of informed consent. When discussing risks and options with patients, doctors and 
counselors should be especially attentive to bringing out the differences of pleiotropic 
genetic testing in order to promote transparency of information and procedures. 
Transparency is crucial for both accountability and trust in the revised model. 
Because patients typically do not assess their physician‘s performance due to the 
complexity of the testing, transparency of the medical staff is extremely important.
209
 The 
transparency of the revised model addresses conflicts of interests and third-party 
interests. For example, financial conflicts of interests often put ―the interests of patients 
and doctors in direct conflict‖210 If a researcher is more focused on the financial backing 
of a trial involving the APOE gene, the researcher might not recognize some of the 
possible harms of the trial. In the revise model, physicians can eliminate conflicts of 
interests by encouraging transparency of the test procedures, test results, and interaction 
among the medical staff.
211
 Physician transparency is also relevant when looking at what 
to disclose to third parties in relation to pleiotropic genetic testing.
212
 The revised model 
requires transparency with physician discussions and consent requirements.  
3). Trust 
Trust in the medical system and staff is important to all aspects of genetic testing. 
Research has shown that if a patient trusts his or her physician, the individual is more 
278 
 
likely to adhere to the doctor‘s recommended treatment plan or behavior changes that can 
help to prevent the disease.
213
  
When the revised model promotes patient safety, accountability, and transparency 
in implementation, trust is encouraged in the system of pleiotropic genetic testing. After 
establishing additional measures, trust is easier to build and maintain in the revised model 
of informed consent. After implementing transparency measures, trust can be easier to 
establish. By promoting confidentiality and eliminating some conflicts of interest, trust in 
the medical staff can be promoted. If the physician is an instrument of any other person 
or entity, trust is much harder to create and sustain. If the patient or research participant 
feels their interests are not being promoted, trust will be almost impossible to maintain.
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The revised model seeks to eliminate the ―organizational pressures‖ that are 
responsible for creating barriers to trust.
215
 Organizational systems can be responsible for 
creating disproportionate power among patients and medical facilities and staff.
216
 As a 
result, the revised model encourages trust in the organizations and physicians by having 
open discussions with patient participation in the revised consent process.  
4). Patient Safety Systems 
Unlike the current model, the revised model of informed consent will promote 
additional patient safety in the area of pleiotropic genetic testing. The revised model 
encourages system-thinking in order to promote patient safety. Because of the complexity 
of pleiotropic genetic testing, the typical individual approach cannot handle the amount 
of information, the multifactorial nature of many diseases, and the consequences of 
having multiple findings for one test.
217
 The system of patient safety includes the 
accountability and transparency measures.
218
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 Also the revised model adheres to a proactive, preventive approach to patient 
safety.
219
 The revised model encourages adopting organizational measures in order to 
protect patients from harm and promote patient safety.
220
 In pleiotropic genetic testing, 
the revised model of informed consent needs to emphasize preventive measures in order 
to help patients understand the idea of pleiotropic genes before serious problems arise.
221
 
In the revised model, patient safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and 
transparency to establish preventive measures that promote the safety of patients 
considering PGT. 
The revised model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting 
communication among medical departments and institutional policies. The revised model 
requires transparency with physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised 
model encourages trust in the organizations and physicians by having open discussions 
with patient participation in the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient 
safety is fostered by having systems of accountability and transparency to establish 
preventive measures as systems that promote the safety of patients considering PGT.   
3. Case Study  
 The last section will look at a case study concerning pleiotropic genetic testing 
and informed consent. The case study will be presented. Then, the case study will apply 
the revised model of informed consent.  
a. Morgan 
 This case study looks at Morgan, who is a twenty year old college student. 
Morgan started running track and field when he was a nineteen year old freshman at his 
school. After winning several races, he wanted to broaden his running and start training 
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for a triathlon. However, just recently his father died from a heart attack due to severe 
coronary heart disease (CHD). Morgan also remembers that another relative had CHD as 
well. Because of the level of endurance training and strenuous activity he has to do to 
prepare for the triathlon, Morgan is concerned about his risk of heart disease. While he 
has no symptoms of heart disease or CAD, he does not want to take an unnecessary risk. 
As a result, Morgan decides to go to his doctor and ask about PGT for CAD.  
Morgan‘s doctor discusses his increased risk due to the family history of CAD 
and CHD and the recommendation of the American Heart Association (AHA) and the 
American College of Sports Medicine (ACSM) that there should be a doctor‘s approval 
before strenuous exercise if there is a heart condition.
222
 As a result, the doctor informs 
Morgan that he might want to participate in PGT for the APOE gene which can 
determine an individual‘s risk of developing CAD. Even though he is asymptomatic at 
the moment, Morgan is concerned about the stress and excessive exercise involved in 
training for a triathlon.  
After asking about the risks and benefits of testing, his doctor informs him that 
the APOE gene also has implications for Alzheimer‘s disease. When testing the APOE 
gene for CAD, having a positive test for the ɛ4 allele means that the individual has a 
higher risk for developing hyperlipidemia and atherosclerosis which would result in a 
higher incidence of heart attacks. However, if the individual tested positive for the ɛ4 
allele on the APOE gene, the individual also has a higher risk of developing Alzheimer‘s 
disease later in life.
223
  
However, his doctor also informs him that if he does have a higher risk of CAD, 
then he could have increased heart problems while training for the triathlon. While 
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exercise can help those with CAD, continual, strenuous activity, like training for a 
triathlon, can reduce arterial function which could increase the likelihood of having a 
heart attack.
224
 While sudden cardiac death occurs more often in those with heart 
deformities, sometimes sudden death can occur in younger individuals involved in 
strenuous sports due to a heart attack in those with a family history of severe CAD.
225
  
 As a result of all of this information, Morgan is not quite sure whether or not he 
should participate in PGT for the APOE gene. Because of the complicated information 
presented, his doctor recommends participating in genetic counseling. At the end of the 
visit, Morgan decides to go home and discuss the information with his family.  
b. Application  
 This section will apply the revised model of informed consent to the case study 
involving Morgan‘s decision. Contrasting the current and revised models of consent can 
help to establish the importance of the revised model. By applying the revised model of 
informed consent, Morgan can be better prepared to make the decision of whether or not 
to get tested for the APOE gene.  
Comprehension is one of the first components of the revised model of informed 
consent. First, the current model uses a standardized approach to consent that typically 
focuses on the autonomous patient signing a consent form without much discussion. On 
the other hand, the revised model adopts a personalized approach to consent that 
emphasizes extensive discussion with the patient as an autonomous agent. In this case, 
Morgan‘s doctor has discussed many of the implications of pleiotropic testing. The 
revised model encourages additional personalization of information such as the 
information that Morgan started training for a triathlon.
226
 The information involved in an 
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autonomous decision for PGT is different for almost all patients. Second, since the 
current model emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time and communication 
for understanding the meaning of PGT risk. However, in this case, the doctor took time to 
explain the meaning of pleiotropic genetic testing for the APOE gene. The revised model 
focuses on a process that provides time for communication to foster an understanding of 
the complex meaning of PGT risk. Third, the current doctor-patient relationship focuses 
upon the patient freely signing the consent form without sufficient education of the 
patient about the meaning of PGT. On the other hand, the revised model emphasizes the 
doctor-patient relationship as an interactive process to ensure sufficient education of the 
patient about the meaning of PGT. In this case, Morgan‘s doctor took the time and effort 
to explain the testing. Overall, the revised model encourages more education in order to 
be able to understand the implications of pleiotropic genetic testing.
227
 
Disclosure is the second aspect of both the current and revised models of 
informed consent. First, the current model focuses on medical information in a 
standardized approach of consent. As previously described, the study by Cooper, Nelson, 
and Ross illustrated that not a lot of researchers discussed the idea of having multiple 
findings for APOE testing in the consent form.
228
 However, in this study, Morgan‘s 
doctor informed Morgan about the risks and benefits of pleiotropic genetic testing 
including the fact that if Morgan tests positive for an increased risk of CAD, then he 
could also have a higher risk of developing Alzheimer‘s disease.229 The revised model 
addresses not only medical information but all other relevant information for the patient 
to consider for consent, including the fact that some PGT diseases might not have any 
available treatment. Second, the current model recommends non-directive counseling, 
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and does not require counseling. In this case study, Morgan‘s doctor recommends genetic 
counseling, but the revised model requires genetic counseling both before and after 
testing. The revised model requires counseling and adopts value transparency and non-
directive counseling. In this model, genetic counselors should use a decision tree, which 
is a tool to look at all the information that goes into a decision to undergo pleiotropic 
genetic testing.
230
 In this case, Morgan needs to analyze his risk of CAD, his increased 
exercise level from triathlon training, and his possible susceptibility to Alzheimer‘s 
disease.  
Voluntariness is the third aspect of the current and revised models. First, in the 
current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources of 
external pressures which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
However, the revised model addresses external pressures on the patient and the family 
(such as pressures by the family for the patient to be tested and pressure upon the family 
regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate or resolve external coercion upon the patient. In 
this case, before participating in PGT, the doctors and counselors should inquire into the 
reasons Morgan wants to get tested in order to eliminate the idea of possible sources of 
coercion.
231
 Second, the current model does not take into consideration all family-related 
implications which can lead to coercion of family members. In this case, there are 
multiple family-related implications because of the risk of Alzheimer‘s disease. As a 
result, the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. In this case, 
Morgan needs to discuss the implications of APOE testing with his family since it could 
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produce results for Alzheimer‘s disease.232 The doctors and counselors should encourage 
discussion of family implications. 
Patient safety is the last component of the revised model. This aspect is a new 
component which is not found in the current model. First, the revised model encourages 
internal and external accountability by promoting communication among medical 
departments and institutional policies. In this case, the accountability of pleiotropic 
genetic testing is important to Morgan‘s decision in order to encourage safety. Second, 
the revised model requires transparency with physician discussions and consent 
requirements. In this case, Morgan‘s doctor should be transparent with his discussions 
and the consent forms. Third, the revised model encourages trust in the organizations and 
physicians by having open discussions with patient participation in the revised consent 
process. Because Morgan‘s doctor already encouraged open discussions, trust can be 
promoted in this case study even further by having additional discussions with the 
counselor as well. Fourth, in the revised model, patient safety is fostered by having 
systems of accountability and transparency to establish preventive measures as systems 
that promote the safety of patients considering PGT. Morgan‘s doctor can encourage 
patient safety when he describes to Morgan the systems of accountability and 
transparency within the revised model of consent in order to encourage an appropriate 
decision for pleiotropic testing.
233
  
In this case study, Morgan needs to take into consideration all of the aspects of the 
revised model of consent, which includes comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and 
patient safety. After analyzing each area, Morgan should be able to make an appropriate, 
ethical decision about PGT for the APOE gene. By applying the revised model of consent 
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to his decision, he can decide whether or not he needs to have the testing performed 
before he continues training for the triathlon.  
C. Conclusion  
The revised model involves the foundational aspects of consent.
234
 In each 
section, the components of the revised model of consent (comprehension, disclosure, 
voluntariness, and patient safety) were applied to a specific topic. The first topic was 
DTC genetic testing. This section analyzed what happens when research and medical care 
merge. Miller and Wertheimer say that unless specifically stated, consent for medical 
care does not carry over into consent for research.
235
 While this statement seems obvious, 
with some tests like DTC genetic testing, the results can illustrate a level of 
interdependence between medical care and research. Thus, any time genetic tests for 
patient care has an association with genetic research, the individuals should be aware of 
that fact and be able to consent accordingly. The second topic was pleiotropic genetic 
testing. This section addresses how multiple findings for a genetic test can affect 
informed consent. Because of the nature of pleiotropic genes, Ellen Wright Clayton 
explains that incidental findings which include the ideas of pleiotropy should certainly be 
addressed in informed consent.
236
 If the individual understands that pleiotropic genetic 
testing will yield results about multiple diseases and if this information is disclosed 
before participating in the test, a person should be able to make an informed choice.  
 With all the new technologies and genetic tests being created, sometimes the new 
tests can create some serious concerns. In order to be able to continue the advances of 
medicine, it is important to balance the protection of patients and research participants 
with the innovation of the medical and research fields. Informed consent plays an 
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important role in the ethical decision making of patients and research participants. As a 
result, the revised model of informed consent can help to eliminate some of the harms 
that might arise from the progression of medicine and research.
237
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Chapter Six: Conclusion  
This dissertation develops a revised model of informed consent for PGT. The 
need for this model arises from distinguishing characteristics of PGT, which make it 
distinctive from other forms of health-related testing. These characteristics are: the 
difficulty in understanding genetic risks and probabilities; the problem of treatment 
options for diagnosed genetic traits; and the concern with family-related genetic 
information.  
Since none of the literature has merged the current components of consent 
(understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) and the distinguishing characteristics of 
PGT together in order to form a revised model, this dissertation addresses an important 
facet for modification. Given the setting of the literature, the dissertation‘s thesis is 
distinctive, because it establishes a revised model by aligning the three distinguishing 
characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized components in the current model. 
In this paper, the first chapter introduces the topic and outline of this dissertation. 
The second chapter explains PGT to identify these characteristics that shape the revised 
model of consent. The third chapter explores the history of consent to identify the widely 
recognized components of consent (understanding, disclosure, and voluntariness) that 
represent the current model. The fourth chapter explains the revised model by aligning 
the three distinguishing characteristics of PGT with the three widely recognized 
components in the current model. In the fifth chapter, the revised model is applied to 
DTC and pleiotropic genetic testing. In the sixth chapter, the conclusion looks at 
implementation of the revised model and a comparison of the current and revised models 
of consent.  
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A. Implementation of the Revised Model of Informed Consent  
The revised model of informed consent for PGT tries to emphasize and clarify the 
expectations, goals, and challenges of implementation to encourage better medical 
treatment for individuals. This section of implementation involves a discussion of the 
responses to failed attempts at reform, system changes, reimbursement changes, and 
measuring the effectiveness of implementation.   
1. Response to Failed Attempts at Reform 
The first part will look at some responses to failed attempts at reforming consent 
and the research that has been done to improve consent. Sometimes attempts to improve 
informed consent can fail, because the consent either did not meet standards or those 
standards are unrealistic. Responses to failure can include looking for lower, more 
practical standards; confirming current standards and keep going with existing clinical 
and research practices; and/or rethinking and transforming informed consent.
1
 Like the 
authors of the book Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, this paper chooses to 
rethink and transform informed consent in the area of PGT. Instead of continuing on with 
the current model, this dissertation adopts a revised model of informed consent for PGT 
that addresses the inconsistencies among the current model and the ethical ideals for 
informed consent.  
Catharine Lucey and Wiley Souba suggest that in order to resolve complex 
problems, new measures need to be implemented. The authors promote identifying new 
information to help solve difficulties. However, while the novel knowledge and changes 
to the current way of thinking can be helpful, implementing new measures could also 
result in unpredictable and/or inconsistent results.
2
 Because implementing completely 
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new changes could encourage additional and unnecessary problems, this paper promotes 
a revised model. As a result, this paper merges both current practices and new practices 
for consent in order to make up the revised model of informed consent for PGT. This 
foundation is important to the implementation of the revised model.  
2. System Changes 
Implementation of the revised model of informed consent for PGT involves a new 
way of thinking. This new way of thinking involves system changes. Catherine Lucey 
and Wiley Souba suggest that often changes to solve complex problems include 
establishing new ―rules and regulations or demanding more resources.‖3 However, the 
authors suggest that those typical implementations might not change the fundamental 
difficulties and challenges that occur. While the authors are emphasizing the problems of 
professionalism in this article, the underlying principles of solving complex problems are 
still the same. 
Since the previous chapters have shown that there are still inadequacies of the 
current model, the current model does not seem to adequately address the essential 
problems of consent. Thus, in order for the revised model to be implemented adequately, 
the revised model encourages system changes. System changes can address some of the 
fundamental challenges to informed consent. By implementing system changes, those 
changes can also help the individual‘s attitudes and behaviors to change as well over 
time. Implementing the revised model requires changes to the system of consent.  
The revised model encourages a proactive approach to consent instead of a 
reactive approach. Kathryn M. Taylor and Merrijoy J. Kelner in the Canadian Medical 
Association Journal conclude that if professionals want to implement ―proactive‖ instead 
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of ―reactive‖ measures towards PGT, then medical organizations and staff have to 
―define clearly the expectations and prerogatives of all physicians. If not, physicians will 
be obligated to respond to rules and regulations imposed from outside the profession, to 
which they are unlikely to adhere.‖4 Thus, consistent and appropriate system changes 
need to be implemented before the revised model can be effective. If there is not adequate 
thought given to the system changes, there can be problems with the implementation and 
adherence of the revised model of consent.  
3. Reimbursement Changes 
In 1982, the President‘s Commission concluded that people were interested in 
knowing their options and discussing their choice and values.
5
 That idea has generally 
stayed constant to encourage disclosure and choices for treatments. Accordingly, Katz 
and Veatch encourage patient participation in choosing treatment options. As a result, 
increased communication through genetic counselors can assist in selecting a suitable 
treatment option for PGT even if the course of action is just continual surveillance.
6
 
Another aspect to address before implementing the revised model is the 
reimbursement policies for counseling. In the current mode, the reimbursement policies 
typically emphasize diagnosis and treatment over prevention.
7 
The current system pays 
for treatments and testing, but not necessarily patient discussions and counseling 
measures.
8
 Arnold and Lidz suggest that the current model has the potential to discourage 
doctors and counselors from spending enough time discussing their options with 
patients.
9
 Hence, disclosure in order to select an appropriate treatment option can be 
compromised.   
299 
 
  However, the revised model has more of an emphasis on prevention in order to 
reduce some of the challenging organizational aspects of the current model. Goetz 
suggests that prevention can help to facilitate appropriate institutional and reimbursement 
policies for counseling and education.
10
 As a result, insurance companies can reimburse 
for proper counseling instead of just diagnosis and procedures.
11
 Right now in the United 
States, doctors are not reimbursed well for talking to patients; they are reimbursed more 
for invasive tests.
12
 Since the revised model is a process, this model will allow more time 
in order to promote patient reflection about the possible options.
13
 It takes time to help 
patients understand their illness, clarify the therapeutic goals, elucidate any false 
perceptions, decide on treatment plan, and answer questions.
14
 As a result, this model 
encourages counselors to set up multiple meetings with patients to discuss any questions 
or concerns. In the United Kingdom, the genetic counseling process involves a flexible 
amount of time with the patients to promote better decision-making about treatment and 
family disclosure options.
15
 Because the revised model encourages more time and 
multiple counseling sessions, in order to adequately implement the revised model, there 
should be more genetic counselors.
16
 However, there cannot be more genetic counselors 
unless the reimbursement policies of counseling change. If counselors are being 
encouraged to spend more time and take on more individuals, in order to implement the 
revised model appropriately, health care systems and insurance organizations need to 
ensure that counselors are reimbursed adequately. If not, the implementation of the 
revised model can suffer.  
4. Measuring the Effectiveness of Implementation  
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The last section looks at how the effectiveness of implementation is measured and 
analyzed. Being able to look at the effectiveness of informed consent is a crucial aspect. 
An article in the American Psychological Association Ethics Rounds suggests that there 
is a relationship between ethics and clinical care. Dr. Stephen Behnke of the American 
Psychological Association says ―good ethics can promote good clinical care.‖17 The 
revised model of informed consent for PGT can improve medical treatments, patient 
outcomes, and ethical decision making about proposed treatments and testing.
18
 The 
improvement of medical care and decision making is one of the most important ways to 
measure the success of the revised model. Because the revised model adds the patient 
safety component to informed consent, the revised model encourages the promotion of 
safety in clinical and research care.  
Also another way to measure the success of the revised model is the addition of 
communication. Because increased communication is promoted in every component, the 
revised model can be analyzed by the level of communication. Since the revised model 
promotes better communication about decision making, the value of communication 
should be the measure by which the model is analyzed instead of by many of the current 
legalistic rules.
19
 Clarke suggests that patient satisfaction is a bad way to measure success 
of counseling, because often patients are receiving bad news.
20
 While the satisfaction of 
the patient might not be high right after receiving certain information, if there is increased 
communication after receiving those results, many patients still feel the informed consent 
was successful. Looking at patient outcomes and the success of communication can be an 
appropriate method of analyzing the success of the revised model of informed consent.  
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In order to encourage a more effective revised model, Lucey and Souba suggest 
―continuous learning and adaptation.‖21 The revised model encourages individuals to 
apply each component of consent to their decision-making process.
22
 While changes of 
systems and attitudes can be difficult, the revised model strives to promote a more ethical 
approach to decision making for informed consent of PGT. The revised process model 
should be a continual ―process where patient insight is developed and re-assessed‖ 
instead of the bureaucratic interferences.
23
 
B. Comparison of the Current and Revised Models 
 In order to recognize the contribution of the revised model of informed consent, 
both models are summarized. This section will look at both the current and revised 
model‘s approach to each component including comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, 
and patient safety. By pointing out the differences among the models, this section will be 
able to identify the role of the revised model and the importance of adopting the revised 
model of consent for PGT. The differences among the models demonstrate the disparities 
between reality and the ethical ideal.
24
  
1. Comprehension 
Comprehension of risk assessment includes autonomy, understanding genetic 
risks, and the doctor-patient relationship. Arnold and Lidz suggest that autonomy and 
beneficence are crucial aspects of both informed consent and ―good medicine.‖25 The 
current model uses a standardized approach to consent that typically focuses on the 
autonomous patient signing a consent form without much discussion. Since this model 
emphasizes the consent form, there is insufficient time and communication for 
understanding the meaning of PGT risk. The current doctor-patient relationship focuses 
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upon the patient freely signing the consent form without sufficient education of the 
patient about the meaning of PGT. On the other hand, the revised model adopts a 
personalized approach to consent that emphasizes extensive discussion with the patient as 
an autonomous agent. The revised model focuses on a process that provides time for 
communication to foster an understanding of the complex meaning of PGT risk. The 
revised model emphasizes the doctor-patient relationship as an interactive process to 
ensure sufficient education of the patient about the meaning of PGT. Howard Brody 
suggests that today‘s culture can help to promote the doctor-patient relationship. He says 
that ―When the physician builds a relationship with the patient in which the power can be 
shared over time, the ground is prepared for ensuring that the patient gets the most benefit 
out of medical care and also exercises autonomy to optimal degree.‖26  
2. Disclosure   
Disclosure to select an appropriate treatment option involves disclosure and 
genetic counseling. The current model focuses on medical information in a standardized 
approach of consent. The current model recommends non-directive counseling, and does 
not require counseling. Whereas, the revised model addresses not only medical 
information but all other relevant information for the patient to consider for consent, 
including the fact that some PGT diseases might not have any available treatment. The 
revised model requires counseling and adopts value transparency and non-directive 
counseling. Genetic counseling along with patient assessment and feedback mechanisms 
can encourage appropriate decision-making.
27
  
3. Voluntariness  
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 While autonomy is promoted for comprehension, too much emphasis on 
individual autonomy can lead to a harmful impact on a patient‘s level of voluntariness.28 
One lesson that can be learned from the Nazi experiments is the fact that no single 
principle should be focused on exclusively and those principles should always be applied 
to actual settings and not too theoretical in nature. Sometimes ethical principles can 
become too abstract and devoid of meaning for individual patients. Glover warns against 
this type of thinking, because this can sometimes cause problems for thinking that leads 
to a possible disconnect between the theoretical and practical ethics principles for 
consent.
29
  
Voluntariness of consent discusses coercion and family-related implications. In 
the current model, there are no specific measures to address or avoid multiple sources of 
external pressures (such as pressures from relatives, the medical staff and community, 
and/or societal influences) which increase the possibility of coercion upon the individual. 
The current model does not take into consideration all family related implications which 
can lead to coercion of family members. Conversely, the revised model addresses 
external pressures on the patient and the family (such as pressures by the family for the 
patient to be tested and pressure upon the family regarding testing outcomes) to alleviate 
or resolve external coercion upon the patient. Because genetic information impacts the 
family, the revised model includes family-related concerns before testing and identifies 
ways to help the patient struggle with family-related PGT information. 
4. Patient Safety  
Patient safety consists of accountability, transparency, trust, and patient safety. 
This is a new component that is not in the current model. Stephen Wear says that even 
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with all the regulating bodies and peer review committees for research that were 
developed in the past, some of the improvements ―were not accomplished without the 
growth of a residual distrust within the society that physicians might use patients as 
guinea pigs.‖30 This last component of consent addresses those issues.  
The revised model of consent requires nationally established systems of 
accountability for PGT that implement the revised components of consent in a transparent 
manner to foster trust in the emerging system of genetic-related services. The revised 
model encourages internal and external accountability by promoting communication 
among medical departments and institutional policies. The revised model requires 
transparency with physician discussions and consent requirements. The revised model 
encourages trust in the organizations and physicians by having open discussions with 
patient participation in the revised consent process. In the revised model, patient safety is 
fostered by having systems of accountability and transparency to establish preventive 
measures as systems that promote the safety of patients considering PGT.   
While everyone agrees that informed consent is important, Sugarman, Jeremy, 
Douglas C. McCrory, Donald Powell, et al. question the reality and adequacy of informed 
consent. The authors state that there is ―uncertainty‖ about the effectiveness of 
implementation, the impact of the current ―theoretical understanding‖ on the value and 
reasonableness of consent, and the measures that might promote meaningful consent.
31
 
However, the revised model of consent addresses each one of those aspects in the 
previous chapters. The revised model of informed consent discusses the inadequacies of 
the current model and identifies ways to resolve the underlying problems in order to 
encourage ethical decision making in the informed consent process for PGT. 
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C. Dissertation Contribution and Future Research  
This dissertation promotes a revised model of informed consent that specifically 
addresses the issues that arise from PGT. Since PGT is a little different than other types 
of genetic testing, having a revised approach to informed consent can help individuals 
come to a better decision about testing. Since PGT often produces a greater level of 
information, the revised model strives to help individuals address and handle 
appropriately the amount of information that results. Often the current model does not 
handle the amount of information well, and often times as a result, the individual is 
confused and makes inappropriate decisions about PGT. However by adopting the 
revised model, individuals can have a greater level of understanding PGT in general, and 
thus the individual will be able to make ethical decisions without coercion and 
misunderstandings. Also by having the new component of patient safety in the revised 
model, the individual considering PGT for research or medical purposes should be able to 
have a greater degree of trust in the medical system and health professionals. Because the 
current model does not specifically emphasize patient safety, the contribution of the 
revised model to safety can greatly impact the future of informed consent.  
The revised model for PGT emphasizes understanding the test, being able to make 
an appropriate decision based on adequate information, eliminating possible sources of 
coercion including family-related coercion, and promoting patient safety through new 
systems. The goal of the revised model of consent is to encourage an ethical decision 
making-process that specifically addresses the distinctive issues of PGT.  
While this dissertation provides the basic components of the revised model of 
consent (comprehension, disclosure, voluntariness, and patient safety), the revised model 
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can be strengthened further by encouraging additional research. First, further research can 
be done analyzing the specific methods of encouraging each component. While this 
dissertation gives specific methods of implementation for each component, additional 
research can propose more methods for encouraging comprehension, disclosure, 
voluntariness, and patient safety. Second, more research should be done to look into the 
revised process of genetic counseling for PGT. Since the revised model of consent 
handles genetic counseling differently, additional research should be done. Research can 
study how to implement the revised approach to counseling, how to handle the 
reimbursement of genetic counseling, and how to get more genetic counselors into the 
field of PGT. Third, more research is needed in order to fully implement a proactive and 
organizational approach to patient safety in informed consent. While many professionals 
might recognize the benefits of taking proactive measures, the health system has not 
completely conformed to this approach yet. Thus, additional research can look into how 
to encourage the application of a systematic, proactive approach to medicine and PGT. 
Since the revised model of consent for PGT cannot be fully implemented until there are 
system changes, this area should encourage significant research for the future.  
Fourth, after implementation of the revised model of PGT, research should be 
conducted analyzing the specific successes and/or failures of the model. Then, if there are 
any risks or failures identified, research can be done to address those failures and seek 
new ways to handle the problems. Fifth, after implementation, research should be done 
comparing and contrasting the effectiveness of both the current and revised model of 
consent in specific situations such as DTC genetic testing and pleiotropic genetic testing. 
These are only a couple of areas identified to encourage additional research. However 
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after analyzing and addressing each area, the revised model of consent can be 
strengthened even further to produce an effective process of informed consent for PGT.   
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